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Executive Summary 
This report addresses the regional dimension to conflicts on the Horn 
of Africa. In particular, it looks at international attempts at addressing 
these conflicts, and the extent to which they have been successful in 
taking into account the regional or cross-border aspects.1 
 
This volume consists of three case studies and a synthesis report. The 
three case studies are entitled ‘Understanding the Gambella Conflict 
Formation’, ‘International Engagement to the Ethiopia–Eritrea Con-
flict’ and ‘IGAD and Regional Peace and Security’. The case studies 
seek to give an overview of the relevant conflict dynamics (for the 
first two cases) and of the structures for and experiences of addressing 
peace and security issues in the case of IGAD (case number three). In 
all the case studies, the role of international actors is an important part 
of the description and analysis. 
 
The synthesis report builds on the three case studies, and seeks to 
draw out general conclusions about the nature of conflicts in the re-
gion, as well as about international engagement and the potential for 
addressing conflicts in a manner that takes into account the regional or 
cross-border perspective. 
The Gambella conflict formation 
The Gambella People’s National Regional State is Ethiopia’s western-
most region, located in the south-western lowlands and bordering Su-
dan. It is one of Ethiopia’s smallest and least populous regions, having 
approximately 307.000 inhabitants according to the 2007 census. The 
region has a long and complex history of conflicts, related to issues 
such as population movement and competition over resources; ethnic-
ity; resettlement programs; relations to the central state; spill over 
from the war in Sudan and refugee influx.  
 
The region’s ethnic composition is complex. In addition to several 
smaller indigenous groups, Gambella has traditionally been dominated 
by the Anuak and the nomadic Nuer, of whom the latter is a relative 
newcomer, moving in from Sudan in search of pasture areas for their 
cattle. The Nuer have only relatively recently outnumbered the Anuak, 
something which is hard to accept for the Anuak who have a strong 
attachment to what they consider their land. Another set of tensions 
stems from the relatively large group of highlanders, i.e. recent immi-
                                                 
1  This research has been funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Section for 
Peace and Reconciliation. 
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grants from the Ethiopian highlands, with distinct linguistic, cultural 
and physical characteristics. Many of the highlanders came to Gam-
bella in the 1980s, through the resettlement program of the Derg. The 
refugee population has fluctuated in response to political develop-
ments in Sudan as well as in Addis Ababa, but at its height it outnum-
bered the non-refugee population. Competition for resources and con-
flicts with local population were of course inevitable, and the ethnic 
composition of the refugees (mostly Nuer, but also Dinka and other 
groups with sometimes uneasy relations with fellow refugees of other 
ethnic backgrounds) have added to the tensions. International refugee 
law also brings the challenging issue of citizenship to the foreground 
as populations have traditionally moved back and forth across the bor-
der in areas with weak state presence. 
 
While ethnic contradictions, stereotyping and enemy images certainly 
are one factor behind the Gambella conflicts, they should not be es-
sentialized as simply ethnic conflicts. On the one hand, there is an im-
portant pattern of cooperation and interdependence between ethnic 
groups, and on the other, there has also been a significant amount of 
intra-ethnic violence. Indeed, over the last years, most violent con-
flicts have been between different Nuer groups (clans and sub-clans, 
ending up in competition over the same resources, due to different 
reasons). The underlying causes of conflicts relate on the one hand to 
such resource conflict emerging from population movements and 
overall increase in numbers of people, and on the other hand, on po-
litical issues related to the ways that the state and central (federal) 
government has attempted to impose control and order. Other underly-
ing causes are the spill-over from the war in Sudan and massive influx 
of refugees, as well as the recent spate of inter-community violence 
and cattle-raiding in Southern Sudan, which also directly involves 
Gambella through cross-border attacks. While the Derg regime ap-
peared to favour the Nuer as well as to some extent the highlanders 
who were resettled in the region, the federalism after 1991 brought a 
new game which initially favoured the Anuak. Gradually, however, 
they have been losing the grip on regional power, as ethnic tensions 
have risen, culminating in the massacre of Anuaks in December 2003. 
The highlanders stand in a curious position with respect to access to 
the power of the state: as a group that is not recognized as endogenous 
to the region, they lack political representation, while as the best-
educated group, they dominate as employees in the administrative 
structures. 
 
The involvement of international actors in the region is limited. For 
the most part, this involvement has been directly linked to the refugee 
situation. UNHCR is the dominant organisation, being assisted by a 
handful of other UN organisations and national and international 
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NGOs. A few of the NGOs have ‘peace programmes’, aimed at ad-
dressing and reducing tensions and conflicts between communities. 
Only one – PACT – has sought to develop a cross-border programme, 
involving communities and authorities on both the Sudanese and 
Ethiopian sides. The difficulties encountered in this work illustrate the 
challenges of applying such a perspective in a complex situation such 
as Gambella.  
International engagement to the Ethiopia--Eritrea conflict 
This case study focuses on the process after the June 2000 ceasefire 
agreement that ended the Ethiopian–Eritrean border war (1998–2000). 
Although the war ended, the border dispute remains and is a key chal-
lenge in the region with ramifications for other conflicts in the Horn of 
Africa.  
 
The Eritrean–Ethiopian war between May 1998 and June 2000 has 
been characterised as a traditional border war over contested territo-
ries. As many as 100,000 people were killed in the intermittent fight-
ing, and up to one million were driven into exile or internal displace-
ment, diverting hundreds of millions from development activities into 
arms procurement. The Algiers agreement of June 2000 not only 
evoked a ceasefire agreement but also called upon the UN to establish 
UNMEE – United Nations Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia. In De-
cember 2000 a second and more comprehensive Algiers agreement 
was signed to aid the prospects for lasting peace. This second Algiers 
agreement also established the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission 
(EECC) and the Eritrean–Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC) to 
determine the origin of conflict and demarcate the border, respec-
tively. The two Algiers agreements stipulate the framework for inter-
national engagement to the Ethiopian–Eritrean conflict. 
 
This case study analyses UNMEE and why it was terminated, to pro-
vide better insights into international engagement in the Ethio–
Eritrean conflict. UNMEE was set up as an observer mission, to moni-
tor the cessation of hostilities and separate the parties by establishing a 
buffer zone. Although war never erupted, the conflict has persisted as 
the parties have never managed to settle the border dispute that ini-
tially triggered the war. UNMEE was, however, detached from engag-
ing practically and politically in mediating the border dispute. This is 
due to the compartmentalisation of the Algiers agreements: while the 
first agreement made UNMEE responsible for monitoring the cease-
fire agreement, EEBC and EECC emanating from the second agree-
ment were to address the border issue and determine the instigator of 
the war.  
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As the situation evolved – notably after EEBC gave its ruling, favour-
ing Eritrea, in April 2002 – UNMEE became increasingly sidelined 
from constructive involvement in the conflict. Whereas Ethiopia was 
supportive to UNMEE and tried to downplay EEBC, Eritrea focused 
on EEBC and the border issue while undermining UNMEE. Eritrea 
imposed restrictions on UNMEE, forcing it to downsize and later to 
relocate from Eritrean territory. Eventually the situation became intol-
erable for UNMEE, which led the Security Council to terminate the 
mission.  
 
Some initiatives outside UNMEE and UN bodies evolved as UNMEE 
found itself facing critical challenges. The Friends of UNMEE group 
was established as an informal gathering of diplomatic missions in 
Addis Ababa, Asmara and New York that met regularly to discuss and 
share information about UNMEE. This group had no role vis-à-vis the 
mission, however. 
 
In 2004 the UN Secretary-General appointed Lloyd Axworthy as spe-
cial envoy for Eritrea and Ethiopia. This diplomatic initiative was un-
successful in trying to merge UNMEE and EEBC.  
 
The few non-UN attempts to address the conflict largely emanate from 
the USA. In 2006 Washington made a unilateral initiative to break the 
impasse by sending Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Jendayi Frazer to the region. Frazer met with Ethiopian political lead-
ership and visited the Ethiopian side of the border region, but was re-
fused meetings with Eritrean leaders, who were unwilling to discuss 
the border issue which they saw as settled by the EEBC.  
 
The witnesses to the last Algiers agreement attempted to address the 
challenges in implementing the accord. The attendance of Eritrean and 
Ethiopian leadership was considered a significant step, but the meet-
ings failed to generate any substantial momentum in implementing the 
agreement or lifting the restrictions put on UNMEE. The parties rather 
used the occasion as a platform to restate their earlier position, show-
ing little inclination to reach an agreement.  
 
International engagement in the Ethiopian–Eritrean conflict has been 
scarce, and predominantly involved UNMEE. The story of UNMEE – 
from its inception, via the challenges it encountered in its wider life-
span, until its termination on 31 July 2008 – is basically the story of 
international engagement to the Ethiopian–Eritrean conflict. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that UNMEE's lack of success is closely linked 
to the fact that it was established by the June 2000 Ceasefire Agree-
ment, and thus had no mandate in relation to the EEBC and the politi-
cal issues arising from it. 
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IGAD, peace and security 
This case study describes and analyzes IGAD from the perspective of 
its role and potential in dealing with conflict, in particular regional or 
cross-border conflict. 
 
IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertifica-
tion) was established by the countries of the wider Horn of Africa 
(Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda) in 1986, 
with relatively narrow mandate. In 1996 it was transformed into 
IGAD, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, a regional 
organisation with a wide mandate, including conflict management and 
resolution as well as preventive diplomacy. 
 
IGAD has had a selective engagement in the region’s peace processes. 
A significant achievement has been its hosting of the peace negotia-
tions leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between 
the Government of Sudan and SPLM in 2005. IGAD played an active 
and constructive role in the process. Since 1997, IGAD has also par-
ticipated in the series of Somali peace processes. While the limited 
achievements of these processes cannot be blamed on IGAD, it is also 
clear that IGAD has not had a particularly strong role in them. The 
absence of IGAD as a key mediator in other conflicts of the region – 
i.e. Ethiopia–Eritrea, Darfur, Northern Uganda – is noteworthy. One 
problem for IGAD has been the ability to appear as an honest and im-
partial broker in conflicts in which so many of the countries of the re-
gion are entangled. 
 
One achievement of IGAD is the establishment of the CEWARN – the 
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism. This is an innova-
tive ‘bottom-up’ system for monitoring and responding to conflicts 
relating to the nomadic populations inhabiting the borderlands be-
tween the countries of the region, which has received considerable 
praise from conflict monitoring experts. This success, however, re-
mains limited to only covering one type of conflicts, and only pockets 
of the region’s vast borderlands. The potential for expanding the scope 
and scaling up may in practice be quite limited. Another security-
related programme is ICPAT, the IGAD Capacity Building Pro-
gramme against Terrorism. This seeks to build the capacities of the 
IGAD member countries and promote regional security cooperation. 
While apparently successful as far as it goes, the programme has been 
characterized as donor-driven.  
 
Thus, while the directly peace- and security-oriented activities of 
IGAD are positive in themselves, they lack the potential to signifi-
cantly alter the underlying causes of conflict or lead to general stabili-
sation of the region. IGAD’s ongoing work of drafting a comprehen-
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sive Peace and Security Strategy appears to point in a similar direc-
tion: any durable peace will have to be built on the creation of strong 
interdependencies among the states, and on development efforts that 
reach out to the marginalised populations of the Horn of Africa. Given 
the current characteristics of the region – weak states with limited ca-
pacity to include and integrate its population groups living in periph-
eral areas, the contradicting interests and ideologies of the regimes, 
the importance of armed insurgent groups, and the shifting alliances 
between these non-state actors and neighbouring states, the vast un-
marked borders, etc. – such a state of affairs is a long way off.  
 
Moreover, these characteristics do not only imply that there is a high 
likelihood that the region will continue to be marked by conflicts. The 
contradictions between the countries of the region also place serious 
limitations on the potential for IGAD to be an important actor for 
promoting peace and security. A prime illustration of this is Eritrea’s 
current suspension of its participation in IGAD. On this background, a 
realistic assessment of IGAD seems to be that it can be successful in 
one-off cases where conditions are favourable, such as with the CPA 
negotiations, or in establishing effective mechanisms at a limited 
scale, as for instance CEWARN. On the other hand, in the short or 
intermediate term one should not expect IGAD to be able assume any 
strong role in resolving the fundamental conflicts of the region. In the 
longer term, though, if IGAD is successful in promoting regional inte-
gration and interconnectedness in infrastructure and economy, 
stronger common interests may emerge that could make IGAD a 
stronger actor. 
Regional dimensions of international engagement in the 
Horn of Africa -- a synthesis 
The conflict-prone character of the region stems from the weaknesses 
and failures of its states in terms of integrating and providing tangible 
benefits to all the groups living within their borders. The continued 
existence of significant population groups alienated from and margin-
alised within the state means that the conditions that give rise to and 
foment conflicts will also continue. The report has sought to demon-
strate that this is the most basic root cause of conflicts on the Horn of 
Africa. Only an inclusive and necessarily long-term development 
process, capable of drawing these groups into the mainstream of the 
states, will be able to significantly change this condition. 
 
A number of related factors contribute to exacerbate and prolong con-
flicts in the region. The weakness of the states in the region and their 
limited presence in and control over their peripheries – the long, un-
demarcated and porous borders of the sparsely populated borderlands; 
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the limited amount of cooperation and interdependencies among the 
countries, and their habit of supporting insurgents of neighbouring 
countries and engage in proxy war – are all characteristics of the re-
gion that serve to prolong conflicts and link them together into com-
plex patterns. Most, if not all, of these conditions can also only be re-
solved in the long term. 
 
In sum then, neither the root causes nor the intermediate contributing 
factors to continued complex conflicts can be resolved, except in the 
long term, through painstaking and uncertain processes of economic 
as well as political development. The conclusion for international ac-
tors seeking to contribute must be twofold: on the one hand, there is a 
need for supporting the kind of long-term processes that eventually 
may transform the region and the logics that underpin continued re-
gional conflict. And on the other hand, individual conflict lines should 
be continually monitored and sought defused and/or contained, to 
limit the entanglement in greater, regional or sub-regional webs. In 
general, the first type of involvement falls outside the scope of this 
report. Nevertheless, it seems useful to emphasize the regional charac-
ter to much of the long-term development that is required. In this 
sense, one relevant strategy would seem to be to support IGAD’s ef-
forts at promoting regional integration.  
 
In the shorter-term attempts at addressing ongoing conflicts – from the 
local to the inter-state level – this report focuses on the international 
and cross-border dimensions. The examples examined do point to a 
number of specific lessons. 
 
Fundamentally, it is difficult for international actors to act regionally. 
For a number of reasons, they are constricted by the state system, and 
tend to operate within the individual state. Due to issues of sover-
eignty, borders must be respected (even though they in practice are 
completely porous and virtually non-existent ‘on the ground’). In par-
ticular when dealing with issues as politically sensitive as armed con-
flict, international actors necessarily must coordinate with and work in 
understanding with the government in question. Cross-border efforts 
consequently become complex affairs. Among other things, important 
requirements are:  
 
– Having a presence on both sides of the border  
– Understanding the conflict dynamics within their social con-
texts on both sides of the border 
– Having communication channels across the border (since in-
ternational organisations are usually set up with communica-
tion lines towards their international headquarters rather than 
to neighbouring countries, and since the border regions we are 
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talking about are generally with extremely limited infrastruc-
ture, this is a complicated requirement) 
– Having the necessary goodwill and go-ahead from government 
institutions on both sides 
– Having the required cross-border or regional perspective and 
the patience and willingness necessary to overcome the bu-
reaucratic hindrances for working in such unorthodox ways 
– Being flexible enough and not limited by mandate, capacity or 
resources to be able to deal with problems within the sectors 
that may prove to be relevant 
 
Thus, it should not be surprising that there are not too many good ex-
amples to be found. Yet, both the PACT and the CEWARN experi-
ences show that it is possible to deal constructively with localized 
cross-border conflicts when the proper institutional set-up is in place. 
At the same time, the examples point to the significant resource re-
quirements involved and the structural difficulties of scaling up. 
 
As for the inter-state conflict level, the experience of the Ethiopia–
Eritrea conflict is that it has been difficult for international actors to go 
beyond the framework established by the Algiers agreements. Since 
this has proved to have limitations, and since the countries themselves 
have shown no willingness to compromise, the situation is still as bit-
ter – and perhaps even more locked – than it was when the war ended 
nine years ago.  
 
However, there may also be some truth to the Eritrean perception, that 
international actors are refraining from putting sufficient pressure on 
Ethiopia to fulfil its obligations according to the Peace Agreement and 
the EEBC, because of Ethiopia’s strategic role as an ally in the US-led 
‘Global War on Terror’. The consequent isolation of Eritrea, and the 
regional spoiler role that the country has taken up – for instance with 
respect to Somalia – can be seen as a very clear negative effect of this 
type of involvement, which is based on own strategic interests rather 
than an analysis of how to contribute to stability in the region.  
 
This points to another fundamental obstacle for good international in-
volvement in seeking to address regional conflict patterns: the diffi-
culty of coordination among actors. When different countries and in-
stitutions have diverging interests and understandings of the conflict 
dynamics, and when short-term strategic interests override more long-
term engagement based on contextual analysis, the potential for con-
structive engagement becomes seriously limited.  
 
Synthesis Report: 
Regional Dimensions of International 
Engagement in the Horn of Africa 
Axel Borchgrevink and Jon Harald Sande Lie 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
 
 
Introduction 
In the Horn of Africa – as in other regions where states are weak – 
conflicts from one country tend to spill over into the neighbouring 
states and become entwined with conflicts there.1 Among the con-
tributory factors are insurgent movements that establish bases in 
neighbouring countries with or without that regime’s support; regimes 
supporting insurgencies in neighbouring countries based on the logic 
of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’; refugee flows; and ethnic groups 
– often with nomadic or semi-nomadic adaptations – that straddle the 
borders. Conflict dynamics within a country are heavily influenced by 
the regional context. Yet, except in the case of open interstate war (as 
with Ethiopia–Eritrea), the international community’s approach to en-
gaging with these conflicts often remains within the framework of the 
individual state.2 That may serve to limit the potential for contributing 
constructively to peace and reconciliation.  
 
This report identifies and analyses experiences where international 
engagement in the dynamics of conflict has managed to transcend the 
one-state-focus to include measures to address the regional context as 
well. It builds on the three empirical studies: of conflicts in Ethiopia’s 
Gambella region and their linkages into Sudan; the conflict between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea; and IGAD as a regional instrument for promot-
ing peace and security. Each of these case studies is presented in sepa-
rate reports: the objective of this overarching paper is to draw general 
conclusions as to the conditions that may facilitate or prevent involved 
                                                 
1  This research has been funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Section for 
Peace and Reconciliation. 
2  For example, even if security issues in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo are 
connected (as in the form of LRA, originating from Uganda but active in both of these 
neighbouring countries), there was at the time when this project was proposed no formal-
ised system of coordination between UNMIS, the UN peacekeeping force in Sudan and 
MONUC, the UN operation in Congo. Since then some measures for coordination have 
been introduced (see de Coning 2008; 2009).  
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international actors from adopting a regional or cross-border frame-
work.3 
 
Analysing the ‘good practices’ we have identified4 and then drawing 
more general conclusions require a systematic way of understanding 
and dealing with various forms of conflicts and of regional linkages. 
The next section discusses elements of such an analytical framework. 
Thereafter we give an overview of the conflict pattern in the Horn of 
Africa, characterising it according to the analytical categories devel-
oped. Subsequently we briefly present a selection of good (and not 
quite so good) examples from the three case studies.  
 
It should be noted that a historical perspective to complement current 
analysis is required to understand the conflict patterns studied. It is 
only through an examination of their historical trajectories that we can 
make sense of the current conflict lines – the first step for any in-
volvement seeking to deal constructively with the situation. However, 
in dealing with examples of good international engagement, we will 
limit ourselves here to presenting current or recent experiences. This 
is in line with the wishes expressed by the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs when commissioning this study, but is also a necessity 
because of the time considerations involved. In the final part of the 
report, we draw some general conclusions from these examples: con-
clusions as to the factors that may facilitate international involvement 
with a regional perspective, as well as on the factors that work against 
this type of involvement. 
Approaches to Interlinked Conflicts 
Conflicts in the Horn of Africa range from interstate conflicts between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia (and between Eritrea and Djibouti), to the large-
scale conflict formation of Somalia, where various clan, religious and 
ideological groups are pitted against each other and where both 
neighbouring population groups, countries and extra-regional actors 
are involved, to small-scale conflicts ostensibly about local groups 
competing over resources. Moreover, through various mechanisms – 
which may involve strategic alliances, population movements, compe-
tition for territorial control, and proxy war – these conflicts become 
entwined in complex patterns. Furthermore, it could be argued that, at 
a deeper level, all conflicts stem from the failure of the states in the 
region to include all groups into a national project, and that, in the ab-
                                                 
3  The three case studies are described in separate papers, enclosed with this synthesis re-
port. The case study papers contain further references and more material on the empirical 
background of each case. 
4  While we originally envisioned conducting this analysis in terms of ‘best practices’, the 
specific cases examined and the empirical material collected are not really sufficient to 
enable conclusions in the superlative – ‘best’ – sense. Instead, we have opted for the more 
modest ambition of discussing good practices. 
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sence of such an inclusive project, the dynamics of the conflicts de-
pend largely on the way the states seek to govern and maintain control 
over their territories. 
 
An analytical grasp of these conflict patterns is necessary as a basis 
for the analysis of international engagement in the region. In the fol-
lowing, brief reference will be made to central theory contributions 
that can help to lay the foundation for such an analysis. Thereafter, an 
eclectic use will be made of these insights to build up a model for un-
derstanding the specific nature of the conflicts of Horn of Africa.  
 
A central theoretical approach for understanding regional patterns of 
conflict is the Regional Security Complex Theory, as developed by 
Buzan and Wæver (Buzan 1991, Buzan and Wæver 2003). Buzan 
originally defined a ‘regional security complex’ as ‘a group of states 
whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that 
their national security concerns cannot reasonably be considered apart 
from each other’ (Buzan 1983: 106, quoted in Buzan and Wæver 
2003: 44). In order to ‘shed the state-centric and military-political fo-
cus’, Buzan and Wæver have reformulated the definition as follows: 
 
a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, de-
securitisation, or both are so interlinked that their security 
problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from 
each other’ (ibid.). 
 
This definition retains the main idea of security concerns as being en-
twined in such a way that that they need to be understood in conjunc-
tion. By referring to processes of securitisation and de-securitisation, 
the new definition gives additional emphasis to the idea that security 
concerns are not objective and given, but rather consist of perceptions 
of threats that are socially constructed. Despite this ‘constructivist fla-
vour’, there is a clear positivist bias in their theory, which seems to 
insist that Regional Security Complexes have an objective existence 
and can be clearly delimited on the map, without allowing for any 
overlap between complexes. In their discussion of whether there exist 
regional security complexes in sub-Saharan Africa, Buzan and Wæver 
tentatively conclude that a Southern African complex can be identi-
fied, whereas the West African and Horn of Africa regions are not 
fully developed and must be characterised as ‘proto-complexes’ 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003: Chapter 8).5 
 
                                                 
5  During the Cold War, the Horn was even less regionally consolidated, they claim. Since at 
that time there was little interaction between the Ethiopia–Sudan and the Ethiopia–
Somalia conflict dynamics, they characterise the Horn during this period as forming a pre-
complex only. 
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However, Buzan and Wæver are cautious about applying their theory 
to Africa. Despite their reformulation of the definition which provides 
an opening for actors other than the state, they question whether the 
underlying focus on states and their territories is really adequate for 
understanding the African context. On the one hand, the weakness of 
African states in terms controlling their territories and peoples, the 
lack of meaningful borders, and the key role played by non-state ac-
tors would indicate that the real security story to be told from Africa is 
not one based on a Westphalian framework, but one that can bring 
‘into view networks of non-state actors and their systems of security 
interaction’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 223). In analysing the African 
context, Buzan and Weaver put the emphasis on the sub-state level. 
However, it is by no means certain that their perspective is particularly 
suited to this focus; and, as pointed out by Rubin (2006: 5), many of 
the non-state actors may be better conceptualised as ‘transnational’ 
rather than ‘sub-state’. Furthermore, the neat delimitation of a South-
ern African regional security complex and a Horn proto-complex has 
been challenged by events on the ground. As warfare in the ‘insulator 
countries’6 of Central Africa and the Great Lakes region has expanded 
into and links up with conflicts in the complexes to the north and to 
the south, it has become increasingly difficult to uphold the notion of 
independently existing regional complexes that can be unambiguously 
delimited without any overlap.  
 
Thus, while the theory of Buzan and Wæver is the most developed 
among perspectives on regional conflict patterns, it may not be opti-
mal for analysing African cases. Various alternative approaches exist: 
these include Lake and Morgan’s regional orders approach (1997);7 
Wallensteen and Sollenberg’s regional conflict complexes (1998);8 
Tavares’ regional peace and security clusters (2008);9 Rubin’s re-
gional conflict formations (2006);10 and Duffield’s concept of network 
wars (2001).11 Moreover, much of the recent literature on regionalism, 
while ostensibly focusing on integration and cooperation rather than 
conflict, contains perspectives that may be useful for understanding 
regional conflicts – for instance, Bach’s notion of trans-state regional-
ism (2003).12  
 
                                                 
6  In Buzan and Wæver’s terminology, an ‘insulator’ is a state or unit that separates two 
security complexes without being part of either of them (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 41). 
7  Less rigid, allowing for states’ multiple membership and overlapping complexes, but even 
more state-centric than Buzan and Wæver’s version. 
8  Focusing on spill-over effects of civil wars. 
9  With emphasis on developing a formal and comprehensive model encompassing types of 
actors as well as patterns of threats and security, peace and war. 
10  Highlighting the importance of transnational non-state actors. 
11  Referring to complex networks spanning local and global interests, closely linked to sys-
tems of liberal governance aimed at protecting the borders of the ‘ordered world’.  
12  Bringing together ideas of neo-patrimonialism and regionalism, the concept refers to the 
transnational or interstate use of public office for private gain. 
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A regional conflict formation is a set of transnational conflicts that 
form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other across state bor-
ders and throughout a region, making for more protracted conflicts 
(CIC 2001). The regional conflict formation model draws on four key 
observations. First, today’s armed conflicts tend to be regional. Sec-
ond, regional conflict formations are characterised by regional and 
global political, military, economic and social networks. Third, a re-
gional conflict management strategy addresses the geographical and 
functional elements of such formations. Fourth, a regional approach 
engages regional and/ or sub-regional states, intergovernmental or-
ganisations and civil society networks (see CIC 2001: 5–6).   
 
The regional conflict formations approach holds that conflicts are nei-
ther local, civil nor intrastate, and may cross national boundaries. 
Linkages among local, regional and global actors facilitate the trans-
national aspects of such formations, including international involve-
ment in these. Global factors – like the policies of external states, de-
velopment agencies and financial institutions – can aggravate regional 
conflict processes, for example by facilitating cross-border migration 
of refugees, civilians and armed groups. Conflict can be exacerbated 
by local actors’ involvement in transnational activities that connect 
them to regional and global forces. This is particularly evident in 
situations of weak states, porous borders, persistent cross-border mi-
gration and contested citizenships. The regional conflict formation ap-
proach thus proposes that international involvement should be integra-
tive and regionally aware, taking into account the linkages and net-
works of conflict within the region and sub-regions. In operational 
terms, it recommends that conflict management policies should ad-
dress military, political, economic and humanitarian factors in con-
flicts – ‘policymakers must be aware of the potential regional impact 
of any strategy focused primarily on a single country’ (CIC 2001: 6).  
 
This is not the place for a comprehensive review of these theories and 
approaches, nor do we believe that any one of them holds the final 
truth while the others are simply mistaken. In our view, all of these 
approaches contribute to understanding different aspects of regional 
conflicts. As we have no ambition of constructing a general theory to 
fit all regions, we will limit ourselves to selecting elements from them 
to help in characterising and understanding the conflict patterns of the 
Horn of Africa.  
 
We do, however, propose a general amendment to the various ap-
proaches: that regional conflicts, the actors involved and the scope of 
conflict should be supplemented by an inductive and bottom-up ap-
proach. This is both to underline the basic finding of our case studies 
as well as to address the challenges evolving from them. A regional 
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conflict pattern is not a priori given and cannot solely be addressed 
top-down. Here we may note that the securitisation theory of Buzan 
and Wæver asserts that ‘by definition, something is a security problem 
when the elites declare it to be so’ (Wæver 1995: 54). Such an elitist 
approach disregards the way in which conflicts are understood and 
articulated in non-elite spheres. Like the other approaches to regional 
conflicts, it also undercuts how different temporal and spatial contexts 
make various conflict aspects relevant. This is illustrated by the case 
of Gambella, one conflict among many within the Horn of Africa: the 
protracted conflict trajectory shows that the conflict has produced and 
been produced by a whole range of factors, like ethnicity, interstate 
relations, the Sudan civil wars, the influx of refugees, and the intro-
duction of federalism and its political system. Let us now proceed 
with a brief overview of conflict patterns on the Horn of Africa. 
Conflict Patterns of the Horn of Africa 
The Horn of Africa – Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan – 
has experienced both intra- and interstate conflicts. Since the demise 
of Barre in 1991, Somalia has been characterised by the lack of an 
overarching state, and fluctuating levels of conflicts (usually been 
clan-based) between various groups. Parallel to this, Somalia has ex-
perienced the growth (and dispersal) of a range of governance systems 
intended to resolve problems of order, security and predictability. 
Most successful in this respect were the Union of Islamic Courts, 
which did offer some vision of an overarching authority with some 
independence from the clan system. This, however, resulted in reli-
gious-ideological conflict lines that sparked the attention of outside 
actors. In late 2006, Ethiopian soldiers crossed the border in support 
of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) backed by the USA. 
This evoked echoes of the Ogaden War (1977–78), when Somalia in-
vaded Ethiopia with the purpose of annexing the Somali-inhabited 
Ogaden region. The Ethiopian invasion was also directly linked to on-
going conflicts between insurgent groups in the Ethiopian Somali re-
gion and the Ethiopian government. 
 
Ethiopia and Eritrea may be said to constitute the main belligerent 
states in the Horn. There is a long historical trajectory here. Starting in 
the 1960s and 70s, insurgent groups from northern Ethiopia and Eri-
trea (at the time annexed as an Ethiopian province) fought against the 
Ethiopian government, seeking to topple the dictatorial Derg regime in 
Addis Ababa (occasionally also fighting among themselves). In 1991 
they were successful and the Tigrayan liberation movement assumed 
power at the national level, while Eritrea in 1993 received its inde-
pendence under the peaceful auspices of a referendum, led by the Eri-
trean movement. However, cordial relations between the new Eritrean 
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and Ethiopian regimes soon deteriorated, cumulating in an all-out bor-
der war in 1998. Although a peace agreement was signed in 2000, po-
litical relations between the two have remained hostile.  
 
In 2008, border conflict erupted between Eritrea and Djibouti. This 
was triggered by Eritrean forces penetrating the border in April and 
fortified positions on the Djiboutian side. Between June 10 and 13, 
armed forces of the two countries clashed in the border area.  
 
These interstate conflicts produce and are produced by domestic fac-
tors that exacerbate established lines of conflict, but they also have 
global geopolitical ramifications. Whereas in the 1970s and 80s the 
Horn was an arena where Cold War rivalries were played out, it has 
today become one of the battlefields of the US-led ‘Global War on 
Terror’ and the accompanying struggle to contain radical Islam. 
Washington has been considering putting Eritrea on its list of terrorist-
supporting states, while Ethiopia on the other hand enjoys consider-
able US support from committing itself to the war on terror. Eritrea is 
accused of supporting militant rebel groups and terrorists in Somalia, 
while Eritrea asserts it is being attacked by rebel groups operating 
from Somalia and Djibouti with financial and military support from 
Ethiopia. This has led many to characterise the Somalia conflict as an 
Ethiopia–Eritrea proxy war.  
 
To the West, Sudan has been plagued by conflicts almost continuously 
since its creation as a state. The most durable and important line of 
conflict has gone between the North and the South, but the eruption of 
the Darfur conflict has added a further dimension. The conflict in East 
Sudan should not be forgotten, either. The overall picture seems to 
support the idea that the main conflict dimension is really between a 
powerful centre and its marginalised peripheries. The Khartoum strat-
egy of managing insurgencies in its peripheries by arming local oppo-
nents of the insurgents has created a complex conflict pattern at the 
local levels. The Sudanese conflicts have also spilled over into 
neighbouring countries.  
 
On the western frontier of the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia’s Gambella 
region, bordering Sudan, has been affected by local and regional con-
flict for many decades, involving both state and non-state actors. Con-
flicts between indigenous groups along and within ethnic lines and the 
influx of Sudanese refugees following the two Sudanese civil wars 
point up the challenges that may emanate from conflicts not directly 
involving central state politics. Refugees and trans-border migration 
also destabilise the Eritrea–Sudan border. The tensions arising out of 
the state-building processes in South Sudan are now leading to a series 
of new local and national-scale conflicts. 
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Sudanese conflicts are also entangled in other directions. Darfur rebel 
groups are supported by diasporas in neighbouring countries. The Dar-
fur problematique, which involves both rebel groups and refugees 
seeking shelter in neighbouring Chad, is addressed by MINURCAT, a 
UN mission meant to deal with challenges in both Chad and the Cen-
tral African Republic. This border region is further destabilised by the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) emanating from Uganda. Uganda, in 
turn, shares a long border with DR Congo and has been involved in 
and affected by the conflicts there. Northeast in Uganda, overlapping 
into Sudan, Kenya and Ethiopia, conflicts and killings are the result of 
clashes between the Karamoja and other nomadic or cattle-keeping 
tribes. Similar problems affect the border area between Kenya, Ethio-
pia and Somalia.  
 
To complete the picture, there are various internally-generated con-
flicts within Ethiopia. These include the OLF and ONLF struggles 
against the government, as well as the Gambella conflict between the 
Anuaks and peoples of the Ethiopian highlands. 
 
These diverse examples demonstrate the vast array and types of con-
flicts in the wider Horn of Africa. While it is difficult to isolate the 
historical and geographical ramifications of one conflict vis-à-vis oth-
ers, that does not mean that the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are dis-
entangled from conflicts outside the region. The overview illustrates 
the problem of delineating a conflict pattern to a specific geographical 
region, as there would inevitably be a range of internal and external 
factors affecting each other, rendering any delineation reductionist.  
 
Furthermore, this array of conflicts and the variety of state and non-
state actors involved direct attention to the problem of conceptualising 
such regional patters. The literature referred to above on security 
complexes and regional conflict complexes has tended to treat such 
complexes as somewhat pre-empirically given, reducing non-state, 
armed actors to ‘rebels’ in ‘civil wars’. This is a simplification that 
blocks insight into the true complexity of the situations (Ulriksen 
2009: 3), and undermines attempts to complement the elitist, state-
centric and military-political focus with a bottom-up approach to con-
flict patters. Rather, in these approaches, such complexes appear to 
have an objective existence, clearly delimited on the map, and in some 
cases even without overlapping with other complexes. The point to be 
made here is that the actual complexity of conflicts and the ways in 
which they interrelate make any such positivistic delineation of com-
plexes reductionist in terms of physical extension, the plethora of ac-
tors involved, and the variety of causes and conflict lines. A whole 
series of factors interplay in forming the regional conflict pattern on 
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the Horn of Africa. Although not an exhaustive list, some of these, 
and ways to understand them, are indicated below. 
Key points on the Horn of Africa pattern of conflicts: 
1. No single conflict can be understood in isolation. 
2. On the other hand, the overall systematic-ness should not be 
exaggerated. The Horn of Africa pattern of conflicts cannot be 
understood as a bounded and closed system. Conflicts in the 
region are entangled with conflicts outside the region across 
most of its borders. Conversely, conflicts at one end of the re-
gion – e.g. Sudan – may have little direct entanglement with 
conflicts at the other end – Somalia. 
3. Determining conflict interrelatedness and demarcating conflict 
patterns should be based on a bottom-up analysis that identi-
fies the various ramifications of one conflict into others.  
4. Almost all conflicts can be traced to a failure of the centre of a 
state to integrate its peripheries. 
5. Weak control by the states over their borderlands provides im-
portant preconditions for the conflict dynamics, especially the 
cross-border entanglements. 
6. A further complicating factor is found in the existence of vari-
ous groups whose territories straddle a national border. All the 
region’s borders have examples of this. The fact that many of 
these are nomadic groups who move from place to place adds 
to the complexity. 
7. The Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict, being primarily a classic inter-
state war, is something of an anomaly in the region, although it 
has become entangled with and has sought to use other con-
flicts in proxy strategies. 
8. Taking account of historical trajectories is fundamental for un-
derstanding conflict dynamics (and hence for devising strate-
gies for dealing with them). 
9. An important aspect of this is the way that security perceptions 
are socially constructed in historical processes of securitisa-
tion, such as the creation of enemy images. 
10. Some conflicts may seem easily categorised as simply ethnic, 
clan-based, or a continuation of traditions of cattle-rustling; 
however, closer examination generally reveals a far more 
complicated set of reasons, with competition for land and/or 
political resources, sparked by the state’s changing attempts at 
regulation and governance, among the most important. 
11. The rationales underpinning protracted conflicts and conflict 
areas may vary over time. Conflict between the same groups 
can at different stages play out as a conflict over resources, 
livelihood, ethnicity and/or politics.   
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12. Compared to many other conflict regions, securing access to 
and control over the exploitation of extractive resources is less 
of a driving force in conflict in the Horn of Africa. Oil re-
sources in Sudan have changed this picture somewhat.13 Still, 
the need for physical installations and control over transport 
lines of the bulky product makes this more a game for gov-
ernments than for the average non-state actor. 
13. It is important to understand how local grievances and drivers 
of conflict intersect with global structures and interests. While 
the role of political Islam has long been important in internal 
Sudan conflicts, since 9/11 this has become perhaps the key 
factor structuring the overall conflict dynamics of the region. 
Gambella 
Gambella is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia. The 
regional conflict pattern in shaped by several interconnected issues, 
including transnational migration, the civil wars in neighbouring Su-
dan, the ethnic composition, identity politics and political representa-
tion, and quarrels over land rights and resources, as well as relations to 
the highlanders and the Ethiopian central state. Understanding the cur-
rent conflict pattern in Gambella requires a diachronic approach that 
takes into account the trajectory of the various factors in order to clar-
ify their interrelated bearing on current and recent conflicts.  
 
It should also be borne in mind that there are significant elements of 
reciprocity and complementary socio-economic relations and ex-
changes among the various groups in Gambella, and that, for the most 
part, Gambella today is a fairly peaceful region. However, conflict 
erupts regularly and is a facet that underpins daily life: the ever-
present potential makes conflict a dominant pattern of intergroup rela-
tions (Feyissa 2008). Conflict and violence find expression in various 
fields of social interaction – from villages to churches, from schools to 
political parties – in ways ranging ‘from the complete destruction of 
villages to rioting in the schools; from targeting minors and the raid-
ing of public transports to the crucifixion of individuals to humiliate 
the group to which they belong’ (ibid.: 148). The underlying tension 
has become part of everyday life. In recent years, once conflicts have 
erupted, they have tended to take on a more violent form, with bomb-
ing and massacres. Main parties are the dominant ethnic groups of the 
Nuer and the Anuak, both endogenous to Gambella, and the more re-
cently arrived highlanders.  
 
                                                 
13  As may likewise be the effect of ongoing oil exploration in Ethiopia’s Somali and Gam-
bella regions. 
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Gambella can be seen as an example for one of the most, if not 
utmost, complex regions in Ethiopia with regard to contempo-
rary political conflicts. Its status as a border region, its multi-
ethnic composition, its exposure to the Sudanese civil war and 
the inner-Ethiopian dynamics between centre and periphery, as 
well as the developments in oil drilling, contributed to the re-
cent extension of the conflict in the area. Each of these causes 
and events is equally important for the understanding of the 
region and should never be seen as separate from each other 
(Meckelburg 2006: 7) 
  
The conflict situation in Ethiopia’s Gambella region shows an intri-
cate web of interrelated and overlapping conflict factors, pivoting 
around ethnicity, federalism, resource conflicts and cross-border link-
ages. The latter is epitomised by the numerous refugees and camps 
established during the Sudanese civil war, which now – after the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 – are in process of 
repatriation and closure. The Gambella pattern of conflicts should also 
be seen in the historical context of the past two decades of factional 
fighting and intercommunity violence, which exacerbate and are exac-
erbated by interstate dimensions. The complex conflict pattern unfold-
ing in Gambella shows how various aspects originating in their par-
ticular setting form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other 
throughout a broader region, leading to more protracted and obdurate 
conflicts (Rubin 2006). Gambella’s conflict patterns are not restricted 
to the clash of internal and external factors. Conflicts over political 
representation, land entitlement, resources, and different and conflict-
ing modes of production do not necessarily emanate from particular 
localities, but follow various divisions, sometimes ethnic, integral to 
the society of Gambella itself. Moreover, with the exception of politi-
cal representation, these intra-societal conflict lines are also found 
across the border in neighbouring Sudan. The historical and mutual 
transnational migration of ethnic groups, as well as the influx from 
Sudan to Gambella of refugees as a consequence of the Sudanese civil 
war, means that citizenship and political representation become im-
portant denominators and explanatory factors for the current regional 
conflict formation. The key point here is that not only does citizenship 
grant certain political privileges, but the status as refugee also conveys 
certain entitlements in terms of access to basic services provided by 
the international community. The regional conflict pattern articulated 
in Gambella should be understood against the backdrop of the possi-
bilities and entitlements provided by ethnic belonging and citizenship. 
As this case study shows, these conflict lines transgress and interre-
late, causing challenges for how the international society can address 
the regional dimensions of conflict. The weakness of state structures 
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on both sides contributes to the complex interplay across the borders, 
while also making it more complicated to deal with these conflicts. 
Good International Engagement in Gambella 
International presence in the Gambella region has been limited. 
Among the NGOs working in the region we find various examples of 
‘peace programmes’ or projects. These range from seeking resolution 
to specific cases of resource competition between different groups, 
through arranging mediation and peace talks with the assistance of 
local elders, church leaders and other respected persons, to pro-
grammes that seek to establish connections and peaceful interaction 
between and among groups by arranging sports competitions and 
similar events. Although we are not in a position to judge the quality 
and results of these programmes, they undoubtedly respond to a need 
within this turbulent region.  
 
The focus in this report, however, is on the international engagement 
that addresses the cross-border aspects of conflicts in the region. 
Many of the international organisations active here work with refu-
gees, which in a sense is a cross-border issue in itself. Still, simply 
dealing with the needs of the refugees in their situation within Ethio-
pia cannot be counted as having a ‘cross-border’ perspective. Seen in 
this light, there are few examples of good international engagement 
from a regional perspective in Gambella. One main reason is that this 
is a peripheral region where the number of international actors is 
small, and their capacity for dealing with issues is over-extended sim-
ply through handling local matters. The two ‘good cases’ we have 
identified are the repatriation programme of refugees in the Gambella 
camps, organised by the UNHCR; and the PACT, which has operated 
a cross-border peace programme for some years. 
 
The UNHCR repatriation programme involves organising refugees on 
the Ethiopian side for voluntary return, while in parallel work is ongo-
ing on the Sudanese side, with various UN organisations mapping 
conditions for return as well as facilitating the arrival of returnees and 
supporting them during the re-establishment phase. Coordination 
meetings are held among the organisations working on both sides. To 
prepare refugees for return, and help them make the decision on 
whether to return, ‘go-and-see’ visits are arranged, where selected rep-
resentatives of the refugees are sent to their home areas to see for 
themselves what conditions are like, before returning and informing 
their fellow camp residents. Reportedly, there have also been in-
stances where already resettled returnees have been brought back to 
the camp to tell about their experiences. At least in theory, this would 
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sound like a solid way of working constructively in tandem on both 
sides of the border.  
 
Reality may be somewhat different, however. Yearly meetings across 
the border between a few representatives of the various UN organisa-
tions are not really sufficient to ensure smooth coordination. Go-and-
see visits appear to be more the exception than the rule, and we did 
not hear of any specific instances of resettled returnees actually having 
come back to the Fugnido camp (which was visited) to inform the 
refugees there. Refugees we interviewed generally appeared highly 
concerned about the security situation in South Sudan and the uncer-
tainties of return, and not at all reassured by the mechanisms that had 
been established. Thus, while the programme has succeeded in organ-
ising the voluntary return of a large number of refugees in a situation 
with extremely weak institutions on the receiving side, practice is too 
far from that presented to be able to qualify it as ‘best practice’. 
 
PACT started working in Gambella because they already had an active 
programme in South Sudan with a significant peace-making compo-
nent, focused inter alia on arranging peace conferences between eld-
ers and leaders of different ethnic groups or communities. Given the 
conflict situation in Gambella, and the many links to South Sudan, it 
was actually the SPLM that requested that PACT’s peace programme 
be extended to the Ethiopian side. In addition to establishing a similar 
programme within Gambella, PACT has also sought to address cross-
border linkages directly, by establishing a specific cross-border com-
ponent. By focusing on specific ‘corridors’ linking clusters of con-
flicts on both sides, PACT has sought to implement its peace pro-
gramme across the border. This includes ‘conflict mapping and analy-
sis’; dialogue involving elders, leaders and traditional reconciliation 
mechanisms; religious dialogue using the churches as well as tradi-
tional religious leaders; and establishing contacts and exchanges be-
tween the authorities on both sides.14  
 
In many ways, this is a model programme in terms of the perspectives 
that underlie this study. For PACT, it has been possible to develop the 
programme because they have had a presence and been involved in 
similar activities on both sides. Still, in an area with extremely limited 
infrastructure on both sides, the cross-border component has been de-
scribed as particularly challenging and exhausting to implement, with 
special requirements in terms of time and of dedicated staff with in-
depth knowledge of local cultures and conditions. While some good 
                                                 
14  PACT’s Peace II programme, implemented in the border areas between Kenya, Ethiopia 
and Somalia, is something of a precursor and inspiration to the Gambella cross–border 
component. Peace II is a more advanced programme, with 10–15 years experience in its 
area, and linking together a host of different organisations and institutions in its activities. 
CEWARN’s Somali cluster (see below) draws on this experience.  
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results have been obtained, PACT representatives have been modest in 
speaking about the results and whether they justify the resource in-
puts. For the present study, this is a quite sobering fact, indicating 
both certain preconditions for successfully addressing this type of 
cross-border conflict, as well as the inherent difficulties of such a task. 
Ethiopia--Eritrea 
For almost three decades, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fought 
against the Ethiopian military dictatorship known as the Derg (1974–
1991). After jointly toppling the Derg regime, the two parties went on 
to pursue separate goals. The TPLF became the dominant party in the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that 
assumed, and still maintains, government office in Addis Ababa. In 
agreement with the EPRDF government, the EPLF prepared Eritrea’s 
secession from Ethiopia. In 1993, Eritrea became independent from 
Ethiopia in a peaceful process involving a referendum. In 1998, how-
ever, a border war erupted between the two states, turning the ‘broth-
ers in arms’ into ‘brothers at war’ and marking the start of a protracted 
conflict with major ramifications for security, regional cooperation 
and relations among the countries of the Horn of Africa. Resolving – 
or at least containing – the Eritrean–Ethiopian conflict is seen as cru-
cial in order to prevent ‘…the dangerous escalation of regional con-
flicts’ – as with regard to Somalia, the Sudan and the implementation 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as the Darfur vio-
lence which continues to rage and even spill over into Chad (Lyons 
2006:3).  
 
The Eritrean–Ethiopian war between May 1998 and June 2000 has 
been characterised as a traditional border war over contested territo-
ries. The belligerents focused explicitly on the border issue as their 
main concern. The international involvement in this conflict perceived 
the conflict as solely one over a disputed international border, and re-
sponded to it as such. However, analysts have pointed out that the war 
was the inevitable culmination of accumulated factors in the Eritrean–
Ethiopian relationship since Eritrean independence – factors like 
Ethiopia’s access to Eritrean harbours, and Eritrea shifting from 
Ethiopian currency to its own currency and thereby affecting taxation, 
border trade and import/export relations. Others claim the war was 
over rival hegemonic claims in the Horn of Africa, national pride and 
territorial integrity. By 1998, relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
were in a poor state. ‘The classic imperatives of state- and nation-
building drove both regimes to set forth unconditional goals and re-
fuse compromise on those questions and the vital issue of territorial-
ity, legitimacy and identity’ (Lyons 2006: 6). In fact, Eritrea, as Af-
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rica’s newest state, has had border disputes with all its neighbours: 
with Djibouti, Ethiopia and Sudan, as well as with Yemen, across the 
Red Sea.  
 
In May 1998, war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in and over 
the disputed and symbolically important border town of Badme. 
Ethiopian authorities saw Eritrea’s territorial annexation of Badme as 
illegal, and the skirmish soon escalated into outright warfare. After 
intermittent fighting and a period of stalemate and unproductive nego-
tiations, Ethiopia launched a major offensive in May 2000, breaking 
through Eritrean defence lines and forcing the army back to pre-May 
1998 positions, whereupon Ethiopia withdrew its army to its original 
position. As many as 100,000 people were killed in the intermittent 
fighting, and up to one million were driven into exile or internal dis-
placement, diverting hundreds of millions from development activities 
into arms procurement.  
Good International Engagement to the Eritrea–Ethiopia Conflict 
International involvement in the Eritrean–Ethiopian conflict has cen-
tred on the United Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). Hence, 
the story of UNMEE – from its inception, via the challenges it en-
countered in its wider lifespan, until its termination on 31 July 2008 – 
is basically the story of international engagement in this conflict. It is 
difficult to identify and separate the good from the not-so-good inter-
national engagements here. Instead, our case study analyses UNMEE 
and why it was terminated, to provide better insights into international 
engagement in the Ethio–Eritrean conflict.  
 
On 18 June 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a ceasefire agreement. 
The agreement was brokered and ratified in Algiers, as Algeria at the 
time chaired the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). This June 
agreement not only produced a cessation of hostilities, it also paved 
the way for future international engagement in the conflict: the Algiers 
agreement called upon the United Nations to establish a peacekeeping 
mission – UNMEE – to establish and monitor a 25 km buffer zone 
separating the parties. The Algiers talks continued, with the aim of 
turning the cessation of hostilities agreement into a more final and 
comprehensive peace agreement. The United States played a promi-
nent role in these talks, and Anthony Lake was appointed special en-
voy due to the Clinton administration’s close relationship to the Eri-
trean and Ethiopian leadership. Under the auspices of an internation-
ally brokered agreement, a second and more comprehensive Algiers 
agreement was signed in December 2000. To aid the prospects for 
lasting peace, this second Algiers agreement also established the Eri-
trea–Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) and the Eritrean–Ethiopian 
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Boundary Commission (EEBC) to determine the origin of conflict and 
demarcate the border, respectively. The two Algiers agreements stipu-
late the framework for international engagement to the Ethiopian–
Eritrean conflict. In-between the two Algiers agreements, the UN Se-
curity Council authorised UNMEE, before the second Algiers agree-
ment established the EECC and EEBC.  
 
The Algiers agreements, their witnesses (OAU, EU, UN, Algeria, and 
the USA) and the institutions they produced (UNMEE, EEBC, EECC) 
can be said to demonstrate good and rapid international engagement. 
The compartmentalisation of the two agreements, however, came to 
create complications, allowing the situation to deteriorate. When, in 
2002, the EEBC ruling was made, UNMEE had no role in implement-
ing or enforcing the decision. This opened the way for the long drawn-
out stalemate since then. While Eritrea gradually imposed restrictions 
on UNMEE and advocated implementing the EEBC decision, Ethio-
pia refused to talk about the EEBC and the contested border issue, and 
focused on UNMEE instead. This raised problems for UNMEE – as 
the only permanent international presence – because it required the 
consent of both host governments to operate across the border. Al-
though neither country ever formally withdrew their consent, the dete-
riorating circumstances UNMEE was faced with gradually impeded 
on the mission and its ability to deliver according to its mandate.  
 
Armed conflict never erupted. Since both parties respected the cessa-
tion of hostilities agreement, interest in the underlying conflict faded. 
The international community paid too little attention to the challenges 
of implementing the Algiers agreements and its provisions to lay the 
foundation for a comprehensive peace process. The Algiers agree-
ments never become converted into a political process to establish 
comprehensive peace: they maintained the political stalemate and pro-
tracted the tensions. As the situation unfolded, UNMEE – the only 
actor continuously engaged in the conflict – proved insufficiently 
equipped to cope, as it had not been mandated to implement the rul-
ings of EECC or EEBC. UNMEE gradually lost momentum for en-
gaging the parties. A critical factor was that it had never been 
equipped with a political mandate allowing it to mediate with the par-
ties. The mission acted in accordance with its designated mandate as 
authorised by the Security Council. As mandates serve as straitjackets 
at the mission level, it was only the Security Council in New York that 
would have been in a position to change the ground rules and allow 
UNMEE to re-engage in the conflict.  
 
Some initiatives outside UNMEE and UN bodies evolved as UNMEE 
found itself facing several challenges that serve to direct attention 
back to the conflict. The group Friends of UNMEE was established, as 
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an informal group of diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa, Asmara 
and New York that met regularly to discuss and share information 
about UNMEE. This group had no role vis-à-vis the mission, how-
ever. 
 
As a response to concerns about the lack of progress in implementing 
the Algiers agreement, the UN Secretary-General in 2004 appointed 
Lloyd Axworthy as special envoy for Eritrea and Ethiopia. This dip-
lomatic initiative was unsuccessful. It attempted to merge UNMEE 
and EEBC, as their compartmentalisation (stemming from their sepa-
rate Algiers agreements) was seen as problematic to the peace process. 
Eritrea, however, saw this as an attempt to use diplomatic dialogue as 
a pretext for amending, revising or reversing established agreements – 
particularly the EEBC decision, which was seen to favour Eritrea, 
even though both parties had agreed that its ruling was to be final and 
binding.  
 
The few non-UN attempts to address the conflict have largely come 
from the USA. After Eritrea imposed restrictions on UNMEE and 
some troop-contributing countries were advocating that the mission be 
withdrawn, Washington in 2006 responded with an improvised unilat-
eral initiative to break the impasse. The US ambassador to the UN, 
John Bolton, asked the Security Council to delay any action while 
Washington sent Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jen-
dayi Frazer and Marine General Carlton Fulford, to the region. While 
Frazer was welcomed to meet the Ethiopian political leadership and 
also visited the Ethiopian side of the border region, she was refused 
meetings with Eritrean leaders, who were unwilling to discuss the 
border issue which they saw as settled by the EEBC. Moreover, Gen-
eral Fulford, who had been invited by Frazer, was never seen as neu-
tral to the conflict by the Eritreans, as he at the time was director of 
the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the US Defense Department 
regional centre located in Addis Ababa.  
 
In early 2006, representatives of the witnesses to the December Al-
giers agreement convened in New York to discuss challenges in im-
plementing the accord. In March and in May 2006, the EEBC met in 
London, together with the Algiers witnesses. It was regarded as sig-
nificant progress that officials from Eritrea and Ethiopia attended both 
meetings. However, this failed to generate any substantial movement 
toward implementing the agreement or lifting the restrictions put on 
UNMEE. The stalemate situation was reproduced as both sides re-
stated their earlier position and showed little inclination to reach an 
agreement.  
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After the Algiers agreements, international engagement in the Ethio-
pian–Eritrean conflict has been scarce. UNMEE and other initiatives 
taken have centred on implementing the provisions of the Algiers 
agreements. The main challenge was the compartmentalisation of the 
two agreements. Today, UNMEE from the first agreement has been 
terminated, and EEBC and EECC dissolved themselves once they 
considered their mandate fulfilled. Although these institutions could 
be said to illustrate good international engagement when they were 
active, they shared the problem of being disconnected from each 
other, allowing the parties to selectively truncate the one and support 
the other. Perhaps the main problem of international engagement after 
2000 has been the lack of any initiatives seeking to transcend the lim-
its imposed by the Algiers agreement. 
IGAD 
Given the characterisation of the region as conflict-ridden and consist-
ing of weak states, constructing an effective regional organisation is – 
to put it mildly – challenging. It should therefore not be surprising that 
IGAD has had the reputation of being a weak regional organisation – 
or REC (Regional Economic Community) in AU terms. Still, there 
have been considerable advances since the inception of the organisa-
tion in 1986. At that time, it was conceived as a collaborative effort 
among the countries of the Horn (including Sudan, Kenya and 
Uganda) to combat the drought, desertification and famine that had 
been plaguing the region, and was named IGADD (the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification). The organi-
sation took a significant step forward in 1996, when its successor 
IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) was estab-
lished, with a far broader mandate. The new organisation was given 
four main working areas: food security and environmental protection; 
infrastructural development; conflict prevention, management and 
resolution; and humanitarian affairs. The process of consolidating the 
new organisation has been uneven, with considerable advances in lim-
ited areas, while overall regional integration has remained weak.  
 
Within the field of peace and security, IGAD has been achieved cer-
tain successes in mediating the peace processes of South Sudan and 
Somalia – but has been notably absent with respect to other conflicts 
(as in Darfur, Ethiopia–Eritrea, Northern Uganda). There is thus a cer-
tain ad-hoc character to IGAD’s engagement in peace processes. 
IGAD has also been quite successful in developing the Regional Con-
flict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism CEWARN and 
the anti-terror capacity-building programme ICPAT. (Peace media-
tion, CEWARN and ICPAT are further discussed below.) Currently, 
IGAD is in the process of developing a new Peace and Security Strat-
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egy. Since this is still in the making, we cannot know what its precise 
content will be. However, we have been informed that a major ele-
ment will be to underscore the need for developing and strengthening 
cooperation and interdependence between the countries, with a spe-
cific focus on issues of joint infrastructure development, cooperative 
management of key cross-border resources such as water, and general 
economic integration. Thus, it is possible to see a continuous evolu-
tion of the organisation, both in terms of expanding its scope to cover 
new areas, and in terms of developing greater integration between 
elements and higher ambitions towards regional integration. 
 
Notwithstanding these advances and the willingness to move forward 
that they indicate, conditions within and around the region pose con-
siderable obstacles and challenges for IGAD’s potential to consolidate 
itself into a strong regional organisation:  
 
– In terms of internal conditions, the IGAD countries are 
plagued by insurgencies and violent conflict. Furthermore, 
they have relatively weak states that have managed to pene-
trate and control their peripheral areas only in partial and in-
complete ways. In addition, IGAD member-states are con-
structed on radically different ideologies,15 and in many cases 
stand on different sides of the conflict lines of the complex 
web of conflicts in which the region is suspended; thus they 
have opposing interests. The war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
the conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti, the fact that the other 
IGAD countries have asked the UN to introduce sanctions 
against Eritrea for its support to Somali insurgents, and Eri-
trea’s suspension of its participation in IGAD are merely the 
most visible dimensions of the underlying conflicts and oppos-
ing interests among IGAD members. While this situation may 
indicate the great need for a strong regional organisation that 
could add stability to the region, it also means that the chances 
of developing such an organisation are quite limited. Rather 
than criticising IGAD for not being sufficiently integrated and 
consolidated, a more realistic attitude could be to see every 
specific achievement as a positive success in its own right.  
– Within the African context, the AU policy of building African 
integration around the RECs, and the intention of limiting the 
number of such regional organisations, perhaps ideally to cor-
respond to the five African regions recognised by the AU, may 
also result in challenges to IGAD. The partially overlapping 
memberships of IGAD, the East African Community (EAC) 
and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
                                                 
15  Such as Somalia: ethnic unity; Ethiopia: ethnic federalism; Eritrea: nationalism built on 
colonial history overriding ethnicity; Sudan: Islam. 
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(COMESA) indicate complications that may force member-
countries to set priorities. For Kenya and Uganda, the EAC is 
undoubtedly the REC that is perceived as most important. 
Should there arise issues where Kenya and Uganda are forced 
to choose between the EAC and IGAD, there is little doubt that 
the choice would fall on the EAC. It also means that Kenya is 
not the strong driving force within IGAD that it might other-
wise have been. Still, Kenya and Uganda are members of 
IGAD because they perceive benefits from this membership, 
and potential conflicts from the double membership should not 
be exaggerated. 
– A weakness of IGAD is its high dependence on donor funding. 
According to some sources, donor preferences and opinions on 
priority areas mean that some areas receive better funding than 
others. Peace and security, and the environment and food secu-
rity, were mentioned as better-funded areas than social devel-
opment, health and economic integration. This leads to a cer-
tain donor shaping of the profile of IGAD. Uncoordinated do-
nor initiatives may also be an important part of the explanation 
for the observed lack of integration between IGAD institutions 
and activities. If long-term regional stability depends on the 
strengthening of regional integration, as the new Peace and Se-
curity Strategy appears to be arguing, then the donor-led focus 
on specific, limited and uncoordinated security-oriented inter-
ventions like CEWARN and ICPAT may prove counterpro-
ductive in the long term.  
Good IGAD engagement in the field of peace and security 
Peace processes. IGAD hosted the negotiations that led to the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and 
the SPLM. While the CPA has not resolved all problems, it did repre-
sent a significant step forward in ending one of the longest and most 
intractable wars on the globe, and the agreement itself has been gener-
ally acknowledged as comprehensive, far-reaching and sound. Of 
course, there were other external actors involved in the process, but 
IGAD (with lead-country Kenya) deserves considerable credit for its 
role. IGAD has also played a relatively positive role in the Somali 
peace processes.  
 
Still, it is fair to say that from the perspective of IGAD being a per-
manent organisation with its secretariat in Djibouti, its involvement in 
peace processes has had a certain ad-hoc character. There has been no 
systematisation of IGAD involvement; there are in the region many 
conflicts and peace processes where IGAD has not sought to take on 
any important role (Ethiopia–Eritrea, Northern Uganda, Darfur); 
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where there is IGAD engagement, new structures and venues are built 
up with only limited participation of the organisation’s permanent se-
cretariat; the roles assumed vary between peace processes and phases. 
While this indicates flexibility to adapt procedures to the task at hand, 
it also gives the impression that these engagements are sidelines to 
normal IGAD operations, more often dominated by individual coun-
tries than by IGAD as such. Furthermore, the processes have been 
heavily dependent on external resources, and extra-regional countries 
and partner groups have been heavily involved and played key roles in 
the actual negotiations. These points indicate that IGAD cannot really 
be counted as a consolidated organisation with proven capacity for 
peace mediation. 
 
CEWARN has developed an impressive early warning system for 
monitoring pastoral conflicts. An early independent review (Adelman, 
Howard 2004, quoted in CEWARN 2006) characterised it as ‘cutting 
edge’ and as showing ‘greater strength than virtually any other early 
warning system existent with respect to data collection’. Since that 
time, CEWARN has managed both to extend its geographical cover-
age and to expand into the field of early response. Thus, the mecha-
nism appears to be on an upward trend of continuing to consolidate 
and strengthen itself. Still, there may be structural limits to how far it 
may develop.  
 
Firstly, while pastoral conflicts are important in the region, they are 
only one among the many types and dimensions present in the Horn. 
Given the sensitivity of other conflict forms to the governments that 
form IGAD and own CEWARN, it is by no means certain that the 
CEWARN mechanism may be able to expand its scope of activity be-
yond the kind of localised conflicts exemplified by pastoralist con-
flicts.  
 
Secondly, while the existing clusters cover important conflict areas, 
there are other areas – for instance along the borders between Eri-
trea/Djibouti, Eritrea/Ethiopia and Ethiopia/Somalia – that may be too 
sensitive for the states involved to allow even the monitoring of pas-
toral conflicts. 
 
Thirdly, while it has been possible to develop a decentralised monitor-
ing mechanism, it may prove far more difficult to apply the same 
principles to an early response mechanism, as not all of the regimes in 
question are known for practices of empowering the populations of 
their peripheries. 
In sum, CEWARN may face great difficulties in expanding its role to 
a) other conflict types, b) cover all border areas, or c) maintain its bot-
tom-up principles when moving into early response. 
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ICPAT also seems to be a successful undertaking when considered in 
isolation and on its own premises. It appears to have been successful 
at building the capacities of its member states within a specific area. 
The programme has been criticised both for being implemented with 
little coordination with other IGAD initiatives and for being donor-
driven. Still, it may be understood as corresponding to the interests of 
the regimes of the IGAD countries in strengthening their security sec-
tors – border controls in particular – and this may be a main reason for 
its relative success. On the other hand, it does not seem likely that the 
security-oriented ICPAT programme will be able to result in increased 
integration and inclusion of marginalised groups into the state. In 
other words, ICPAT does not have great potential for addressing the 
underlying drivers of conflict.  
 
In sum, IGAD has been successful in individual interventions within 
the area of regional peace and security, but has so far not been able to 
show that it may have the potential for significantly altering the under-
lying factors behind the pervasive conflicts of the region. The fact that 
IGAD is an organisation of the states of the region is significant. 
Bringing together representatives of regimes and the state apparatus is 
not likely to lead directly to the inclusion of the groups who inhabit 
the peripheries and borderlands of these areas. Thus, while IGAD may 
be successful in developing mechanisms for surveillance of its no-
madic populations of the borderlands (CEWARN) or strengthening 
forms of border control (ICPAT), this is far from integrating these 
groups into the state, in the sense of creating citizenship and national 
identity. In that light, IGAD may not be particularly well equipped to 
deal with the fundamental root causes of conflict on the Horn of Af-
rica. 
 
Moreover, the fact that IGAD states are often involved in various 
forms of alliances with insurgent groups of their neighbouring coun-
tries creates further obstacles to IGAD’s role of promoting regional 
peace and stability. If IGAD countries are not impartial to the conflicts 
affecting the neighbouring countries, they cannot be expected to func-
tion as neutral mediators. 
General Conclusions 
The conflict-prone character of the region stems from the weaknesses 
and failures of its states in terms of integrating and providing tangible 
benefits to all the groups living within their borders. The continued 
existence of significant population groups alienated from and margin-
alised within the state means that the conditions that give rise to and 
foment conflicts will also continue. The report has sought to demon-
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strate that this is the most basic root cause of conflicts on the Horn of 
Africa. Only an inclusive and necessarily long-term development 
process, capable of drawing these groups into the mainstream of the 
states, will be able to significantly change this condition. 
 
A number of related factors contribute to exacerbate and prolong con-
flicts in the region. The weakness of the states in the region and their 
limited presence in and control over their peripheries; the long, un-
demarcated and porous borders of the sparsely populated borderlands; 
the limited amount of cooperation and interdependencies among the 
countries, and their habit of supporting insurgents of neighbouring 
countries and engage in proxy war – all of these are characteristics of 
the region that serve to prolong conflicts and link them together into 
complex patterns. Most, if not all, of these conditions can also only be 
resolved in the long term.16 
 
In sum then, neither the root causes nor the intermediate contributing 
factors to continued complex conflicts can be resolved, except in the 
long term, through painstaking and uncertain processes of economic 
as well as political development. The conclusion for international ac-
tors seeking to contribute must be twofold: On the one hand, there is a 
need for supporting the kind of long-term processes that eventually 
may transform the region and the logics that underpin continued re-
gional conflict. And on the other hand, individual conflict lines should 
be continually monitored and sought defused and/or contained, to 
limit the entanglement in greater, regional or sub-regional webs. In 
general, the first type of involvement falls outside the scope of this 
report. Nevertheless, it seems useful to emphasize the regional charac-
ter to much of the long-term development that is required. In this 
sense, one relevant strategy would seem to be to support IGAD’s ef-
forts at promoting regional integration.  
 
In the shorter-term attempts at addressing ongoing conflicts – from the 
local to the inter-state level – this report focuses on the international 
and cross-border dimensions. The examples examined do point to a 
number of specific lessons. 
 
Fundamentally, it is difficult for international actors to act regionally. 
For a number of reasons, they are constricted by the state system, and 
tend to operate within the individual state. Due to issues of sover-
eignty, borders must be respected (even though they in practice are 
completely porous and virtually non-existent ‘on the ground’). In par-
ticular when dealing with issues as politically sensitive as armed con-
                                                 
16  Logically, the only one of these conditions that can be changed overnight is the practice of 
supporting insurgents in other countries, as this is really dependent on the decisions of a 
limited number of individuals. In practice, of course, there is no reason to suspect that this 
practice will change in the near future. 
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flict, international actors necessarily must coordinate with and work in 
understanding with the government in question.17 Cross-border efforts 
consequently become complex affairs. Among other things, important 
requirements are:  
 
– Having a presence on both sides of the border  
– Understanding the conflict dynamics within their social con-
texts on both sides of the border 
– Having communication channels across the border (since in-
ternational organizations are usually set up with communica-
tion lines towards their international headquarters rather than 
to neighbouring countries, and since the border regions we are 
talking about are generally with extremely limited infrastruc-
ture, this is a complicated requirement) 
– Having the necessary goodwill and go-ahead from government 
institutions on both sides 
– Having the required cross-border or regional perspective and 
the patience and willingness necessary to overcome the bu-
reaucratic hindrances for working in such unorthodox ways 
– Being flexible enough and not limited by mandate, capacity or 
resources to be able to deal with problems within the sectors 
that may prove to be relevant 
 
Thus, it should not be surprising that there are not too many good ex-
amples to be found. Yet, both the PACT and the CEWARN experi-
ences show that it is possible to deal constructively with localized 
cross-border conflicts when the proper institutional set-up is in place. 
At the same time, the examples point to the significant resource re-
quirements involved and the structural difficulties of scaling up. 
 
As for the inter-state conflict level, the experience of the Ethiopia – 
Eritrea conflict is that it has been difficult for international actors to go 
beyond the framework established by the Algiers agreements. Since 
this has proved to have limitations, and since the countries themselves 
have shown no willingness to compromise, the situation is still as bit-
ter – and perhaps even more locked – than it was when the war ended 
nine years ago.  
 
However, there may also be some truth to the Eritrean perception, that 
international actors are refraining from putting sufficient pressure on 
Ethiopia to fulfil its obligations according to the Peace Agreement and 
                                                 
17  Exceptions to this rule have previously been quite frequent in this region. During their 
time as insurgent groups, the EPLF, TPLF and SPLA all controlled significant areas and 
received some recognition by international actors as being the de facto governments of 
these areas. Today, however, all three movements form part of the national governments 
of their states. Apart from the possible case of Somaliland, it is not easy to see similar 
situations of international recognition of non-state organizations on the Horn of Africa 
arising in the near future.  
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the EEBC, because of Ethiopia’s strategic role as an ally in the US-led 
‘Global War on Terror’. The consequent isolation of Eritrea, and the 
regional spoiler role that the country has taken up – for instance with 
respect to Somalia – can be seen as a very clear negative effect of this 
type of involvement, which is based on own strategic interests rather 
than an analysis of how to contribute to stability in the region.  
 
This points to another fundamental obstacle for good international in-
volvement in seeking to address regional conflict patterns: The diffi-
culty of coordination among actors. When different countries and in-
stitutions have diverging interests and understandings of the conflict 
dynamics, and when short-term strategic interests override more long-
term engagement based on contextual analysis, the potential for con-
structive engagement becomes seriously limited.  
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Case Study I: 
Understanding the Gambella Conflict 
Formation  
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Gambella can be seen as an example for one of the most, if not utmost, 
complex regions in Ethiopia with regard to contemporary political con-
flicts. Its status as a border region, its multi-ethnic composition, its expo-
sure to the Sudanese civil war and the inner-Ethiopian dynamics between 
centre and periphery, as well as the developments in oil drilling, contrib-
uted to the recent extension of the conflict in the area. Each of these causes 
and events is equally important for the understanding of the region and 
should never be seen as separate from each other. (Meckelburg 2006: 7) 
  
The conflict situation in the Ethiopian Gambella region involves an 
intricate web of interrelated and overlapping factors to conflict, pivot-
ing around ethnicity, federalism, resource conflicts and cross-border 
linkages. The latter is epitomised by the numerous refugee camps es-
tablished during the Sudanese civil war, which now – after the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 – are in the process of 
closure, while the refugees are being repatriated. The conflict pattern 
in Gambella illustrates how intra- and interstate dimensions are inter-
related, and that these have their separate historical bearings that both 
exacerbate and are exacerbated by contemporary conflict. The com-
plex conflict pattern unfolding in Gambella shows how various as-
pects originating in their particular setting form mutually reinforcing 
linkages throughout a broader region, leading to more protracted and 
obdurate conflicts (Rubin 2006). Gambella’s conflict patterns are not 
restricted to the clash of internal and external factors. Conflicts over 
political representation, land entitlement and different and conflicting 
modes of production do not emanate from particular localities, but fol-
low various divisions, sometimes ethnic, integral to the society of 
Gambella itself. Many of these intra-societal conflict lines are also 
found across the border in neighbouring Sudan. The historical and 
mutual transnational migration of ethnic groups, as well as the influx 
from Sudan to Gambella of refugees because of the Sudanese civil 
war, makes claims to citizenship and political representation important 
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denominators and explanatory factors in the current regional conflict 
formation. Not only does citizenship allow certain political privileges, 
but refugee status also conveys certain benefits in terms of access to 
basic services provided by the international community.  The regional 
conflict formation articulating itself in Gambella should thus be un-
derstood against the backdrop of the possibilities and entitlements 
provided by ethnic belonging and citizenship. As this paper shows, 
these conflict lines criss-cross and interrelate, creating challenges for 
how the international society can address the regional dimensions of 
conflict.  
 
This paper first gives a brief outline of the regional conflict patterns as 
these appear from a perspective foregrounding Gambella. The second 
and main part offers both contextual and potential explanatory factors 
to the Gambella conflict formation. This section focuses on endoge-
nous factors like ethnicity, federalism, politics and settlement pro-
grammes, as well as on exogenous factors relating to central state poli-
tics, relationship with highlanders, the Sudanese civil wars and the 
subsequent massive influx of refugees. These factors should be seen 
as interrelated and as both producing and produced by conflict. The 
final part introduces various international actors present in the area 
and their involvement in the complex regional conflict formation, 
highlighting both challenges and good practices.  
Gambella -- Context 
The Gambella People’s National Regional State (GPNRS) is situated 
in the southwestern Ethiopian lowlands, some 780 km from Addis 
Ababa, and covers one of Ethiopia’s longest international boundaries 
with neighbouring Sudan. Its border with Sudan’s Upper Nile and 
Jonglei states (both part of the Southern Sudan) is demarcated by the 
Baro and Akobo rivers. To the east, Gambella borders the Ethiopian 
highland plateau of the Oromia region, and to the southeast it borders 
the conglomerate Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Re-
gion. The Gambella region covers an area of 25,294 square km and 
has, according to the 2007 census, a population of approximately 
307,000. It also has the highest annual growth rate (4.1 per cent) of all 
Ethiopian regions in relation to the 1994 census. The vast majority of 
its population (74.8 per cent) live in rural areas. Gambella’s interna-
tional border and proximity to previous Sudanese conflict zones make 
it subject to transnational migration and hosts of refugees. Moreover, 
the area’s low population density, coupled with access to scrubland 
and water, makes it a desirable location for pastoral grazing as well as 
for agricultural activities. Consequently, the region has attracted set-
tlers from both Sudan and the Highlands. Together with Gambella’s 
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multiethnic composition, all these factors have contributed to the re-
gional conflict pattern.  
The Gambella Conflict Formation 
Gambella is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in Ethiopia. The 
regional conflict formation of Gambella is shaped by several intercon-
nected issues – among them, transnational migration, the civil wars in 
neighbouring Sudan, the ethnic composition, identity politics and po-
litical representation, quarrels over land rights and resources, as well 
as by relations to the highlanders and the Ethiopian central state. Un-
derstanding the conflict formation in Gambella requires a diachronic 
approach that can take into account the trajectory of the various fac-
tors in order to clarify their interrelated bearing on current and recent 
conflicts.  
 
Here it should also be noted that there are significant elements of re-
ciprocity and complementary socio-economic relations and exchanges 
between and among the conflicting groups in Gambella. To a large 
extent, this is a peaceful region today. However, conflict erupts regu-
larly and is a facet that underpins daily life, making the potential for 
conflict an ever-present factor in intergroup relations (Feyissa 2008). 
Conflict and violence are regularly expressed in various fields of so-
cial interaction – from villages to churches, from schools to political 
parties – and the manifestations range ‘from the complete destruction 
of villages to rioting in the schools; from targeting minors and the 
raiding of public transports to the crucifixion of individuals to humili-
ate the group to which they belong’ (ibid.: 148). Underlying tension is 
part of everyday life. Recently, once conflicts have erupted they have 
tended to take on a more violent form, involving bombing and massa-
cres. The main parties are the two dominant ethnic groups – the Nuer 
and the Anuak, both endogenous to Gambella – and the more recently 
arrived highlanders.  
 
In the early 1990, in what is locally known as the girgir (1991–2), an 
Anuak military faction of the Gambella People’s Liberation Move-
ment (GPML) committed atrocities against the civilian Nuer popula-
tions in what appeared to be ethnic reprisals over political dominance. 
Ethiopian Nuer citizens and Sudanese Nuer refugees residing in Gam-
bella fled across the border to Sudan, from which armed Nuer groups 
mounted counter-offensives that resulted in the destruction of Anuak 
villages. Tension remained, with regular minor disputes, until large-
scale clashes again took place in 1998. Another major conflict oc-
curred between the Nuer and the Anuak in 2002 over issues related to 
who should succeed as regional vice president. In 2001, there was 
conflict between the marginal Majangir ethnic group and the Anuak - 
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a conflict that the Anuak saw as instigated by either the Nuer or the 
highlanders as representatives of the central government. In December 
2003, an ambush allegedly committed by Anuaks triggered a bloody 
three-day rampage in the regional capital in which federal soldiers 
joined highlander mobs in destroying Anuak neighbourhoods. The 
424 reported killed were Anuak. Gambella has also been host to a 
large number of refugees from the civil wars of Sudan. The overall 
deterioration of security in Gambella also affected these camps: 
Anuak refugees were forced to evacuate and seek shelter in nearby 
Anuak communities, while Dinka refugees were compelled to run to 
local Nuer societies. Following this, the Fugnido refugee camp was 
divided into an Anuak and Nuer section, to prevent local conflict from 
settling in the camp (Feyissa 2008; HRW 2005; Meckelburg 2008).  
 
One should not, however, be misled by the seemingly clear demarca-
tion lines of interethnic strife – intra-ethnic clashes are just as much 
part of the conflict complex. Although Nuer-Anuak-highlander rela-
tions constitute a central dimension for grasping the Gambella conflict 
formation, the indigenous groups in the region are also characterised 
by internal struggle. The main Anuak divide goes between the Lull 
and Openo sub-clans, with opposing interests and conflicts between 
those living along the rivers in the central areas and those of the forest 
region. The more marginal Majangir ethic group is internally divided 
due to party politics. Political competition and resource competition 
constitute the main causes of conflict among Nuer groups, which at 
the time of writing is the most common type of violent conflict in 
Gambella. The relations between the three Nuer sub-clans – the Gaa-
jak, the Gaajok and the Gaaguang – are highly competitive and at 
times hostile (Feyissa 2008: 150–152).  
 
The Gambella conflict pattern is furthermore affected by incidents on 
the Sudanese side, such as conflicts between the Dinka and Luo Nuer 
tribes. Both these groups mainly originate and reside in Sudan, but 
there are cross-border activities in the form of refugees, settlers and 
migrating nomads. Sudanese Murle also regularly attack and raid the 
cattle of communities on the Ethiopian side. Lately, intercommunal 
violence has flared up in Sudan. In June 2009, a Jikany Nuer group 
ambushed and killed 40 south Sudanese soldiers and civilians trans-
porting UN food aid on riverboats destined for displaced Luo Nuer in 
Akobo.1 This incident, known as the 2009 Sobat River Ambush, was 
believed to be in retaliation for an incident the previous May, when 
people from Akobo, arguably Luo Nuer, attacked a settlement in Up-
per Nile and killed about 70 people.2 In late September 2009, around 
100 were killed in Bor of Jonglei state in what appears to be conflict 
                                                 
1  http://in.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idINHEA62861920090616  
2   http://www.webcitation.org/5j1UNmpWn  
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between the Dinka and Luo Nuer over cattle and pasture.3 Speculation 
that the Khartoum regime is somehow behind this recent spate of vio-
lence is widespread in the area. 
 
Such events, although occurring in Sudan, contribute to destabilise the 
whole region and spill over into Gambella. Intra- and interethnic rival-
ries over politics and resources shape the wider conflict formation, 
showing that what happens on one side of the geographical border 
cannot be disentangled from what happens on the other side. The 
Gambella conflict formation should not be understood as simply tradi-
tional forms of cattle-raiding and ethnic conflicts that are allowed to 
flourish due to the weak penetration of the state in these peripheral 
areas. In addition to the ethnic aspects, we need to take into account 
intra-ethnic dimensions, politics, centre-periphery relations, and their 
historical trajectories, in order to grasp the wider regional conflict 
formation of Gambella. With that perspective, it becomes clear that 
the conflicts are not due to the lack of state presence and control, but 
are just as much caused by political events at the national level of the 
two states, as well as by the regimes’ attempts at extending their reach 
and exerting control over these areas. Even global events can be rec-
ognised as influencing the conflict dynamics. In sum, then, the con-
flict pattern of Gambella must be understood in relation to endogenous 
as well as exogenous factors. 
Ethnicity and Conflict 
Gambella is a multiethnic region. It comprises five distinct ethno-
linguistic groups: the Anuak (27 per cent), the Nuer (40 per cent), the 
Majangir (six per cent), the Opo and the Komo (three per cent). The 
remaining 20 per cent are highlanders, i.e. settlers from the Amhara, 
Tigray and Oromo regions. It should be emphasised that these per-
centages – which have far-reaching consequences for political influ-
ence – are highly contested within the region and should not be taken 
as anything more than indications of relative size and the best figures 
available. The Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 considers all the non-
highlanders as the region’s endogenous peoples. This gives them par-
ticular rights with respect to political representation, rights that are not 
accorded to the highlanders. The various lowlander groups are linguis-
tically related and engage in various forms of economic and social ex-
change, but they nevertheless form distinct ethnic communities. The 
distinctions are continuously reproduced, with social organisation, 
form of subsistence and mode of productivity as the key identity 
markers: ‘Ethnic boundaries are marked, among other ways, by differ-
ence in subsistence system’ (Feyissa 2006). The Anuak and the more 
                                                 
3   http://allafrica.com/stories/200909220711.html  
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marginal Opo are predominantly sedentary agriculturalists, while the 
Nuer are traditionally nomadic, transhumant pastoralists, who are 
gradually turning towards agro-pastoralism. The marginal Majangir 
combine hunting and gathering (ibid.). These distinctions are, how-
ever, only characteristics. In order to avoid primordial understandings 
of ethnicity and ethnic boundaries, we need a less formalistic notion of 
ethnicity and of what unities and divides. In this respect, Feyissa sug-
gests seeing the ethnic formations not as ideal types but more as fam-
ily resemblances (Feyissa 2005).  
 
What distinguishes the two dominant groups, the Anuak and the Nuer 
– who together make up two-thirds of Gambella’s population – forms 
a source of inevitable conflict rooted in their different discourses over 
land, with contrasting notions of belonging and concepts of property 
and land entitlement. Although in the distant past also the Anuak were 
pastoral nomads who migrated into Gambella, their current identity 
draws on a strong idea of being indigenous to the region with seden-
tary farming activities, and this has produced an identity discourse 
based on territory and livelihood. To the Anuak, the Nuer are the sig-
nificant ‘Other’, exogenous to Gambella, with weaker territorial 
claims. The nomadic Nuer are perceived as new to the area, having 
come there to use the vast scrublands for pasture. Relevant to the no-
tion of belonging, Feyissa thus claims that the Nuer and Anuak repre-
sent two different kinds of ethnicities: the Anuak as primordialist, 
principally concerned with a static and reified meaning of ethnicity, 
while the Nuer are instrumentalist or constructivist, chiefly concerned 
with the interest dimension of ethnicity (Fayissa 2005: 205). While the 
Anuak draw their identity from being a people that have always been 
in the region and cultivated the same soil, the formation of Nuer iden-
tity is based on a different type of land use and mode of production. 
The contestation over belonging and territorial heritage – and thus tra-
ditional ownership to land – is shown by the mutually constituted 
Anuak concepts of obur and welo. While obur designates people of 
the settlement, welo denotes guests or visitors, or recent arrivals in the 
area (ibid.: 207). As we shall see, welo has in recent years been ap-
plied to the highlanders as well.  
 
The Nuer and Anuak differ in their concepts of property rights and 
land entitlement. Furthermore, their relations to and use of the land 
relate to the two diverging notions of ethnicity. Typically, Anuak set-
tlements are scattered along the river banks. They also comprise adja-
cent territories which, although these might not be economically ex-
ploited or used for subsistence production, nevertheless constitute an 
integral part of the local community and Anuak village. Among the 
Anuak, the notion of land ownership need not entail effective occupa-
tion or use of land for income-generating activities. As Feyissa ex-
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plains, it is enough to lay claim to a territory because it is seen as land 
of the ancestors (Feyissa 2002). Conversely, and paralleling their in-
strumentalist view of ethnicity, the Nuer connotation of land rights 
involves the active and accrued use of land. As a corollary, if no one 
uses the land, no one owns it – hence it is available for others to use. 
In effect, incompatible modes of production and diverging livelihoods 
are a key feature and rationale for the continued conflict between the 
Anuak and the Nuer, i.e. between groups relating to sedentary and 
pastoral resources respectively. The pastoralist and semi-pastoralist 
Nuer graze their cattle on the Gambella plains. During the wet season 
the Nuer herd their cattle to upland settlements to escape flooding, 
whereas during the dry season they move closer to the river banks, 
where the moisture provides important pasture. The Nuer pattern of 
movement thus involves migrating with their cattle to areas inhabited 
by Anuak during the dry season, which gives rise to competition and 
conflict over both land and water resources (Tadesse 2007). At the 
same time, there is a certain complementarity to these two forms of 
livelihood, which also has facilitated exchange and accommodation 
between the groups. 
 
To some extent, the source of the conflict is migration, which itself is 
an integral feature of Nuer livelihood. Conflict is further exacerbated 
by two factors. First, increased population density and reduced access 
to land and water resources have forced the Nuer to expand their pas-
ture area, thus putting pressure on sedentary settlements and estab-
lished farming systems. Second, the Nuer’s experience of conflict in 
the west has forced them to migrate eastwards. Historically, the Nuer 
in both Ethiopia and Sudan have had a conflicting relationship with 
the Dinka living to the west of them in Sudan, even though the Dinka 
and Nuer share many similarities in terms of livelihood and mode of 
production. Additionally, Young asserts that the Sudanese Nuer 
moved eastward to escape taxation of the British colonial rule (Young 
1999). The eastward migration of the Sudanese Nuer was later exac-
erbated by the Sudanese civil war, which brought with it both insecu-
rity and increased scarcity of land. In sum, the Nuer’s historical and 
continuous eastward migration onto Anuak land has been driven by 
increased population density and low access to pastureland, as well as 
the wish to escape colonial taxation, to flee the Dinka conflict and to 
mitigate security concerns during the civil war in Sudan. Gambella’s 
escarpment to the Ethiopian highland plateau in the east made a natu-
ral border for the migration of pastoral people. The result has been in-
creased conflict in Gambella, mainly along ethnic lines: ‘both groups 
seem to be accustomed to a tradition of ongoing conflict concerning 
power and access to natural resources’ (Meckelburg 2006: 8). 
 
Jon Harald Sande Lie and Axel Borchgrevink 50 
The Nuer-Anuak relationship is, however, not only one of conflict. 
Cordial interaction and trade are more the daily features than is con-
flict. Moreover, the Nuer gave shelter to fleeing Anuaks when Oromos 
from the highland attacked Gambella, and the Anuak apparently intro-
duced the Nuer to the ivory trade with the highlanders (ibid.). This 
later evolved into an ‘ivory-for firearms’ trade, which eventually re-
sulted in the Nuer achieving a military balance with their competitors  
– which in turn brought stabilisation of relations, interethnic ex-
changes, and a balance of power leading the way to socio-economic 
cooperation (cf. James 2002). The introduction of Ethiopian federal-
ism, however, not only refuelled tensions between the Nuer and 
Anuak, it also aggravated latent conflict lines between local, low-
lander groups and the highlanders who were seen as external new-
comers to region.  
 
The ethnic division and demographic imbalance do not correlate with 
settlement patters. The Anuak live in eight of Gambella’s nine dis-
tricts, and constitute the majority in five of them. The total area settled 
and claimed by the Anuak makes up about 70 per cent of the region. 
By contrast, most Nuer are found in only two districts covering only 
one-fourth of the land mass. The great majority of the highlanders live 
in the regional capital and other urban centres.  
 
While the Anuak distinguish between people of the settlement on the 
one hand, and those who have come more recently, there is also a 
dominant distinction line between locals and lowlanders, on the one 
side, and settlers and highlanders on the other. The highlanders, con-
stituting roughly 27 per cent of the Gambella populace and living 
mainly in urban areas, are later arrivals to Gambella. Many of them 
came to the region under the forced resettlement programme of the 
Derg. Others have come individually, in search of employment, new 
business opportunities, or to acquire arable land. Many came because 
of employment opportunities in municipal offices, schools and other 
government offices and public services, as the highlanders – in con-
trast to the local people – had the required qualifications of literacy 
and basic schooling. Others found employment in the policy or the 
military, which during the 1980s were prominent in the region due to 
the border to civil-war Sudan. To the original population, the high-
landers have come to connote power relations, being identified with 
the central state. In fact, to many locals, the term ‘highlander’ is as 
much a metaphor for power and the state as it is a description of geo-
graphical origin (Feyissa 2005). In the current ethnic federal system, 
this has been given a curious twist, because the highlanders – as ‘non-
native’ to the region – are not entitled to political representation. At 
the same time, they are heavily overrepresented within state institu-
tions, especially at leadership levels. That places them in the special 
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situation of being relatively powerless in terms of influence through 
the formal representative political system, and yet enjoying consider-
able informal power from manning central positions within the state 
apparatus.  
Ethnic Federalism in Gambella 
In 1991, the socialist Derg dictatorship was toppled by the TPLF-led 
insurgency after a decade and a half of civil war. Soon after assuming 
power, the coalition government of the Ethiopian People’s Revolu-
tionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was created. The new government 
recognised that its own emphasis on national self-determination meant 
that local demands for self-determination could not convincingly be 
denied. It intended to decentralise power and resolve the ‘nationalities 
question’ by accommodating the various ethno-linguistic groups. In 
August 1995 the Federal Constitution was introduced in Ethiopia, ac-
companied by the establishment of ethnic federalism. Before 1996, 
Ethiopia had been divided into 13 provinces, but with ethnic federal-
ism it became divided into nine ethnically-based regional states. The 
move to ethnic federalism and increased decentralised self-
determination were seen as the only way to achieve countrywide 
peace, stability and development. Critics, however,  asserted that eth-
nic federalism and the prominence given to the principle of ethnicity 
would inevitably reinforce ethnic tension and conflict (Fiseha 2006). 
Gambella, itself being a multiethnic state within the federal system, is 
a telling case, as the new context of institutionalised ethnicity situates 
the social struggle between the Anuak and the Nuer.  
 
After the transition to federalism, the Anuak were supported by the 
new ruling party (EPRDF) because of their support to the regime 
change, while the Nuer were associated with the previous Derg dicta-
torship. The Anuak have used this support to renegotiate their political 
influence and role vis-à-vis the Nuer, although they are in minority. 
(This, however, only became apparent after the census published in 
1995, and even after that, its figures have been highly contested by 
many Anuaks.) The Anuak saw an opportunity to contain the Nuer by 
the possibilities provided by the transition to ethnic federalism, nota-
bly by using what Feyissa calls the ‘citizenship card’ – excluding the 
Nuer from job opportunities in administrative posts, political roles, 
and goods and service delivery (Feyissa 2005). By controlling central 
political and administrative offices, the Anuak elites redefined all the 
Nuer as Sudanese, even though some Nuer have lived in Gambella 
since the 19th century. The Anuak elites and officials consolidate their 
own position by homogenising the Nuer not as ‘people that have ar-
rived late, but as nominal foreigners without Ethiopian citizenship’. 
The Anuak have justified this with reference to the practice of many 
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Nuers of altering and alternative citizenship, since switching to Suda-
nese citizenship brought refugee status, with access to services pro-
vided in the refugee camps in Gambella, such as relief, physical secu-
rity and various basic services. This is a point we will return to below.  
 
This application of the federal system and the central government’s 
bias towards the Anuak have resulted in structural inequalities along 
ethnic lines regarding the allocation of political representation, mana-
gerial posts, and composition of civil servants in the Gambella region. 
Feyissa (2005) provides schematic overviews of these issues from 
1992 to 2002. Although there have been improvements in terms of 
representation and distribution, considerable preference is still ac-
corded to the Anuak. In 1992, the Anuak held 50 per cent of the seats 
in the regional council, while the Nuer held a mere 30 per cent. Al-
though the total seats increased from 38 to 55 in 2000, the 29 Anuak 
seats represent 53 per cent compared to the Nuer’s 34 per cent. The 
allocation of managerial posts is also considerably in favour of the 
Anuak, who held 11 out of 18 posts in 2002. Although the Anuak are 
overrepresented in the regional political council and in managerial 
posts, the ethnic profile of the civil servants in Gambella is very dif-
ferent: of 3,845 civil servants, the distribution among Anuak, Nuer 
and highlanders is 36, 6 and 56 per cent, respectively. One reason for 
the overrepresentation of highlanders, who do not hold any political or 
managerial positions, is, as noted above, their basic educational level, 
but, as Feyissa notes, ‘access to government offices has been increas-
ingly dictated by ethno-politics and the position of the various groups 
in the decision-making power’ (ibid.: 213). To counter their underrep-
resentation, the Nuer have sought to establish two additional regional 
districts (wereda) to form new Nuer constituencies. Currently only 
two of the nine constituencies are recognised as Nuer, although the 
Nuer make up 40 per cent of the total population of Gambella. Both 
the regional and federal levels have until recently refused this request. 
On the other hand, the Nuer are no longer seen as foreign, but have 
now become recognised as the majority group in the multiethnic 
Gambella region.  
 
It is this form of gerrymandering that has turned the apparent blessing 
of federalism into a curse in the region. The political underrepresenta-
tion of the Nuer and the highlander-dominated regional civil service 
illustrate that ethnic federalism has produced a new and insecure po-
litical minority. Numerically, the Nuer comprise the majority in Gam-
bella, but the division of constituencies gives precedence to the 
Anuak. This furthermore point to a larger dilemma of ethnic federal-
ism and divisions in a state’s borderland. Taken as ethnic groups liv-
ing in the Ethio-Sudan borderlands, the majority of Anuak live on the 
Ethiopian side, with only a small number living in southern Sudan. 
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For the Nuer, the cross-border division is different. Although they are 
in the majority in the Gambella region, the overwhelming majority of 
the Nuer live in southern Sudan. Anuak resistance to allowing in-
creased Nuer influence stems largely from fears of becoming a mar-
ginalised minority in their own land. Thus Anuak-Nuer relations have 
been and will continue to be characterised by persistent conflicts over 
land entitlement and political representation.  
 
The agro-pastoral livelihood of the Nuer, their opportunistic claims to 
grazing land, their innate nomadic character, as well as the Anuak re-
luctance to allow the Nuer increased political influence, have both 
domestic and transnational bearings. The regional pattern of conflicts 
and their transnational linkages are, however, not limited to nomadic 
movements, competition over land resources, interethnic unrest and 
political misrepresentation. Rather, these features that are being articu-
lated in Gambella should be seen as interconnected with wider re-
gional politics, conflict and state formation, and a small component of 
Cold War geopolitics, all of which have repercussion in the current 
context.  
The Gambella Resettlement Programme 
Governments will inevitably seek to increase control over their more 
peripheral areas, particularly when these constitute borderlands to 
neighbouring states. As the Ethiopian state evolved, it came to recog-
nise that controlling space even in the most rural and peripheral areas 
would be a means for the central government to secure its power 
(Clapham 2002). In Ethiopia, one form that this has taken is through 
forced resettlement and sedentarisation schemes.4 Such schemes were 
introduced in the 1960s when Haile Selassie intensified his moderni-
sation efforts and adopted a policy of assimilating lowlanders into the 
culture of the ruling highlanders, aimed at Christianisation and the 
dissemination of Amhara culture and language (Lie 2004: 129-133). 
While this in itself created lowlander resentment to the highlanders, 
the resettlement politics that emerged with the Derg regime from 1974 
were more radical, attempting to change the agricultural production 
system and transform the traditional power structures of rural societies 
(Viezzoli 1992). The land reform proclamation of 1975 abolished age-
old feudal production relations and nationalised all land, without com-
pensating former rights-holders. Land was now to be distributed by 
peasant associations appointed by the Derg at central level (Clapham 
2002). State planners saw these associations and the resettlement pro-
grammes as means of propagating socialist ideas. The programmes 
                                                 
4   ‘Resettlement, land settlement, colonisation or transmigration all refer to the phenomenon 
of population redistribution, either planner or spontaneous’ (Dessalgn 2003; quoted in 
Meckelburg 2006: 4).  
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were directed at the urban unemployed, at rural populations regularly 
affected by natural disasters and at nomads. Resettlement meant long-
distance movement of people from high-density areas to planned 
modern villages, usually in the lowlands. ‘Villagisation’ and sedenta-
risation involved the concentration of scattered homesteads into des-
ignated villages (Clapham 2002: 19). By 1985, the Derg had resettled 
up to 600,000 while about 12 million people had been villagised (Hu-
man Right Watch 1991: 234, referred to in Meckelburg 2006). Gam-
bella, which also had a significant pull factor in being seen as the po-
tential ‘bread basket in the West’ (Pankhurst 1997), was subjected to 
both these schemes.  
 
The aims of the central government schemes for Gambella were two-
fold. The resettlement programme focused on resettling northern high-
landers to the fertile grounds of Gambella, whereas the villagisation 
programme aspired to strengthen and eventually transform the liveli-
hood and modes of production among local people. While stated mo-
tives were framed altruistically, other factors could be discerned. As 
Gambella was inhabited mostly by the Nuer and Anuak, ‘communica-
tion with the people and provisions of services for them have conse-
quently been difficult. The government of socialist Ethiopia, through 
the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission is embarking on a settle-
ment program for the local population…’ (RRC 1981; quoted in 
Meckelburg 2006: 10). It should also be added that the vast infusion 
of highlanders had implications for government’s ability to control the 
society, survey the border, collect taxes, and merge the centre and pe-
riphery (cf. Clapham 2002). The government schemes had devastating 
effects on the traditional subsistence economy, settlement patterns, 
modes of production, and not least on the ethnic composition of Gam-
bella. The resettlement programmes produced joint local resistance to 
the highlanders and the central state, which became seen as largely 
synonymous. The highland settlers made a significant impact. While 
the Gambella population was estimated at 125,000 in the early 1980s 
(RRC 1981), the highlanders, which started to arrive from 1984, soon 
numbered about 60,000 (Kurimoto 2005), most of whom were settled 
on traditional Anuak territory.  
 
Moreover, the rising influx of refugees as an effect of the Sudanese 
civil wars aggravated already tense relationships among locals, set-
tlers, refugees and state power, increasing the conflict sources and 
making the regional conflict formation of Gambella even more com-
plex.  
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Gambella and the Impact of the Sudanese Civil War 
Gambella borders on turbulent Sudan, a physical setting which itself 
makes the Gambella conflict formation politically sensitive as well as 
prone to be affected by events in the neighbouring country. With the 
exception of the eleven years between the first (1955–72) and second 
(1983–2005) civil wars, Sudan has experienced internal conflict ever 
since independence from British colonial rule. During colonial rule, 
the British had administered North and South Sudan as separate re-
gions, but then, as part of the British post-Second World War strategy 
in the Middle East these two regions were merged into a single admin-
istrative unit. When Sudan became independent in 1956, conflict 
erupted between the North and the South. The main cause and concern 
of the two civil wars have been the South’s fear of being subsumed by 
the political power of the larger and more prosperous North. The con-
flicts have been epitomised as a struggle for independence by the 
Christian, culturally sub-Saharan Africans of the South against the Is-
lamic North, whose people who see themselves as culturally Arabic. 
Control over water and oil resources located in Southern Sudan has 
also been an important impetus. The conflicts’ main belligerents were 
the Government of Sudan and the secessionist Sudan People’s Libera-
tion Army (SPLA) and its political wing, SPLM – Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement. The SPLA/M was not established until 1983, 
when it was formed by South Sudanese soldiers defecting from the 
Sudanese Army. The SPLA included many of the veterans from the 
first civil war, but was a more structured and formalised resistance 
group than had been the case with the South Sudanese fighting the 
first civil war. More recently, the main parties to the conflict have 
transformed into the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS), through the processes leading to 
the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 1995. 
The CPA not only brought an end to the civil war. It also meant for-
mal representation of SPLM in the GoNU, with the development of 
democratic governance countrywide and the sharing of oil revenues, 
and not least – it gave the promise of a referendum to be held by 2011 
on Southern independence. However, as yet this has not meant the end 
to all the fighting in Sudan, nor to violent spillovers into Ethiopia. 
 
The Sudanese civil wars have had significant impact on the Gambella 
conflict formation, for numerous reasons. Large parts of the war were 
waged very close to Gambella, notably in the neighbouring states of 
Jonglei and Upper Nile. The Nuer residing in these areas have repre-
sented a main contributor to the SPLA forces. Gambella constituted a 
repository for SPLA fighters, as well as becoming to vast numbers of 
refugees. As a locus for the effects of the civil war, Gambella became 
increasingly entangled in processes and politics not only at the centre 
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of the Ethiopian state, but also in the articulation of Cold War geopoli-
tics on the Horn of Africa more generally.  
 
Soon after the second Sudanese civil war broke out in 1983, the 
Ethiopian Derg regime made plain its support to SPLM/A, which al-
lowed ‘the SPLA to set up military training and base-camp facilities 
inside Ethiopia’ (James 2002: 267). The Derg’s involvement in the 
Sudanese civil war made borders and security a major concern of the 
Ethiopian central state in all its western frontier regions. The ordinary 
people of these formerly ‘marginal’ areas now became increasingly 
aware of their relations with Addis Ababa and that they were in the 
orbit of the Ethiopian centre, both directly and indirectly affected by 
centralised policies. Not only were the SPLA allowed into Ethiopian 
territory, they also recruited from the rural population, while the Su-
danese army began counter-insurgency operations against local Ethio-
pian civilians in the mid-1980s, notably in the Benishangul region just 
north of Gambella (James 2002).  
 
From this, tension evolved between Addis Ababa and Khartoum, with 
geopolitical and domestic ramifications. The socialist Derg regime 
was backed by the Soviet Union, whereas Khartoum received US sup-
port. While the SPLA received armaments from Soviet Union via Ad-
dis Ababa, Khartoum stepped up its general support to forces aimed at 
overthrowing Mengistu’s Derg regime and allowed international ac-
tors to assist the Tigrean-based uprising from Khartoum. While SPLA 
soldiers operated on Ethiopian side, anti-Mengistu forces were active 
on Sudanese soil. Finally, in 1991 and interrelated with the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the uprising led by the Ti-
grayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) managed to topple the Derg 
regime, after 15 years of struggle (Hammond 1999).  
 
The regime change in Addis seriously affected the situation in Gam-
bella. The Derg had not only supported the Nuer of the SPLA, but had 
also strongly favoured the Ethiopian Nuer, who were incorporated into 
the local administration. The marginalised Anuak, by contrast, had 
joined the peasant militias formed into the Gambella People’s Libera-
tion Front (GPLF), from the 1980s under Sudanese patronage 
(Johnson 2003: 87–90). The GPLF, moreover, fought alongside that 
TPLF as the Gambella branch of the general uprising against the Derg, 
thus targeting both Ethiopian and Sudanese Nuer communities. After 
toppling the Derg junta, TPLF became the dominant part of the coali-
tion EPRDF government. The GPLF and Anuak were thus duly re-
warded when the ethno-federal system was installed. As seen in the 
section on federalism above, the Gambella configuration of the federal 
system and division of constituencies proved favourable to the Anuak 
community, while the Nuer majority were grossly under-represented.  
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Following the regime change in Ethiopia, the Gambella conflict for-
mation became increasingly linked to events on the Sudan side of the 
border. When the Derg regime in Addis Ababa – which had supported 
the SPLA – was toppled in 1991, the SPLA were forced to leave their 
Ethiopia bases. The Itang camp was also evacuated – out of fear of 
what the victorious liberation armies OLF and TPLF (which had re-
ceived support from Khartoum for their struggle) might do. It has also 
been alleged that control over the refugees was an important meal 
ticket for the local SPLA commanders, who were about to split off 
from the main, Garang-led part of the movement, and that for this rea-
son they took the refugees with them (Johnson 1996). The massive but 
little-prepared evacuation was a humanitarian disaster, resulting in 
thousands of deaths. There were few facilities for providing relief to 
the returnees on the Sudanese side, as well as an intensifying of the 
civil war – this time with the added complexity of the two factions of 
the SPLA turning on each other. The break-away faction was Nuer-
dominated, reacting against what was perceived as Dinka dominance 
within the SPLA under the Garang leadership. With the relatively 
good relations prevailing at that time between Addis Ababa and Khar-
toum, Sudanese forces were allowed to use, inter alia, Gambella as 
passage to attack southern SPLA groups behind the frontlines. Diplo-
matic relations were re-established, with a Sudanese consulate in 
Gambella trying to tempt refugees back across the border, as agricul-
tural labour was needed. Later, this Gambella consulate was closed 
after diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Addis deteriorated 
from 1995 onwards. The SPLA were then able to reconstruct their 
strength morally and politically backed by both Ethiopia and newly 
independent Eritrea (James 2002: 269–270). Eventually, also the 
Nuer-dominated break-away factions with strong links to Gambella 
found their way back into the main SPLA movement, and even into its 
political leadership.  
 
The second Sudan Civil War was one of the longest-lasting and dead-
liest wars of the 20th century, with perhaps as many as 1.9 million 
casualties. The signing of the CPA in 2005 not only meant an end to 
the atrocities of war, but also that the approx. 4 million civilian south-
erners who had been forced to flee their homes could return.  
The Refugee Situation  
The UNHCR Sub-office in Gambella was established in 1969  – that 
is, during the first Sudanese Civil War and following the arrival of the 
first Sudanese refugees in the region. These groups were admitted into 
Ethiopia under the provisions of the OAU Convention of 1969, which 
governs the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. Most of 
the Southern Sudanese refugees were granted prima facie refugee 
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status in Ethiopia. Additionally, a small number of refugees, including 
asylum-seekers from Uganda, Burundi, DRC and more recently Dar-
fur, have been granted refugee status and accepted into the camps in 
Gambella, based on screening procedures and individual or group in-
terviews.5  
 
The refugee influx due to the Sudanese civil war has been an enduring 
and highly challenging situation for the Gambella community. 
Throughout the course of the Sudanese civil war, many Sudanese took 
refuge in neighbouring Gambella  – in fact, the Itang camp was at one 
point reported to be the largest refugee camp in the world. During the 
1991 regime change in Ethiopia, the camps were evacuated and refu-
gees returned to Sudan under difficult conditions, while most humani-
tarian and refugee workers left the area. From 1993 camps started to 
reopen, followed by a new and increased influx of refugees. This pe-
riod saw considerable cross-border movement.  
 
In the early 1990s the number of refugees peaked, with the UNHCR 
and Government of Ethiopia hosting about 550,000 Sudanese refu-
gees, who outnumbered the local community by a ratio of about 3:1. 
This became a critical challenge for the host society, particularly since 
the refugees altered the multiethnic composition of Gambella: the ma-
jority of arrivals were Nuer, along with a considerable portion of 
Anuak refugees, along with Dinka and Shiluk, amongst others. Deal-
ing with the refugee situation and its various facets remains the main 
concern of international engagement in the Gambella region. 
 
In 2006 there were about 70,000 refugees in Gambella. After the sign-
ing of the CPA, bringing peace between the warring North and South 
Sudan, repatriation programmes started. From March 2006 to May 
2007, more than 35,000 returned home, and three of the original five 
refugee camps were closed. Gambella region had hosted three camps 
(Bonga, Dimma and Fugnido), while two (Sherkole and Yarenja) were 
located in the Benshangul-Gumuz region to the north. Today, only 
Fugnido and Sherkole remain operative. In late May 2007, the Gam-
bella refugee camps hosted 32,623 refugees, mainly from Sudan’s 
Blue Nile and Upper Nile states. After Dimma camp was closed, 
Gambella hosted 21,960 refugees in the Fugnido camp as of August 
2008.6 Due to interethnic rivalries, this camp has been split into an 
Anuak and a Nuer part, of roughly equal size.  
 
There are at least two critical challenges to the ongoing voluntary re-
patriation programme: one relates to uncertainty regarding what to ex-
                                                 
5  See http://www.unhcrrlo.org/BasicFacts/Docs/Gambella.pdf. Accessed 24 September 
2009.  
6  UNHCR Briefing Note: Refugees in Gambella, Western Ethiopia. 
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pect, the other to citizenship. Most of the refugees have lived the ma-
jor parts of their lives in refugee camps, some even their whole lives. 
Leaving a life as refugees, they are now anxious as to what to expect 
upon return, and if the CPA of 2005 has brought lasting peace to Su-
dan. Moreover, having lived in Gambella camps for decades there is a 
concern over how the situation is in their home community – indeed, 
if the community even exists. Seeking to assuage these anxieties, the 
UNHCR has arranged information campaigns, lectures and so-called 
‘go-and-see’ trips in which authoritative figures, notably elders and 
political leaders of refugee communities, travel to Sudan to observe 
the areas of reception and verify the peace process. Although perhaps 
comparatively minor in extent, the issue of citizenship provides a 
challenge for repatriation as there have been reports that some Ethio-
pian Nuer have ‘enrolled’ in the refugee camps by claiming Sudanese 
citizenship. By claiming refugee status, these persons try to gain ac-
cess to the services and resources provided in the refugee camps, seen 
as better than what is available in the local communities. This practice 
interrelates with the regional conflict formation, as it mainly concerns 
the Ethiopian Nuer – who are, as we have noted, politically marginal-
ised in Gambella – and not the Anuak. When many remaining refu-
gees are reluctant to return to Sudan, one cause may in some cases be 
that they never were Sudanese in the first place. How this issue will be 
dealt with in the process of repatriation and camp closure remains to 
be seen. Both these challenges show that the camps are seen by refu-
gees and locals alike as relatively peaceful havens that offer better 
services than do their home communities in  Ethiopia or Sudan.  
International Involvement in the Gambella Conflict Formation 
We have seen that the pattern of conflicts in Gambella is highly com-
plex, spanning ethnic, livelihood, historical, and political dimensions. 
However, international involvement in this conflict formation has fo-
cused largely on one issue – the refugee situation – although some at-
tention has also been given to improving Nuer-Anuak relations and 
settling intra-Nuer conflicts.  
 
The limited attention currently accorded to Gambella by international 
actors can be explained by numerous interlinked factors. First is the 
security situation. The December 2003 massacre in Gambella, in 
which over 400 people were killed by Ethiopian soldiers and high-
lander mobs, was sparked by an alleged Anuak ambush of an ARRA 
vehicle.7 The ARRA vehicle had licence plates emblazoned with the 
UN logo, and although ARRA and the UN are by no means formally 
connected, the ambush led UN staff to fear that armed Anuak were 
                                                 
7  ARRA is the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs, a Government of Ethio-
pia agency that is the principal counterpart to the UNHCR.  
Jon Harald Sande Lie and Axel Borchgrevink 60 
deliberately targeting UN personnel (see HRW 2005: footnote 193). 
This led the UN to temporarily to pull all its staff out of Gambella, on 
grounds of security. Almost all foreign government agencies and in-
ternational NGOs followed suit. Although the 2003 massacre and UN 
withdrawal gave rise to a brief flurry of international attention to the 
region’s conflicts, this attention soon waned considerably – due not 
least to the lack of international presence. This relates to the second 
factor – the lack of reliable information. With most international ac-
tors having left the scene, the Ethiopian authorities have gained con-
trol over the information flow from Gambella. According to a recent 
Human Rights Watch report, ‘the Ethiopian government is manipulat-
ing those security issues to keep information from filtering out of the 
region for as long as possible’ (HRW 2005: 37). As information about 
conflict and security concerns is being under-communicated and in-
ternational actors are prone to take such information at face value, in-
ternational engagement in Gambella remains limited. This is further-
more exacerbated by and interlinked with a third factor – Gambella’s 
remoteness from central-level politics and (thus) international actors’ 
knowledge formation. It is also physically remote, located on the pe-
ripheral margin of the Ethiopian state, and difficult to access. Finally, 
international actors tend to shape their activities more in line with 
their own mandates and core competencies, rather than adjusting them 
to the contextual situation. When it comes to recognising the complex-
ity of the Gambella conflict formation, few actors are prepared to re-
spond as comprehensively as the situation requires. Such an acknowl-
edgement also implies the recognition that cross-border activities are 
crucial, and while Gambella might be in the remote periphery of a 
state demarcated by porous borders, international actors still recognise 
and respect these borders. This curtails attempts at addressing the 
cross-border dimensions of the regional conflict formation.  
 
While all these factors contribute to limiting international engagement 
in Gambella, there are some actors still operating in the area, although 
they deal primarily with the post-Sudan civil war refugee situation. 
Below we present the most prominent actors and their activities, be-
fore turning to a brief discussion of the challenges they face and the 
good practices they represent.  
 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
The UNHCR is the main international actor present in Gambella. It is 
mandated to protect and support refugees, and assist in their voluntary 
repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. The 
UNHCR has had a sub-office in Gambella since the first arrival of 
refugees in 1969, and has since been responsible for coordinating, 
monitoring and funding the refugee assistance programme. Today, it 
spearheads the international engagement in the region, and carries the 
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main responsibility of guaranteeing for refugee protection and sup-
port. The UNHCR has two main projects for Sudanese refugees in 
Western Ethiopia – care and maintenance assistance for the camps, 
and repatriation. The main objective of the former is to continue the 
provision of international protection and material assistance to all 
refugees. It also work to mitigate environmental degradation in refu-
gee-impacted areas, to promote the well-being of vulnerable groups 
and to prepare refugees for resettlement as a durable solution. The re-
patriation project supports the voluntary return of refugees to Sudan.8 
In Gambella, the UNHCR has no direct implementing role vis-à-vis 
the refugees or the camps, however. It coordinates and monitors pro-
grammes executed by and in collaboration with other agencies. The 
UNHCR serves as a funding agency that supervises the activities of 
other agencies and ensures that refugees receive the protection, ser-
vices and support to which they are entitled by international refugee 
law. 
 
ARRA – Administration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs 
ARRA is an Ethiopian government agency and the principal counter-
part of the UNHCR. It is responsible for managing the refugee camps 
and provides legal and physical protection of camp staff, organisation 
and refugees. It also facilitates primary and junior secondary educa-
tion and health and nutrition clinics. It manages all logistics involved 
in the delivery of services, water supplies and sanitation, and the dis-
tribution of food and non-food items. ARRA provides for the camps’ 
‘hardware’, while the ‘software’ components are delivered by associ-
ated partners, NGOs and others that receive UNHCR funding.  
 
ZoA Refugee Care 
ZoA is a Dutch NGO that supports refugees, internally displaced per-
sons, returnees and others affected by conflict or natural disaster. In 
the Gambella camps, ZoA provides community services, supports the 
UNHCR’s environmental awareness work and introduces environ-
mentally-friendly technologies. It also provides psycho-social service, 
pre-school activities, trains teachers, and is actively involved in 
HIV/AIDS awareness-raising.  
 
ZoA has a peace-building and conflict resolution programme, focused 
on both intra-camp conflict resolution and mitigating the feuds and 
conflicts between camp refugees and the host community. The latter 
conflict line concerns livelihood and resource use, as refugees graze 
their cattle in surrounding areas and thus impinge on what the locals 
consider their territory.  
 
 
                                                 
8  See UNHCR Briefing Note: Refugees in Gambella, Western Ethiopia.  
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RaDO – Rehabilitation and Development Organisation 
This organisation is rather limited in its dedicated scope of working 
with disabled persons. It provides disability prevention awareness, 
physical rehabilitation of disabled persons including the provision of 
auxiliary limbs, and physiotherapy services.  
 
NRDP – Natural Resource Development  
This organisation is engaged in rehabilitation of natural resources in 
affected areas and environment. Its activities include forestation, plan-
tation and managing a nursery site.  
 
DICAC – Development Inter Church Aid Commission 
DICAC is responsible for providing higher education and vocational 
skill training. It is also involved in promoting various income-
generating activities among refugees, to improve their livelihood as 
refugees and as returnees.  
 
These organisations are involved in the daily management and activi-
ties of the Fugnido refugee camp in Gambella. Additionally there are a 
few organisations involved in refugee matters and the wider Gambella 
conflict formation, although not as an integral part of daily camp man-
agement. Most of these belong to the UN family co-located in the 
Gambella UN compound and work according to their designated 
mandate. These agencies include the International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), which works with government and other UN agen-
cies with regard to the repatriation and resettlement of refugees; 
UNICEF, which facilitates schooling systems; the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP), which works together with the UNHCR in assisting 
refugees with food; and OCHA, which coordinates the relief activities 
and programmes of various UN and non-UN agencies. Of the non-UN 
agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has 
been present on a needs basis, with no permanent office in Gambella. 
It has been involved in delivering relief aid to displaced persons in the 
region following both natural and man-made crises. In May 2005, the 
ICRC delivered food and non-food items like agricultural tools to dis-
placed Anuak and Nuer communities, following clashes between 
them.9 Save the Children (UK) had an office in Gambella, but lack of 
resources has recently forced it to close.  
 
There are three international NGOs with permanent offices in Gam-
bella that deal with the regional conflict formation:  
 
HEKS 
HEKS is the aid organisation of the Protestant Churches of Switzer-
land. It is not an implementing agency, but serves as a donor to local 
                                                 
9  http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/6chldn?opendocument  
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and international NGOs in Gambella, and focuses on food and water 
security and community empowerment. The latter aspect includes a 
peace component; moreover, it responds and provides relief to hu-
manitarian emergencies. The peace component involves organising 
and funding interethnic workshops that emphasise dialogue between 
different groups – often centring around church activities. HEKS used 
to have an office in Sudan as well, but this was closed in 2005. Until 
then, however, no cross-border activities or cooperation had been un-
dertaken aimed at addressing the regional dimension of conflict.  
 
Acord – Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development 
Acord is an Africa-led international alliance working to promote so-
cial justice. In Gambella it has had two programmes, one on food se-
curity and livelihood, and the other on peace advocacy. However, the 
latter has now been terminated due to lack of funding, after being op-
erational from 2004 to 2008. The peace programme sought to address 
various interclan conflicts and conflicts between local population and 
highlanders by establishing peace committees and an elders’ peace 
council to facilitate dialogue and cordial relations between groups in-
ternal to Gambella. It did not explicitly address refugees or activities 
on the Sudanese side. Today, Acord’s work focuses on food security, 
livelihood and animal health. 
 
PACT10  
PACT is an American NGO, active in Ethiopia since 1996 under 
grants from USAID to strengthen the Ethiopian NGO sector. From its 
core competency in capacity-building, PACT has gradually expanded 
its focus to peace and conflict issues. PACT’s involvement in Gam-
bella region started in 2004. In fact, PACT began working in Gam-
bella because the organisation already had an active programme in 
South Sudan with a significant peace-making component, focused in-
ter alia on arranging peace conferences between elders and leaders of 
different ethnic groups or communities. With the conflict-filled situa-
tion in Gambella, and the many links to South Sudan, it was actually 
the SPLM that requested that USAID fund an extension of PACT’s 
peace programme over into the Ethiopian side of the border.  
 
In Gambella, PACT works with both local institutions and govern-
ment bodies in facilitating participatory approaches to conflict mitiga-
tion and peace-building campaigns that use various social events (like 
sports, concerts, art) to create space for later dialogue on more sensi-
tive issues between conflicting groups. Drawing on this, PACT at-
tempts to address tough political issues concerning interethnic rivalry 
                                                 
10   PACT is the only organization that is actually involved in a trans-border peace program, 
and consequently more space is dedicated to this NGO. 
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and the conflicts involving indigenous people, highlanders and repre-
sentatives of the central state.  
 
PACT has also recognised the cross-border dimensions to the conflicts 
and sought to develop specific component of its peace programme to 
deal with the issue. In general, PACT’s peace work is organised 
around clusters. For the cross-border component, four ‘corridors’ were 
identified between clusters on both sides, on the basis of the degree of 
connections (peaceful as well as conflictive) between the clusters. 
PACT’s work has included conflict mapping and analysis, a ‘people to 
people’ programme making use of elders, leaders and traditional reso-
lution mechanisms, dialogue between churches and traditional reli-
gious leaders  and intergovernmental approaches.  
 
Running a cross-border programme is extremely taxing and requires 
significant resource inputs. While all peace work is long-term and 
needs patience, doing this in coordination across a border with almost 
complete lack of infrastructure on either side is supremely challeng-
ing. ‘If you want to be efficient, don’t do it’, was the self-deprecating 
statement of one programme coordinator. Still, some results of the 
programme were seen. In our view, the ongoing problems and occa-
sional clashes across the border, between different Nuer sub-clans as 
well as between Sudanese Murle and Ethiopian Nuer and Anuaks, tes-
tify to the continuing need for such cross-border programmes. 
Conclusions: Challenges for Good International Engagement 
in Gambella  
The presentation above may give the impression of a vast international 
presence in Gambella. That is not the case. Although there are a num-
ber of actors present in Gambella, all have rather limited budgets, 
scopes and activities. The UN family – notably the UNHCR – consti-
tutes the main international involvement in the region, but their level 
of activity is gradually being reduced parallel to the increased repatria-
tion of refugees to Sudan. The involvement of other non-UN actors is 
also declining due to lack of funds. When back-donors de-prioritise 
Gambella, this may be due to a perceived reduction of conflict in the 
area as refugees return. This reflects the general sentiment of the vari-
ous actors in their activities in Gambella: that they are there first and 
foremost to deal with the refugee situation, including conflict, and, 
secondly, to address the effects of refugees and trans-border migration 
– not the causes. However, as this report has sought to demonstrate, 
the pattern of conflicts in Gambella is highly complex, shaped by en-
dogenous factors, including ethnicity, livelihood patterns, modes of 
production, resources, politics, as well as exogenous factors like high-
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land politics and federalism, the Sudanese civil war and the subse-
quent influx of refugees.  
 
There are obvious challenges for actors seeking to deal with the Gam-
bella conflict situation. Complex problems demands complex solu-
tions, and no single organisations has a mandate as comprehensive as 
this set of conflicts requires. The most appropriate would be the agen-
cies of the UN family, but although they operate interlinked – not in-
tegrated – their main focus is still on the refugees. The Gambella con-
flict formation is, as we have seen, much more complex than just lim-
ited to the refugee situation.  
 
There are two central challenges in dealing with such conflict forma-
tions that limit the actors seeking to deal with them. One concerns 
mandate, the other concerns border and state sovereignty. Organisa-
tions, both UN and non-UN actors, have their separate mandates and 
core competencies which direct their scope and focus of attention. 
This scope tends to be just as much determined by organisational his-
tory and the policies and organisational culture of their respective 
headquarters as by the actual needs present in the local context. 
Within the aid community there is an inevitable antagonism between 
bottom -up and top -down approaches, where the former relate to con-
cepts like local participation and ownership to enhance context sensi-
tivity and the latter relate to the concept of conditionality and how in-
ternational actors pursue their own objectives and strategies. Any in-
crease in organisational complexity tends to be paralleled by a de-
crease in context sensitivity. Moreover, although Gambella conflicts 
occur in the far periphery of the Ethiopian state and the international 
border is perceived as highly porous with significant transnational 
movement of people and goods, and this international dimension is 
recognised by the organisations, they must nevertheless respect the 
border. From the 1980s and particularly since the introduction of fed-
eralism in the early 1990s, Gambella has become increasingly eco-
nomically, culturally and administratively integrated with the central 
Ethiopian state, but the border with Sudan has never been effectively 
controlled. While cross-border communities, migrants, refugees and 
pasture-seeking nomads remain an important part of the regional con-
flict formation, international actors seem to focus on and operate in 
one state at a time. These remain critical challenges in dealing with 
the regional conflict formation of Gambella.  
 
There have been, however, some practical attempts at recognising the 
cross-border dimension that can be said to constitute good lessons of 
international involvement in regional conflict. Prior to commencing its 
activities in Ethiopia, PACT was deeply involved in Southern Sudan – 
including in regions bordering Gambella – with a peace programme. 
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Its establishment in Gambella was partly due to recognition of the 
relevance of cross-border movement for conflict formation, and some 
activities were initiated seeking to deal with the issue. However, the 
complexity of working in these remote areas with very little infra-
structure, and great challenges in terms of communication, transport, 
contact with authorities, etc., has meant that the results have not been 
overwhelming. Still, we can see some positive results from this ap-
proach. Worthy of mention is the willingness of border authorities and 
other state representatives on both sides to take part in and support the 
initiatives, and the positive effect of relatively simple inputs, such as 
communication equipment that enables telephone contact between the 
authorities on both sides of the border.11  
 
We should also point out the specific resources that PACT could bring 
to the cross-border project: an ongoing programme on both sides of 
the border, solid knowledge of the area and its peoples, experience 
with successful local-level peace interventions in Southern Sudan, the 
support of the authorities on both sides, financial backing from 
USAID, etc. In short, they were in a position for implementing a 
cross-border programme that few other international actors may hope 
to match. When PACT representatives themselves conclude that the 
results of these interventions have been limited, that is an indication of 
the tremendous difficulties facing such work. It leads to sobering con-
clusions about what can be expected from international actors seeking 
to deal with complex transnational conflict situations. 
 
The overall lesson of the experiences in Gambella points to the inher-
ent structural challenges to the international society. International ac-
tors are not only state-centric by themselves. The need to work 
through and with the consent of host government, as well as its admin-
istrative and bureaucratic structures, reinforces the state-centric ap-
proach of international actors to transnational and regional conflict 
formation. Any organisations working on both sides of a border need 
to relate to the host governments’ structures and strategies, so trans-
border operations will inevitably add administrative and transaction 
costs. Although the areas on both the Sudanese and the Ethiopian side 
are seen as lying on the very margins of two states separated by a po-
rous border that allows for continuous cross-border migrations and 
relations, this actually adds to the problem: Weak institutions with 
limited resources, communication equipment, transport facilities and 
human resources make coordination slow and burdensome. 
                                                 
11   In general, the international actors involved in peace issues within Gambella (mostly 
NGOs) all reported relatively good relations with state institutions, although with some 
concerns as to what the implementation of the new NGO Law would mean for activities 
of this type.  
Understanding the Gambella Conflict Formation 67
Bibliography 
Clapham, Christopher. 2002. Controlling Space in Ethiopia. In Re-
mapping Ethiopia. Socialism & After, edited by W. James, D. 
L. Donham, E. Kurimoto and A. Triulzi. Oxford; Athens, OH; 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: James Curry, Ohio University Press, 
Addis Ababa University Press. 
Feyissa, Dereje. 2002. Contesting autochtony: strategies of land enti-
tlement among the Nuer of the Gambella region. Draft paper. 
Presented at conference on The landed and the landless: 
strategies on territorial integration and dissociation in Africa. 
Max Planck Institute, May 27–29, 2002. 
———. 2005. Land and the politics of identity. The case of Anywaa-
Nuer relations in the Gambella Region. In Competing jurisdic-
tion. Settling land claims in Africa, edited by S. Evers, M. 
Spierenburg and H. Wels. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill Aca-
demic Publishers. 
———. 2006. The experience of Gambella regional state. In Ethnic 
federalism. The Ethiopian experience in comparative perspec-
tive, edited by D. Turton. Oxford: James Currey. 
———. 2008. Layers of conflict in the Gambella region. An interac-
tive approach. In Hot spot Horn of Africa revisited. Ap-
proaches to make sense of conflict, edited by E.-M. Bruchhaus 
and M. M. Sommer. Berlin: LIT Verlag. 
Fiseha, Assefa. 2006. Theory versus practice in the implementation of 
Ethiopia's ethnic federalism. In Ethnic federalism. The Ethio-
pian experience in comparative perspective, edited by D. Tur-
ton. Oxford: James Currey. 
Hammond, Jenny. 1999. Fire from the ashes. A chronicle of the revo-
lution in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975–1991. Asmara, Eritrea: The 
Red Sea Press, Inc. 
HRW. 2005. Targeting the Anuak. Human rights violations and 
crimes against humanity in Ethiopia's Gambella Region. 
March 23, 2005. Available at 
www.hrw.org/en/node/11812/section/1: Human Rights Watch. 
James, Wendy. 2002. No place to hide. Flag waving on the western 
frontier. In Remapping Ethiopia: Socialism and after, edited 
by W. James, D. Donham, E. Kurimoto and A. Triulzi. Ox-
ford: James Currey. 
Johnson, Douglas H. 1996. ‘Increasing the Trauma of Return: An As-
sessment of the UN’s Emergency Response to the Evacuation 
of the Sudanese Refugee Camps in Ethiopia 1991’. In Allen 
(ed.) In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight and Homecoming 
in Northeast Africa. Geneva: UNRISD. 
Jon Harald Sande Lie and Axel Borchgrevink 68 
Johnson, Douglas H. 2003. The root causes of Sudan's civil wars. Ox-
ford: James Currey. 
Kurimoto, Eisei. 2005. Multidimensional impact of refugees and set-
tlers in the Gambella Region, Western Ethiopia. In Displace-
ment risks in Africa, edited by O. Ituru and G. Yintso. Kyoto: 
Kyoto University Press. 
Lie, Jon Harald Sande. 2004. Discursive development order and local 
informal practices: a development project in Northern Ethio-
pia. Cand. Polit., Department of Social Anthropology, Univer-
sity of Oslo, Oslo. 
Meckelburg, Alexander. 2006. Changing ethnic relations. A prelimi-
nary investigation of Gambella, Southwest Ethiopia. In Work-
ing paper. Available at 
http://www.anyuakmedia.com/Changing%20Ethnic%20Relatio
ns%20in%20Gambella.pdf. Hamburg: Asien-Afrika Institut 
der Universität Hamburg. 
———. 2008. Some preliminary considerations on collective vio-
lence, identity and conflict and their coherence: The case of 
Gambella, Western Ethiopia. In Hot spot Horn of Africa revis-
ited. Approaches to make sense of conflict, edited by E.-M. 
Bruchhaus and M. M. Sommer. Berlin: LIT Verlag. 
Pankhurst, Alula. 1997. When the centre relocates the periphery. Re-
settlement during the Derg. In Ethiopia in a broader perspec-
tive. Papers of the 13th International Conference of Ethiopian 
Studies. Kyoto: University of Kyoto Press. 
RRC. 1981. Settlement Policy of the Relief and Rehabilitation Com-
mission of the Provisional Military Government of Socialist 
Ethiopia. Addis Ababa. 
Rubin, Barnett. 2006. Central Asia and Central Africa: transnational 
wars and ethnic conflicts. Journal of Human Development 
7:5–22. 
Tadesse, Medhane. 2007. Gambella. The impact of local conflict on 
regional security. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security 
Studies. 
Ulriksen, Ståle. 2009. Webs of war. The international community and 
the handling of regional conflict formations in West Africa and 
Central Africa. FORTHCOMING.  
Viezzoli, Claudio. 1992. Scenarios of economic development in the 
Beles Valley. In Resettlement and rural development in Ethio-
pia : social and economic research, training, and technical as-
sistance in the Beles Valley, edited by P. Dieci and C. Viez-
zoli. Milano, Italy: Angeli. 
Young, John. 1999. Along Ethiopia's western frontier: Gambella and 
Benishangul in transition. Journal of Modern African Studies 
37:312–346. 
Case Study II:  
International Engagement to the 
Ethiopia--Eritrea Conflict 
 
By Jon Harald Sande Lie 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) 
 
 
Introduction 
For almost three decades, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) fought 
against the Ethiopian military dictatorship known as the Derg (1974–
1991). After jointly toppling the Derg regime, the two parties went on 
to pursue separate goals. The TPLF became the dominant party in the 
Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that 
assumed, and still maintains, government office in Addis Ababa. In 
agreement with the EPRDF government, the EPLF prepared Eritrea’s 
secession from Ethiopia. In 1993, Eritrea became independent from 
Ethiopia in a peaceful process involving a referendum. In 1998, how-
ever, a border war erupted between the two states, turning the ‘broth-
ers in arms’ into ‘brothers at war’ and marking the start of a protracted 
conflict with major ramifications for security, regional cooperation 
and relations among the countries of the Horn of Africa. Resolving – 
or at least containing – the Eritrean–Ethiopian conflict is seen as cru-
cial in order to prevent ‘…the dangerous escalation of regional con-
flicts’ – as with regard to Somalia, the Sudan and the implementation 
of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as well as the Darfur vio-
lence which continues to rage and even spill over into Chad.1  
 
The Eritrean–Ethiopian war between May 1998 and June 2000 has 
been characterised as a traditional border war over contested territo-
ries. The belligerents focused explicitly on the border issue as their 
main concern. The international involvement in this conflict perceived 
the conflict as solely one over a disputed international border, and re-
                                                 
1   Lyons, Terrence. 2006. Avoiding conflict in the Horn of Africa. U.S. policy toward 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). The Center 
for Preventive Action (CPA). Available at  
www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Ethiopia_EritreaCSR21.pdf  
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sponded to it as such. However, analysts have pointed out that the war 
was the inevitable culmination of accumulated factors in the Eritrean–
Ethiopian relationship since Eritrean independence – factors like 
Ethiopia’s access to Eritrean harbours, and Eritrea shifting from 
Ethiopian currency to its own currency and thereby affecting taxation, 
border trade and import/export relations. Others claim the war was 
over rival hegemonic claims in the Horn of Africa, national pride and 
territorial integrity. By 1998, relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia 
were in a poor state. ‘The classic imperatives of state- and nation-
building drove both regimes to set forth unconditional goals and re-
fuse compromise on those questions and the vital issue of territorial-
ity, legitimacy and identity’.2 In fact, Eritrea, as Africa’s newest state, 
has had border disputes with all its neighbours: with Djibouti, Ethio-
pia and Sudan, as well as with Yemen, across the Red Sea.  
 
In May 1998, war broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in and over 
the disputed and symbolically important border town of Badme. 
Ethiopian authorities saw Eritrea’s territorial annexation of Badme as 
illegal, and the skirmish soon escalated into outright warfare. After 
intermittent fighting and a period of stalemate and unproductive nego-
tiations, Ethiopia launched a major offensive in May 2000, breaking 
through Eritrean defence lines and forcing the army back to pre-May 
1998 positions, whereupon Ethiopia withdrew its army to its original 
position. As many as 100,000 people were killed in the intermittent 
fighting, and up to one million were driven into exile or internal dis-
placement, diverting hundreds of millions from development activities 
into arms procurement.  
International Engagement to the Eritrea--Ethiopia Conflict 
On 18 June 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a ceasefire agreement. 
The agreement was brokered and ratified in Algiers, as Algeria at the 
time chaired the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). This June 
agreement not only produced a cessation of hostilities, it also paved 
the way for future international engagement in the conflict: the Algiers 
agreement called upon the United Nations to establish a peacekeeping 
mission – UNMEE – to establish and monitor a 25 km buffer zone 
separating the parties. The Algiers talks continued, with the aim of 
turning the cessation of hostilities agreement into a more final and 
comprehensive peace agreement. The United States played a promi-
nent role in these talks, and Anthony Lake was appointed special en-
voy due to the Clinton administration’s close relationship to the Eri-
trean and Ethiopian leadership. Under the auspices of an internation-
ally brokered agreement, a second and more comprehensive Algiers 
                                                 
2   Ibid.: 6. 
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agreement was signed in December 2000. To aid the prospects for 
lasting peace, this second Algiers agreement also established the Eri-
trea–Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) and the Eritrean–Ethiopian 
Boundary Commission (EEBC) to determine the origin of conflict and 
demarcate the border, respectively. The two Algiers agreements stipu-
late the framework for international engagement to the Ethiopian–
Eritrean conflict. In-between the two Algiers agreements, the UN Se-
curity Council authorised UNMEE, before the second Algiers agree-
ment established the EECC and EEBC.  
 
International involvement in the Eritrean–Ethiopian conflict has cen-
tred on the United Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE). Hence, 
the story of UNMEE – from its inception, via the challenges it en-
countered in its wider lifespan, until its termination on 31 July 2008 – 
is basically the story of international engagement in this conflict. This 
case study analyses UNMEE and why it was terminated, to provide 
better insights into international engagement in the Ethio–Eritrean 
conflict. Before proceeding to the UNMEE-story, a brief account is 
given of other minor and unsuccessful attempts of international in-
volvement.  
 
Some initiatives outside UNMEE and UN bodies evolved as UNMEE 
found itself facing several challenges that serve to direct attention 
back to the conflict. The group Friends of UNMEE was established, as 
an informal group of diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa, Asmara 
and New York that met regularly to discuss and share information 
about UNMEE. This group had no role vis-à-vis the mission, how-
ever. 
 
As a response to concerns about the lack of progress in implementing 
the Algiers agreement, the UN Secretary-General in 2004 appointed 
Lloyd Axworthy as special envoy for Eritrea and Ethiopia. This dip-
lomatic initiative was unsuccessful. It attempted to merge UNMEE 
and EEBC, as their compartmentalisation (stemming from their sepa-
rate Algiers agreements) was seen as problematic to the peace process. 
Eritrea, however, saw this as an attempt to use diplomatic dialogue as 
a pretext for amending, revising or reversing established agreements – 
particularly the EEBC decision, which was seen to favour Eritrea, 
even though both parties had agreed that its ruling was to be final and 
binding.  
 
The few non-UN attempts to address the conflict have largely come 
from the USA. After Eritrea imposed restrictions on UNMEE and 
some troop-contributing countries were advocating that the mission be 
withdrawn, Washington in 2006 responded with an improvised unilat-
eral initiative to break the impasse. The US ambassador to the UN, 
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John Bolton, asked the Security Council to delay any action while 
Washington sent Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jen-
dayi Frazer and Marine General Carlton Fulford, to the region. While 
Frazer was welcomed to meet the Ethiopian political leadership and 
also visited the Ethiopian side of the border region, she was refused 
meetings with Eritrean leaders, who were unwilling to discuss the 
border issue which they saw as settled by the EEBC. Moreover, Gen-
eral Fulford, who had been invited by Frazer, was never seen as neu-
tral to the conflict by the Eritreans, as he at the time was director of 
the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, the US Defense Department 
regional centre located in Addis Ababa.  
 
In early 2006, representatives of the witnesses (OAU, EU, UN, Alge-
ria, and the USA) to the December Algiers agreement convened in 
New York to discuss challenges in implementing the accord. In March 
and in May 2006, the EEBC met in London, together with the Algiers 
witnesses. It was regarded as significant progress that officials from 
Eritrea and Ethiopia attended both meetings. However, this failed to 
generate any substantial movement toward implementing the agree-
ment or lifting the restrictions put on UNMEE. The stalemate situation 
was reproduced as both sides restated their earlier position and 
showed little inclination to reach an agreement.  
 
After the Algiers agreements, international engagement in the Ethio-
pian–Eritrean conflict has been scarce. UNMEE and other initiatives 
taken have centred on implementing the provisions of the Algiers 
agreements. The main challenge was the compartmentalisation of the 
two agreements. Today, UNMEE from the first agreement has been 
terminated, and EEBC and EECC dissolved themselves once they 
considered their mandate fulfilled. Although these institutions could 
be said to illustrate good international engagement when they were 
active, they shared the problem of being disconnected from each 
other, allowing the parties to selectively truncate the one and support 
the other. Perhaps the main problem of international engagement after 
2000 has been the lack of any initiatives seeking to transcend the lim-
its imposed by the Algiers agreement. The UNMEE-story is as such a 
telling case.  
Establishing UNMEE 
UNMEE was established to monitor the cessation of hostilities agree-
ment between Eritrea and Ethiopia following their mutual ceasefire 
agreement. The border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea lasted for 
about two years, from May 1998 to June 2000. On 18 June 2000, both 
parties signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities; this was in 
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Algiers,3 which chaired the OAU at the time.4 In the agreement the 
parties committed themselves to the immediate cessation of hostilities 
and to allow a peacekeeping mission to be deployed by the UN. In the 
parties’ request to the UN to assist in implementing the cessation of 
hostilities agreement, the Security Council in July 2000 established 
UNMEE.5 UNMEE was to be deployed in three phases: first a liaison 
officer to each capital; then, up to one hundred military observers and 
necessary civilian support staff would be deployed.6 Finally, a full 
peacekeeping operation would be deployed, pending authorisation 
from the Security Council. In September, the Security Council author-
ised the deployment of up to 4,200 troops including up to 220 military 
observers.7 UNMEE was established under Chapter 6 of the UN Char-
ter as an observer mission that would monitor the ceasefire agreement 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the temporary security zone (TSZ) 
separating the parties.  
 
While the UN dispatched and implemented UNMEE, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia continued negotiations in Algiers with the aim of a final and 
comprehensive peace agreement. This agreement, signed 12 Decem-
ber 2000, commits the parties to terminate military hostilities perma-
nently, to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, 
and to respect and implement the provisions of the cessation of hostili-
ties agreement.8 In addition, the December agreement produced two 
important outputs that would later become highly contentious, and 
thus affect UNMEE in managing the dialogue between the parties and 
facilitating UNMEE. 
 
Article 3 states that ‘in order to determine the origins of the conflict, 
an investigation will be carried out on the incidents of 6 May 1998 
and on any other incident prior to that date which could have contrib-
uted to a misunderstanding between the parties regarding their com-
mon border, including the incidents of July and August 1997.’ Article 
5 states that a neutral Claims Commission shall be established with 
the mandate ‘…to decide through binding arbitration all claims for 
loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other…’. The 
Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) was convened in 2001, 
consisting of five members – Eritrea appointed two non-Eritreans and 
Ethiopia appointed two non-Ethiopians, who together agreed upon a 
                                                 
3  Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Federal De-
mocratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/17/8/8238.pdf. Accessed 15 May 2000.  
4  Organisation for African Unity, the predecessor to the African Union.  
5  S/RES/1312, adopted by the Security Council on 31 July 2000.  
6  Both as a result of S/RES/1312 (2000). 
7  S/RES/1320, adopted by the Security Council on 15 September 2000.  
8  The Algiers Peace Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Re-
public of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, signed 12 December 2000, 
is available at http://unmee.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=57. Accessed 17 May 
2009.  
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fifth member, who also chaired the commission. With reference to jus 
ad bellum – a set of criteria for determining whether entering into war 
is justifiable – the EECC ruled that Eritrea had broken international 
law and triggered the war by invading Ethiopia. It asserted that since 
there had been no armed attack against Eritrea, its attack on Ethiopia 
and the settling of border disputes by the use of force could not be 
considered lawful self-defence under the UN Charter. The Claims 
Commission ruled Eritrea as the perpetrator to the armed border con-
flict. In public opinion, Ethiopia became celebrated as the moral vic-
tor: after having repelled Eritrean forces back into Eritrea, it arguably 
withdrew to its original position along the border which it had held 
before the war broke out. Although Eritrea disputed the EECC deci-
sion for a long time, it finally, on 18 August 2009 and over one year 
after the closure of UNMEE, accepted the verdict ‘without any 
equivocation due to its final and binding nature under the Algiers 
Agreement’.9 Although the EECC held Eritrea to be the instigator of 
the war, this thorny issue was overshadowed by another commission – 
the EEBC – which became the central issue to the two parties.  
 
According to Article 4 of the December 2000 agreement, ‘the parties 
agree that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of five members 
shall be established with a mandate to delimit and demarcate the colo-
nial treaty border… The Commission shall not have the power to 
make decisions ex aequo et bono.’10 On 13 April 2002, the Eritrean–
Ethiopian Boundary Commission (EEBC)11 published its decision re-
garding delimitation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia,12 un-
der reference to the Algiers agreement that ‘the parties agree that the 
delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Commission shall 
be final and binding’. Initially, both parties welcomed the EEBC deci-
sion. Ethiopia was happy to be granted Zalambessa, but Ethiopia 
started to refute the EEBC’s ruling when it later realised that the 
EEBC established the city of Badme as Eritrean. On 13 May the 
Ethiopian government filed a request for interpretation, correction and 
consultation, challenging EEBC’s decision by requesting new consid-
eration before or during the physical demarcation phase. The EEBC, 
in response to the Ethiopian request, did not find anything to indicate 
an uncertainty in the decision that needed to be resolved by a reinter-
                                                 
9  See http://www.shabait.com/staging/publish/article_0010314.html. This statement came 
the day after the EECC had delivered its final verdict. See EECC press release where it 
rendered final awards on damages. http://www.pca–
cpa.org/upload/files/EECC%20Final%20Awards%20Press%20Release.pdf Both these 
sites were accessed 8 October 2009.  
10  Ex aequo et bono: the arbitrator decides on a case on the basis of what is just and fair 
under the circumstances. The Algiers December agreement explicitly forbids Boundary 
Commission to decide on the border dispute ex aequo et bono, and stipulates that the bor-
der be delimited on the basis of relevant colonial treaties (from 1900, 1902, and 1908) and 
applicable international law.  
11  For EEBC, see http://www.pca–cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1150  
12  The final document is available at http://www.un.org/NewLinks/eebcarbitration/EEBC–
Decision.pdf.  
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pretation of the factual matters, ‘nor is any case made out for revi-
sion’, and thus concluded that the Ethiopian request was ‘inadmissible 
and no further action will be taken upon it’.13 Ethiopia has maintained 
its claim over the Badme area, the disputed territory where the first 
fighting occurred in May 1998 and now established as the metonym of 
the Ethio–Eritrean conflict. As of 2009, Ethiopia has continued to 
claim this territory, while Eritrea insists that the border issue is no 
longer negotiable, since the EEBC dissolved itself after providing de-
marcation by coordinates. 
 
International involvement in the Eritrean–Ethiopian boundary conflict 
has emanated from the Algiers agreements. While the June 2000 Al-
giers agreement – often referred to as the first Algiers agreement, or 
AA1 – produced a ceasefire agreement between the parties, it also re-
quested the UN to establish a peacekeeping mission, hence UNMEE. 
The second Algiers agreement – or AA2, often referred to as the main 
and comprehensive peace agreement – permanently terminated mili-
tary hostilities between the parties, as well as establishing the EECC 
and the EEBC. Apart from AA2 including language re-committing the 
parties to respect and implement the provisions of AA1, there is no 
formal interlinkage between the two agreements. Thus initially and 
formally, UNMEE was largely decoupled from the comprehensive 
peace process, from settling the border dispute and from facilitating 
the EECC and EEBC decisions – all of which were to have significant 
bearing for UNMEE’s role and ability to fulfil its mandate.  
Reconfiguring UNMEE 
UNMEE was regularly adjusted and reconfigured, usually in response 
to factors external to itself. This section outlines the formation and 
reconfiguration of UNMEE. In response to the Secretary-General’s 
report on Ethiopia and Eritrea,14 which summed up the June Algiers 
agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the Security Council first 
established and then authorised UNMEE.15 In accordance with AA1, 
UNMEE was authorised by the Security Council as follows:  
 
– to monitor the cessation of hostilities;  
– to assist, as appropriate, in ensuring the observance of the se-
curity commitments agreed by the parties;  
                                                 
13  See EEBC ‘Decision Regarding the “request for interpretation, correction and consulta-
tion” submitted by the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 13 May 2002’, avail-
able at http://www.pca–cpa.org/upload/files/Decision24June2002.pdf  
14  S/2000/643 Report of the Secretary–General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 30 June 2000. 
Available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/508/70/PDF/N0050870.pdf?OpenElement  
15  S/RES/1312 and S/RES/1320 respectively.  
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– to monitor and verify the redeployment of Ethiopian troops 
from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not un-
der Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998;  
– to monitor the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed;  
– to monitor the positions of Eritrean forces that were to rede-
ploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 kilometres from po-
sitions to which Ethiopian forces were to redeploy;  
– to monitor the temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in en-
suring compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostili-
ties;  
– to chair the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to be 
established by UN and AU in agreement with AA1;  
– to coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian 
de-mining action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it; 
and  
– to coordinate the Mission’s activities in the TSZ and areas ad-
jacent to it with humanitarian and human rights activities of 
the UN and other organisations in those areas.16  
 
According to the security commitments of AA1 referred to in the au-
thorisation of the UNMEE mandate:  
 
Ethiopia shall submit to the peacekeeping mission redeployment plans for 
its troops from positions taken after 6 February 1999 which were not under 
Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998. This redeployment is to take 
place within two weeks after the deployment of the peacekeeping mission 
and is to be verified by it. For its part, Eritrea is to maintain its forces at a 
distance of 25 kilometres (artillery range) from positions to which the 
Ethiopian forces are to redeploy.17 
  
Subsequently, when UNMEE was put before the Security Council for 
mandate renewal, it ‘would take into account whether the parties had 
made adequate progress in the process of delimitation and demarca-
tion’.18 In his report, the Secretary-General asserted that the timely 
deployment of troops had allowed the mission to proceed in a satisfac-
tory manner, although some difficulties pertaining to the parties were 
noted, especially in establishing the TSZ. Consequently, following the 
recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council 15 
March 2001 renewed UNMEE’s mandate, with a call to the parties to 
‘continue working towards the full and prompt implementation of 
their Agreements … in particular the rearrangement of forces neces-
                                                 
16  S/RES/1320 point 2 a-i.  
17  S/2000/643. See also Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eri-
trea, points 9 and 12.  
18  S/2001/202 Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 7 March 2001. 
Available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/275/36/PDF/N0127536.pdf?OpenElement  
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sary for the establishment of the Temporary Security Zone’.19 For the 
next mission renewal, the Security Council’s wording changed, from 
calls on the parties to ‘continue working’,20 to ‘cooperate fully and 
expeditiously with UNMEE in the implementation of its mandate and 
to abide scrupulously by the letter and spirit of their agreements’.21 
The next time UNMEE renewal was brought before the Security 
Council, the tone was more optimistic, expressing ‘satisfaction and 
anticipation that a final legal settlement of the border issues is about to 
be reached’ and welcoming ‘recent statements by both parties reaf-
firming that the upcoming border delimitation determination … by the 
Boundary Commission is final and binding’.22 The same resolution, 
however, also called on Eritrea to ‘provide UNMEE with full freedom 
of movement’ and disclose the size and position of its militia and po-
lice inside the TSZ, and to conclude the status-of-force agreement 
(SOFA) with the Secretary-General.23 Although indicating challenges 
to UNMEE’s operational capabilities in the TSZ, the Security Council 
nevertheless renewed the mandate for a further six months, pending 
the EEBC decision of 13 April 2002 and the parties’ promise to abide 
by its decision.  
 
When renewing the mission mandate on 14 August 2002, the Security 
Council adjusted UNMEE’s mandate to assist the EEBC ‘in the expe-
ditious and orderly implementation of its Delimitation Decision’,24 
including de-mining activities in the demarcation areas and adminis-
trative and logistical support to EEBC field offices.25 The Security 
Council strongly emphasised the importance of implementing the de-
marcation process as the key to further peace and to normalising rela-
tions. While the following Security Council resolution merely ex-
tended UNMEE for another six months,26 the subsequent resolution 
urged the parties to assume their responsibilities, fulfil their commit-
ments under the Algiers agreements and to cooperate fully with the 
EEBC.27  
 
Although the Security Council in all resolutions stated that it had de-
cided ‘to remain actively seized of the matter’,28 UNMEE was regu-
larly reproduced without any significant alterations, apart from at-
                                                 
19  S/RES/1344 Resolution 1344 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4284th meeting, on 
15 March 2001.  
20  Ibid.: Article 2. 
21  S/RES/1369 Resolution 1369 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4372nd meeting, on 
14 September 2001, Article 2.  
22  S/RES/1398, Resolution 1398 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4494th meeting, on 
15 March 2002, Article 2.  
23  Ibid.: Article 10.  
24  The adjustments were made in accordance with the Secretary-General’s recommendations 
in his report of 10 July 2002 (S/2002/744).  
25  S/RES1430, Resolution 1430 Adopted by the Security Council at its 4600th meeting, on 
14 August 2002, Article 1. 
26  S/RES/1434. 
27  S/RES/1466. 
28  This phrase is added as the last article in all resolutions concerning UNMEE.  
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tempts to link UNMEE closer to the EEBC. This proved difficult be-
cause of the independent constitution of the EEBC, and materialised 
only in establishing mine action activities for UNMEE to assist the 
EEBC in implementing its decision. From September 2003, however, 
the Security Council started to include language about following 
closely the progress made by the parties in subscribing to their com-
mitments under the Algiers agreements, and ‘to review any implica-
tions for UNMEE’.29 Although many – largely in retrospect – saw se-
rious implications for UNMEE’s operational capabilities, the Security 
Council over the next two years renewed the mandate four times 
without making any significant changes to the mandate, apart from 
repeated calls on the parties to ‘cooperate fully and promptly’ and ‘re-
frain from any threat of use of force against each other’.30 The minor 
changes made included an adjustment of UNMEE’s presence and op-
erations,31 and an increase of ten military observers.32  
 
The next time UNMEE was brought before the Security Council – on 
23 November 2005, only two months after last time the Security 
Council had deliberated UNMEE and extended its mandate by another 
six months – the tone had become harsher. Whereas all previous Secu-
rity Council resolutions had concerned mission extension and were 
preceded by a special report, this resolution, S/RES/1640, focused ex-
plicitly on the situation in expressing ‘its grave concern’ that Eritrea 
since 4 October had restricted all helicopter flights within its airspace 
and that the restrictions put on UNMEE’s freedom of movement have 
‘serious implications for UNMEE’s ability to carry out its man-
date…’.33 While the Security Council declared that it ‘deeply deplores 
Eritrea’s continued imposition of restrictions’ on UNMEE’s freedom 
of movement, it also expressed ‘grave concern’ that Ethiopia was not 
abiding by the final and binding EEBC decision. Although the Secu-
rity Council had previously stated it would ‘review any implications 
for UNMEE’,34 it still did not alter the mission following these restric-
tions. Based on the reports of the Secretary-General (SG) dated 3 
January and 6 March 2006,35 in which the former reported ‘a serious 
deterioration of the security and political situation in the UNMEE 
Mission area’ resulting from ‘an accumulation of unresolved issues’, 
the Security Council on 14 March extended UNMEE’s mandate by a 
period of one month36 ‘in order to allow for the diplomatic process to 
                                                 
29  S/RES/1507. See Article 7. 
30  S/RES/1531; S/RES/1560; S/RES/1586; S/RES/1622. 
31  In S/RES/1560 of 14 September 2004, in accordance with the Secretary-General’s report 
S/2004/708. 
32  S/RES/1622. 
33  S/RES/1640, adopted by the Security Council on 23 November 2005.  
34  First included in S/RES/1507 of 12 September 2003. 
35  S/2006/1 and S/2006/140, respectively. The former mentions a possible adjustment of 
UNMEE.  
36  S/RES/1661, in which the Council reaffirmed its strong commitment to ensure that the 
two parties permit UNMEE to perform its duties without restrictions. 
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proceed and the forthcoming meeting of the EEBC to bear fruit’.37 In 
fact that meeting failed to bear more fruit, so the Security Council yet 
again extended the mandate for a period of one month until 15 May,38 
while noting that the restrictions put on UNMEE had drastically re-
duced UNMEE operational capacity, which could entail serious impli-
cations for the mission’s future.39 On 15 May the mandate was ex-
tended for the bare minimum of two weeks until 31 May, pending the 
outcome of the EEBC meeting on 17 May, on which a possible mis-
sion adjustment was contingent. In conjunction with renewing the 
mandate with four months, the military component was reconfigured, 
reducing the maximum troop limit to 2300.40 In late September that 
year, the mandate was extended by another four months,41 with provi-
sions to transform or reconfigure the mission further if the parties 
should fail to demonstrate progress in the border demarcation.42 In 
January 2007, the mission is extended by six months, but reduced to a 
maximum of 1700 military personnel.43 This resolution, it should be 
noted, acknowledged the EEBC letter of 27 November 2006, which 
stated that if the parties had not reached an agreement on the border 
issues by the end of November 2007, ‘the Commission hereby deter-
mines that the boundary will automatically stand as demarcated by the 
boundary points … and that the mandate of the Commission can then 
be regarded as fulfilled’.44 This reference and the troop level were 
maintained in the two subsequent mandate renewals,45 each of which 
prolonged the mission by six months, until 31 July 2008.  
 
On 30 July 2008, the Security Council adopted resolution 1827, which 
terminated UNMEE with effect from 31 July.46 The decision evolved 
after long deliberations following the Secretary-General’s special re-
                                                 
37  S/2006/140, paragraph 32.  
38  S/RES1670, adopted 13 April 2006.  
39  There were some unsuccessful diplomatic initiatives to mitigate the conflict at this stage, 
for example by Special Envoy Lloyd Axworthy, and a US campaign in 2006 involving 
General Fulford. The Ethio–Eritrean conflict got wider ramifications. In 2007 Eritrea sus-
pended its membership in IGAD, and later recalled its AU ambassador because of the or-
ganisation’s perceived failure to condemn Ethiopia’s ‘gross violations’ of the existing 
peace agreement. See Afrol News: Eritrea Breaks With African Union.  
http://www.afrol.com/articles/10577  
40  S/RES/1681, adopted 31 May 2006.  
41  In S/2006/749 the Secretary-General proposed a six–month extension.  
42  S/RES/1710, adopted 29 September 2006.  
43  S/RES/1741, adopted 30 January 2007. The reconfiguration is in accordance with option 
1 as described in paragraph 24 and 25 of the Secretary–General’s special report 
(S/2006/992). Option 2 suggested relocating all personnel outside of TSZ to the south of 
TSZ, which would entail increased cross–border activity being contingent on full coop-
eration of the parties. Option 3 involved transforming UNMEE into an observer mission 
supported by a smaller military protection force, thus reducing personnel from 2300 to 
800. Option 4 suggested converting UNMEE into a small liaison mission with office in 
Addis Ababa and Asmara. 
44  Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission. Statement by the Commission, dated 27 No-
vember 2006, paragraph 22. Available at  
www.pca–cpa.org/upload/files/Statement%20271106.pdf.  
45  S/RES/1767, adopted 30 July 2007, and S/RES/1798, adopted 30 January 2008.  
46  S/RES/1827. 
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port on UNMEE, dated 7 April.47 Recognising the detrimental situa-
tion facing UNMEE and its challenges in fulfilling its mandate, the 
SG outlined four options: a) to maintain and pursue implementing 
UNMEE as originally intended and envisaged; b) terminate UNMEE; 
c) recalibrate and reduce UNMEE to a small observer mission in the 
border area; and d) exchange the mission with liaison offices in Addis 
Ababa and Asmara to maintain UN readiness and assistance.48 These 
options, the SG added, ‘are not ideal; they bear considerable risks and 
would not resolve the serious dilemma created by the restrictions that 
have prevented the Mission from performing its mandate…’.49 While 
the first option was made contingent on the full cooperation of the par-
ties and lifting of all restrictions put on the mission, the second alter-
native could result in an escalation of tension between parties and a 
resumption of open hostilities. Establishing an observer mission 
would require the consent of both parties, and the fourth option could 
work only if the parties resumed implementing the final and binding 
EEBC decision. In advising against termination, the SG’s report rec-
ommended further explorations of the alternatives with the two par-
ties.  
 
On 30 April 2008 a Security Council presidential statement noted that, 
in light of consultation with the parties, it would decide on the terms 
of a future UN engagement and on the future of UNMEE.50 On 14 
May the Security Council members met in closed consultation to con-
sider the future of UNMEE, notably the possibility of termination. On 
17 June, the Ethiopian Prime Minister wrote in a letter said he was 
open to a UN presence as long as that did not imply a ‘continuation 
whatsoever of UNMEE under a new arrangement’. The next day, the 
Eritrean President issued a letter saying his government’s sole concern 
was Ethiopian withdrawal from its territories, adding that the UN 
could not have legal authority to legitimise occupation.51 On 29 July 
the Secretary-General informed the Security Council he had consulted 
the parties about the three possible options, indicating that both parties 
had responded that they would not accept any of these. The day after, 
the Security Council terminated UNMEE with effect as of 31 July, 
even though this was against the action desired by the Secretary-
General and the action expected by Security Council observers.52 
 
Why then was UNMEE terminated? The various reports and resolu-
tions indicate structural problems in the UNMEE–Eritrea/Ethiopia in-
terface, but, as shown above, the official mission trajectory does not 
                                                 
47  S/2008/226, 7 April 2008, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia an Eritrea. 
48  Ibid.: paragraph 46 a-d. 
49  Ibid.: paragraph 47.  
50  S/PRST/2008/12. 
51  See Security Council Report. 2008. Update Report Ethiopia/ Eritrea, 26 June 2008. No. 8.  
52  Ibid. 
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provide any clear answer to why the Security Council decided to end 
the mission. The following section searches behind this formal repre-
sentation and considers various stakeholders’ narratives of the proc-
esses of curtailing UNMEE. As will become evident, none of these 
events can provide any clear rationale or answer, but they serve as an 
important backdrop and context that illustrate the gradually deteriorat-
ing situation that UNMEE faced and to which the Security Council 
eventually responded.  
Restricting UNMEE 
Interviewees never referred to any one specific incident or gave one 
clear answer as to why UNMEE was terminated. They held that it was 
due to a number of events that cumulatively made the situation un-
bearable for the UN. As UNMEE lacked a political mandate, it was 
cut off from mitigating and responding to the deteriorating consent. 
This challenge derives from the Security Council’s design and au-
thorisation of mandate, which at mission level serves as a straitjacket 
for what the operations can and cannot do. It also relates to UNMEE’s 
status vis-à-vis the compartmentalised Algiers agreements, which set 
border settlement as crucial, without cross-cutting this with other rele-
vant processes and actors. The disconnect between contextual chal-
lenges and operational needs and opportunities became more evident 
as UNMEE found itself faced with a growing number of restrictions 
that prevented it from delivering according to its mandate. These re-
strictions evolved gradually, with increasing disregard for the first Al-
giers agreement and resolution 1312 which established UNMEE with 
a call for the parties ‘to provide the Mission with the access, assis-
tance, support and protection required for the performance of its du-
ties’.53 The restrictions became stronger, in line with the logic of ‘once 
you pass one hurdle, you naturally increase the height next time’, as a 
UN staff-member phrased it. The gradual undermining of UNMEE 
started after the EEBC issued its border delineation decision in April 
2002. Here it should be noted that while Eritrea was largely responsi-
ble for the restrictions imposed on UNMEE, Ethiopia – which for a 
long time welcomed the mission’s presence – had never accepted the 
EEBC. A comprehensive peace process was contingent on both parties 
and framework, but the mission design facilitated and related only to 
AA1. The framework’s structural setup to address and solve the con-
flict allowed both parties to challenge the process. In brief, while 
Ethiopia was in favour of UNMEE but disdained the EEBC, Eritrea 
held the opposite view. Further, whereas Eritrea was responsible for 
the majority of restrictions imposed on UNMEE, Ethiopia never ac-
                                                 
53  S/RES/1312, paragraph 3. 
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cepted the EEBC ruling that was deemed central to a sustainable 
peace process.  
 
The first restriction imposed on UNMEE came in early 2004. In 
March 2004 Eritrea closed off the mission’s main supply route be-
tween Asmara and its Sector West headquarters in Barentu. The Eri-
trean authorities refused to let UNMEE use the rather new, paved As-
mara-Keren-Barentu road, on the grounds that there were spies and 
armed rebels along the road and that the Eritrean host government 
could not guarantee the safety of the mission’s personnel. Eritrea in-
structed UNMEE to use the old dirt road between the two cities. As a 
result, travel time increased from three to over ten hours, in effect cut-
ting off transportation and physical communication between Asmara 
and Barentu. As with other restrictions to come, Eritrean authorities 
never stated that this was meant to undermine UNMEE, and, as one 
interviewee stated, the mission itself did not see this as a means to 
limit its movement and curtail the mission. It was only later, in the 
context of other restrictions imposed on the mission, that this was 
deemed a growing and structural problem. 
 
In late 2005, restrictions were put on UNMEE freedom of movement 
in certain parts of the TSZ and adjacent areas. UNMEE night patrols 
were prohibited and restrictions were put on the patrolling of main 
supply routes, whereupon the UN vacated 18 of its 40 posts. The 5 
October ban invoked by Eritrean authorities restricting all kinds of 
helicopter flights by UNMEE within Eritrean airspace was highly det-
rimental to the mission. This not only severely inhibited the mission’s 
capacity to implement its monitoring mandate, but also affected the 
security of UN peacekeeping personnel and their operations. Several 
small mission outposts became inaccessible, forcing the mission to 
relocate to more central and accessible areas. As a result of the heli-
copter ban and restrictions put on UNMEE ground patrols inside and 
outside the TSZ, the mission was able only to monitor only 40 per 
cent of the TSZ, it was estimated.54 In a letter to the president of the 
Security Council, the Secretary-General ‘once again calls on the Secu-
rity Council to exert its maximum influence to avert further deteriora-
tion of the situation and to ensure that the restrictions imposed on 
UNMEE are lifted’.55 The Security Council responded by merely de-
ploring the restrictions of movement imposed by Eritrea.56  
 
                                                 
54  SC/8944. 30 January 2007. Security Council Extends Ethiopia and Eritrea Mission Until 
31 July 2007, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1741 (2007). Department of Public In-
formation. Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc8944.doc.htm. Ac-
cessed October 8, 2009. 
55  S/2005/668. Letter dated 24 October 2005 from the Secretary–General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council.  
56  S/RES/1640, adopted 23 November 2005.  
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Restrictions also affected humanitarian relief and food delivery. Inter-
national relief agencies were restricted from working in the mission 
area. Reportedly 113,000 internally displaced persons staying in the 
border area in makeshift settlement camps or with host communities 
lacked sufficient access to food, water, health care services, education, 
shelter and other basic services. Overall, some 2 million people were 
facing varying degrees of food shortages, and 1.3 million were esti-
mated to be in need of food assistance.57 The general food insecurity 
was exacerbated by lack of water and rainfall, by the fact that the 
presence of conflict created an environment non-conducive to crop 
production, and because the Eritrean government had suspended most 
general food distribution from September 2005. While the latter was 
explained by reference to the government’s need to establish a clearer 
picture of the actual need, some assert it was due to the government’s 
budget reallocations to accommodate increased military spending.  
 
In early December 2005, Eritrea expelled 180 members of UNMEE. 
In a letter to the UN mission, dated 6 December, the Eritrean govern-
ment requested that Canadian, Russian Federation, European and US 
peacekeepers leave the country within ten days. No reason was pro-
vided. UNMEE staff was surprised at this unexpected turn, having no 
idea as to why they were being ordered out. The expulsion affected 
staff from 18 of the 44 troop-contributing countries. Although those 
expelled made up just a small share of the 3,300-strong peacekeeping 
force, they included important military observers, key logistical per-
sonnel and those responsible for the management of air operations be-
tween Asmara and Addis Ababa. As such the expulsion had detrimen-
tal ramifications throughout the mission, affecting supplies, transport, 
finance and communication. Eritrea’s expulsion of certain nationali-
ties was seen as a major crisis to the mission and to the UN in general 
at the headquarters level in New York, but again the Security Council 
failed to react adequately. In condemning the expulsion, the Secretary-
General stated that the UN ‘cannot accede to Eritrea’s request and 
demands that the government immediately and unequivocally rescind 
its decision without prejudice’.58 Although all within the UN system 
saw the expulsions as unacceptable, the mission continued, only relo-
cating ‘in order to save face’, as an interviewee stated. With the bene-
fit of hindsight, several interviewees asserted that the expulsion of cer-
tain UN troops should have sparked a discussion between the choice 
of full withdrawal or the insistent and steadfast pursuance of the 
UNMEE mandate. Instead, however, in temporarily relocating mili-
tary and civilian staff from Eritrea to Ethiopia ‘solely in the interests 
                                                 
57  Cf. S/2006/1; notably paragraphs 39 and 43.  
58  SG/SM/10250. Secretary-General Condemns Eritrea’s Decision to Expel Peacekeepers. 7 
December 2005.  
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of the safety and security of UNMEE staff’,59 the Security Council 
opted for an either/or solution that demonstrated its unwillingness or 
lack of commitment to push for a harder tone – which to many 
showed that the UNMEE trajectory had become captured between the 
wishes of the UN Secretariat and the Security Council’s lack of com-
mitment and forethought. 
 
The Security Council’s subsequent deliberations of UNMEE show 
indecisiveness on behalf of the mission and its future. The ensuing 
two mandate renewals prolonged the mandate by one month each, 
while the third extended it by only two weeks, until the end of May 
2006.60 This indecisiveness on what to do about the mission continued 
as the Security Council on 31 May started to downsize the mission 
with the dual rationale of responding to the challenging situation while 
still trying to keep UNMEE operational for conducting its designated 
tasks. This gradual downscaling benefited neither UNMEE nor the 
situation. On 28 November 2006, the EEBC issued its statement, giv-
ing Ethiopia and Eritrea one year to reach agreement on the border 
demarcation. As consensus had not been attained by 30 November 
2007, the EEBC then dissolved itself, stating that it considered the 
boundary between the countries as settled – although marked only by 
coordinates and not by emplacing pillars in the ground. The Security 
Council’s deliberations over UNMEE would never be as decisive as 
the firm stance taken by the EEBC. 
 
Although UNMEE faced critical challenges in its operational envi-
ronment, limited access to fuel was to prove a critical element for the 
Security Council’s deliberation of the mission. Since September 2006, 
Eritrean authorities had imposed restrictions on fuel delivery, cutting 
it to only 50 per cent of the mission’s monthly requirements. This 
forced UNMEE to scale down and relocate mission components to 
Ethiopia.61 Then, on 1 December 2007, Eritrea decided to cut off fuel 
supplies completely – devastating for all operational activity within 
Eritrea. Not only did this further limit the mission’s access to already 
restricted areas, it also undermined the safety and security of UN per-
sonnel, as all equipment – from evacuation vehicles to clinics, stor-
ages and communication systems – depended on diesel generators.  
 
UNMEE’s insistent requests to the Eritrean authorities to import fuel 
directly or from the UNMIS operation in neighbouring Sudan were 
either refused or ignored. Indeed, the Eritrean authorities informed 
UNMEE that the non-delivery of fuel merely was ‘a technical matter’ 
                                                 
59  See S/PRST/2005/62. Statement by the President of the Security Council, 14 December 
2005.  
60  See S/RES/1661, S/RES/1670 and S/RES/1678. 
61  Cf. S/2008/226, paragraph 33.  
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that would be resolved shortly.62 The ‘technical’ problem was never 
solved, despite the Secretary-General’s warning that ‘if the fuel sup-
plies were not resumed immediately, the Mission would be forced to 
halt its operations and relocate from Eritrea.’63 Soon after, other UN 
agencies in Eritrea began facing ‘technical matters’ regarding fuel de-
livery. For UNMEE this involved a cross-border movement of 1375 
military personnel and their equipment to five designated places in 
Ethiopia. Although the increasing restrictions emplaced on UNMEE 
indicate that Eritrea wanted to see the mission off its territory, this 
withdrawal was not unproblematic. The ground relocation was se-
verely delayed due to lack of cooperation from the Eritrean authori-
ties: numerous vehicles were delayed or prevented from crossing the 
border by Eritrean soldiers,64 and some UN staff were refused with-
drawal by being threatened at gunpoint.65 
 
In addition to obstructing UNMEE withdrawal, Eritrea on 15 February 
2008 cut off food supplies to UN troops. The company responsible for 
catering the mission explained that it was not able to distribute rations 
as its Eritrean subcontractor had stated it had no vehicles ‘to do the 
business for UNMEE’,66 leaving the relocating contingents with only 
two days of emergency rations. Apparently, the Eritrean subcontractor 
feared losing its government license if it continued to serve UN per-
sonnel. This problem was resolved after UN’s Department of Field 
Support raised the issue with the Eritrean permanent UN representa-
tive.  
 
In preparation to the Security Council’s 30 January 2008 deliberations 
on the mission’s mandate and possible extension, the Secretary-
General recommended ‘a one month technical roll-over of the man-
date’.67 This brief extension was proposed because the restrictions im-
posed by Eritrea, notably the stoppage of fuel supplies to run the mis-
sion, handicapped UNMEE’s capacity to fulfil its mandate, and in the 
meantime the SG wished to review the developments and challenges 
on the ground to prepare specific future recommendations, including 
possible withdrawal. The Security Council, however, extended the 
mandate for a period of six months, until 31 July 2008. Although this 
discrepancy might be indicative of dissonance between the Security 
Council and the Secretariat, ‘diplomats said the Council felt a short 
extension would mean submitting to “blackmail” by Eritrea.’68 And 
                                                 
62  S/2008/145, paragraph 3. 
63  S/2008/145, paragraph 5.  
64  S/2008/145, paragraph 13.  
65  BBC. ‘UN Troops ’trapped’ in Eritrea’. 16 February 2008. Accessed 8 October 2009. 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7248085.stm  
66  S/2008/145, paragraph 14.  
67  S/200840, paragraph 45. 
68  Reuters, 15 February 2008. ‘UN says Eritrea cut off food to peacekeepers’, available at 
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then, on 30 July, the Security Council terminated UNMEE – although 
this had not been the Secretary-General’s preferred option.69 
 
The problem thus far and perhaps most important lesson learned is 
that Security Council allowed UNMEE to be gradually undermined by 
not providing a firmer response at an earlier stage. Several of my re-
spondents saw the EEBC’s one-year deadline for the parties to commit 
themselves to the process as something to replicate – although others 
assert that the Security Council would never accept such an ultima-
tum. Instead, the two parties – Eritrea and Ethiopia – were allowed to 
undermine UNMEE. Whereas Eritrea was responsible for most of the 
restrictions that were imposed, Ethiopia opposed the EEBC. It thus 
appears Eritrea was the only part to challenge the UN as such. This 
might be so, but only because Eritrea alone managed to curtail 
UNMEE. When UNMEE relocated to Ethiopia and the UN Secretary-
General was contemplating various future options, one suggestion was 
that UNMEE could continue working from the Ethiopian side. Al-
though Ethiopia had appeared largely cordial to the UN and had wel-
comed UNMEE, it also stated that if it were to host a new mission, the 
mandate should include no reference to the EEBC – which under-
mined a sustainable peace process and UN presence in the conflict.  
Perceptions and Interpretations  
As to why UNMEE was terminated, the interviewees all made exten-
sive reference to the restrictions imposed. No one could say precisely 
why the mission was ended – but, together, the respondents provided 
an elaboration of contextual factors which had eventually made the 
situation impossible for UNMEE. With hindsight, informants felt that 
the Security Council had allowed the UN, through UNMEE, to be 
‘spit on’, ‘humiliated’ and ‘kept hostage’ by the restrictions and the 
way Security Council dealt with the situation. Against this backdrop, 
most informants agreed that it was, in the end, correct of the Security 
Council to decide to ‘to pull the plug on UNMEE’ – not least because 
that sent a signal as to what could and could not be tolerated. In retro-
spect, however, most informants also hold that the Security Council 
should have acted earlier ‘to prevent UNMEE being trapped in the 
quagmire’. Who inspired whom is uncertain, but the hybrid AU-UN 
mission to Darfur (UNAMID) has also experienced challenges and 
personnel restrictions similar to UNMEE.70  
                                                 
69  S/2008/226. 
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From the very outset, UNMEE’s structural design became a challenge 
that affected the mission’s trajectory, its operational capacity and me-
diatory role. UNMEE’s architecture was produced by the difficult 
context, and to some extent it reflected the conflict’s underpinnings. 
UNMEE was a rare example of a classic peacekeeping mission – 
mandated to prevent interstate dispute, and focused on enforcing a 
ceasefire agreement and patrolling the buffer zone separating the war-
ring states. Since the end of the Cold War, however, security threats 
have been commonly seen as emanating from civil wars within states 
rather than from interstate wars – a point to which the UN has ac-
commodated itself to at the expense of losing institutional expertise in 
dealing with traditional conflicts like the border dispute between Eri-
trea and Ethiopia. Whereas UN capacity had become attuned to intra-
state conflicts, UNMEE had to deal with a highly politicised interstate 
conflict that necessitated an institutional setup where the consent of 
both host governments was required. Some respondents asserted that 
the Security Council did not have its mindset tuned into this type of 
conflict, and that the Secretariat was not adequately equipped to mas-
ter the ‘type of conflict placed on the list of endangered species’, as 
one interviewee phrased it. This backdrop impinged on the mission 
design and structure, with later repercussions that would become cen-
tral challenges to the UNMEE.  
 
First of all, although UNMEE had been welcomed by the parties, it 
had not been allowed a political mandate. It was set up as a purely 
technical monitoring mission, and, in the words of one interviewee, 
‘since the UN was called upon by the parties through the Algiers 
agreement to establish a peacekeeping mission, we simply took the 
parties’ will to cooperate for granted and so did not make any signifi-
cant push to include a political role for UNMEE.’ Many respondents 
felt that the parties’ hospitability at the very outset of UNMEE con-
fused the design process, leading those involved to expect it would be 
a straightforward mission,71 and that what appeared as the parties’ co-
operation and apparent willingness to solve the dispute would make a 
political mandate redundant.  
 
Second, UNMEE was detached from what constituted the actual prob-
lem – that of solving the border issue. While the first Algiers agree-
ment (of July 2000) involved the cessation of hostilities and estab-
lished UNMEE, the border issue remained to be solved in the second 
Algiers agreement (December 2000), which established EEBC. As 
such, UNMEE was hindered in making any significant contribution 
                                                 
71  Indeed, in the start UNMEE was perhaps ‘a holiday, not a mission’, as a member of the 
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towards solving the conflict, and instead concentrated on verifying the 
ceasefire agreement and monitoring the buffer zone. If the ceasefire 
agreement were breached, and when the TSZ was violated, UNMEE 
had no means of enforcement at its disposal. To many of the respon-
dents, this ‘irrelevance by conception’ as one called it, illustrates that 
UN did not sufficiently take into account the political context. In 
merely separating the parties, but prevented from fostering political 
dialogue or addressing the tense border issue, UNMEE eventually be-
came locked in stalemate.  
 
There were, however, attempts to mitigate these structural shortcom-
ings that stemmed from the combination of the lack of clear political 
analysis of the conflict formation when setting up the mission and the 
host governments’ reluctance to endow UNMEE with a political me-
diation role. For instance, the Military Coordination Commission 
(MCC), deriving from the first Algiers agreement and mandated to 
coordinate and resolve issues relating to implementing UNMEE’s 
mandate, reportedly took on an increasingly political role, although it 
had been intended only to be technical. The MCC was composed of 
representatives of the two parties; it was supposed to be chaired by the 
head of UNMEE, but as the SRSG is a political appointment, the 
choice fell on the mission’s force commander. Reportedly, as the par-
ties were reluctant to meet on a political platform, the MCC became 
the only forum where the parties met bilaterally. This was a technical 
forum, but political matters were occasionally discussed. True, this 
was only on the informal level, but nevertheless vital for maintaining 
the parties’ commitment and avoiding misinterpretations. As the poli-
ticians refused dialogue, several informants assert that the MCC 
gained increased importance as the only venue for facilitating political 
dialogue and information-sharing, thereby in practice taking on a more 
political role than originally foreseen. The MCC stopped convening in 
July 2006, and its absence was sorely felt in the ensuing border inci-
dents and escalating tensions.  
 
The Algiers Agreements specified that the EEBC was to be an inde-
pendent body. In order to assist in dealing with the border dispute and 
demarcation, there were attempts – notably through numerous refer-
ences to the border commission’s decision and AA2 in Security Coun-
cil resolutions pertaining to UNMEE – to attach UNMEE (from AA1) 
to EEBC and the framework from the second Algiers agreement. 
UNMEE later included a de-mining component to assist in the 
EEBC’s work, but never came close to formally linking the two in-
struments and agreements (UNMEE/AA1 and EEBC/ AA2). Repeated 
attempts by the UN to align these two realms were undermined by 
both parties: Ethiopia refused to accept the EEBC and its 2002 deci-
sion, and Eritrea refused to accept UNMEE – and conversely, Ethiopia 
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was largely supportive of UNMEE and Eritrea of the EEBC. It is due 
to the separation of UNMEE and EEBC that informants assert that 
‘UNMEE was being kept hostage in the situation’ and not able to con-
tribute to an amicable or lasting solution.  
 
The interviewees were unanimous in their views on these points, and 
most agreed that the mission’s initial design proved less than optimal 
as the situation developed. First of all, the UN and the OAU (later 
AU) should have pressed for integrating the frameworks of both Al-
giers agreements and thus those of UNMEE and the EEBC. Had these 
two been interrelated, the Security Council could have made a 
stronger push to use UNMEE in implementing the EEBC decision. 
Second, the Security Council should never have authorised a mission 
without an integral political component – and particularly not in an 
interstate border conflict with deeply entrenched political ramifica-
tions. A more comprehensive political analysis to underpin setting up 
the mission might have helped; moreover, the Council should have 
been more willing to discuss the political ramifications. When a cease-
fire agreement was brokered, the Security Council was too eager to 
dispatch a mission without contemplating future scenarios or political 
consequences. This nevertheless gives rise to the question of who is 
best suited to step into the political vacuum. Can the UN be political 
and still be perceived as a neutral, objective party to the conflict? 
Would the AU, the EU or friends of the respective countries be better 
suited to deal with the political side of the conflict? Or was a political 
solution made impossible by the technical and apolitical provisions 
emanating from the Algiers agreements – UNMEE, EECC, EEBC? 
 
Had UNMEE/ AA1 and EEBC/ AA2 been integrated frameworks, as 
well as if UNMEE had included a political component, the Security 
Council might have opted for a firmer response and political line to 
prevent the parties from selectively subverting the international en-
gagement. It could also have allowed UNMEE to play a stronger me-
diatory role in the political contentious situation, and in practice ‘re-
main actively seized of the matter’ – to use the phrase reiterated in all 
Security Council UNMEE resolutions.  
 
Because UNMEE lacked the means to be practically ‘seized of the 
matter’, it became a piece in the conflict game, used by the parties to 
maintain the status quo and subvert external mediation efforts. As one 
interviewee described the situation, ‘once the parties realised we were 
just Xeroxing and then understood that statements are just words and 
resolutions just pieces of paper, UNMEE was de facto dead’. The Se-
curity Council’s numerous calls on the parties, stressing again and 
again, regretting, confirming, reaffirming, considering, deciding, re-
questing and even demanding, never materialised in practical action 
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on the part of UNMEE nor the parties. The mission design largely 
prevented words from being transformed into deeds, and UNMEE 
ended up being tossed between the Security Council and the Secre-
tariat.  
 
Several interviewees working in the UN Secretariat have asserted the 
Security Council was not sufficiently committed to UNMEE. For in-
stance, at one point when the Security Council visited Sudan it was 
invited to Eritrea and Ethiopia as well, but did not go as the govern-
ments signalled reluctance to discuss the border conflict. While Ethio-
pia was hospitable to the UNMEE presence, Eritrea made repeated 
calls on the Security Council to shoulder its responsibility in not pres-
suring Ethiopia to respect the EEBC. At another time, the Security 
Council went only to Ethiopia, and refrained from visiting Eritrea, as 
it was not granted access to the desired political players there. Both 
UNMEE and the Secretariat interpreted this as the Security Council 
showing lack of commitment and reluctance to involve itself in a dif-
ficult political situation. Whereas the Security Council was actively 
engaged to other missions in the area,72 UNMEE received little atten-
tion and was largely left to the Secretariat. The Security Council had 
numerous opportunities for deciding upon the mission’s fate and fu-
ture, but never applied sufficient leverage to aid the mission or put 
pressure to bear on the parties. On several occasions the Security 
Council failed to follow the recommendations of the Secretariat, as 
with the final two UNMEE resolutions that went counter to the action 
proposed by the Secretary-General. My respondents generally agree 
that the Security Council should have opted for a much firmer line at 
an earlier stage, particularly when operational capacity deteriorated 
due to the restrictions imposed on UNMEE. Instead, the mission was 
gradually dismantled, leaving the Secretariat with a decapitated opera-
tion in terms of mandate and size. Some respondents have sought to 
explain the Security Council’s lack of commitment to UNMEE as due 
to weak situation assessment and conflict analysis – meaning that the 
Security Council did not have or receive sufficient information to act 
upon. Others hold that the Security Council failed to absorb the inputs 
provided by the Secretariat and the mission. Such staff perceptions 
indicate lack of coherence between the Secretariat and Security Coun-
cil in dealing with UNMEE. This in turn can be explained by the mis-
sion design and the lack of a political component and mandate: these 
circumstances not only prevented the Security Council from including 
a political assessment of the situation and gaining access to political 
players among the parties, but also undermined UN’s ability to play a 
role in the political conflict. Other respondents have asserted that the 
Security Council was well aware of the situation – Eritrea frequently 
complained of the ‘unfair treatment’ it received given even when the 
                                                 
72  As, for example, UNMIS and UNAMID in Sudan, and MONUC in DR Congo.  
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EEBC granted it the contested Badme area. Precisely because of the 
political character of the conflict, the Security Council sought to main-
tain some distance, in order to forestall a major political debate – 
knowing this might alienate certain of its Permanent Members and 
thus force it to take a firmer stance on the conflict, in effect jeopardis-
ing either the parties’ or the Security Council’s consent to the mission. 
In this balancing act, the Security Council seems to have opted to keep 
the curtailed mission at arm’s length and leave it to the Secretariat, 
instead of pushing through a political debate that would further de-
grade the mission while also bringing the Security Council’s lack of 
commitment to the fore.  
Responding to Deteriorating Consent  
The answer to the overarching research question of why UNMEE was 
terminated remains unclear and complex. No interviewees could pro-
vide one single, definitive reason, neither can an unambiguous answer 
be derived from the presentation above. Instead, it appears that nu-
merous cumulative factors led to a situation that proved untenable for 
the UN, eventually forcing the Security Council to terminate UNMEE. 
From this process there are important lessons to be learned regarding 
the political role of peacekeeping operations and the UN’s ability to 
detect and deal with deteriorating political consent from host govern-
ments.  
 
These assumptions imply that there was a withdrawal of consent, 
which reflects the conventional interpretation of the mission trajec-
tory. Not all interviewees hold this view: one stated, ‘the regular ap-
proach is that if there is no peace there is no peacekeeping. But as the 
Brahimi Report suggests, if there is no consent, there is no peacekeep-
ing. Peacekeeping missions are formally dependent on governments’ 
consent and withdrawal of consent means pulling out the mission’. 
This respondent asserts there was consent by the governments, as war-
ranted by three factors. First, the seminal Algiers agreement devised 
by the parties prior to UNMEE called upon the UN to establish a mis-
sion. Second, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General – 
the head of mission – was approved by both governments. Third, both 
governments welcomed the mission and hosted it. At no point did ei-
ther of the parties state they did not approve the mission, and never 
did they withdraw consent. As pointed out by several respondents, at-
tempts by the parties to find grounds for their respective cases, which 
in effect undermined the mission, are not the same as withdrawing 
consent.  
 
The gradual imposition of restrictions nevertheless had the practical 
effect of consent withdrawal, although circumventing the either/or di-
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chotomy of how the UN relates to consent. An explicit withdrawal by 
either of the parties would have effectively terminated the operation; 
moreover, the withdrawing party would lose international respect and 
diplomatic esteem. Neither of the parties saw this as conducive to their 
cause. In terms of detecting the gradual deterioration of consent it be-
came clear quite early for UN staff – at least with hindsight – that both 
parties were undermining the mission and the comprehensive peace 
process. As one interviewee stated: ‘While Eritrea devoted 90 per cent 
of its attention to the border issue in public, Ethiopia was similarly 
biased in talking about Eritrea disrespecting UNMEE and spent 
maximum 10 per cent of its time talking about the border. The parties 
refused to talk about the same issue and see them as interlinked. Con-
sequently, there was no dialogue supportive to the process after Ethio-
pia challenged the border commission’s ruling.’ While this scenario, 
evolving from mid-2002, was read as a challenging political context, it 
was not until Eritrea started to impose restrictions on UNMEE’s free-
dom of movement from 2005 that the deteriorating consent and ex-
plicit attempts to challenge UNMEE were recognised.  
 
The restrictions were reported in official UN documents but were 
never presented as ‘deterioration’. This might be due to the apolitical 
UN jargon, or that the deteriorating consent was in fact not detected. 
Whether read as consent withdrawal or not, the Security Council did 
not react sufficiently to these warnings. In was only when the number 
of restrictions had accumulated that the situation was found to be un-
acceptable. The impact and implications were that UNMEE became 
increasingly detached from fulfilling its mandate as more and stricter 
restrictions were imposed.  
 
Should the mission have been terminated earlier? No formal criteria 
were used to determine the point where the mission could no longer 
operate. Nor were there any defined thresholds as to what the mission 
could tolerate in non-cooperation by the parties before ending the mis-
sion. The lack of fuel eventually forced UNMEE to withdraw from 
Eritrea, as that affected the whole operation, staff safety not least. 
UNMEE itself was, however, not terminated until the proposed op-
tions for reconfiguring the mission were declined by the involved ac-
tors. With hindsight, however, some respondents assert the Security 
Council should have opted for a stronger reaction, including mission 
closure, already in late 2005 when UNMEE’s freedom of movement 
was restricted, as this is regarded as the start of the end of the mission. 
In fact, however, it would have been difficult for the Security Council 
to react to these restrictions, as Eritrea justified them on grounds of 
not being able to guarantee the safety of UN personnel, which the host 
nation is meant to facilitate.  
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Instead, most interviewees opine that the Security Council should 
have ‘pulled the plug’ when Eritrea became selective as to which na-
tionalities it allowed as part of UNMEE. In late 2005 Eritrea expelled 
UNMEE 180 staff of European and North American nationalities, all 
of whom held important positions. It is, however, not the decrease of 
capacity and skilled labour that have led most to see this as the main 
and critical turning point – it was more a matter of principle, as Eritrea 
now dictated the terms for UNMEE. The original mandate had not ex-
cluded any nationalities from participating in the mission. When Eri-
trea later decided to restrict troop contributors, the Security Council 
allowed UNMEE to become ‘a puppet and a hostage to the conflict’, 
as one informant phrased it. This event was a critical turning point, 
causing wrath and humiliation among UNMEE staff. Although 
UNMEE entered a minor crisis regarding its future when the Security 
Council began reviewing its mandate for one month at a time, the 
Council should have opted for a stronger and firmer tone rather than 
clinging to the conflict for another three years. One point raised by 
interviewees is the ensuing lack of trust and respect for UNMEE; an-
other aspect of more general concern relates to the precedent created: 
other governments could see that it is possible to play with, undermine 
and direct UN – as later witnessed with regard to UNAMID and the 
selective drafting of troops.  
 
Official UN documents, like the Secretary-General’s special reports 
and the Security Council resolutions pertaining to UNMEE, illustrate 
that the UN was aware of the gradual imposition of restrictions. How-
ever, it is important to distinguish between the official and formal 
rhetoric, and the informal practices and effects of these restrictions. 
The host government kept UNMEE informed of the various restric-
tions, which always were explained with reference to safety and tech-
nical matters. Initially these were perceived as challenges and hurdles 
to be overcome, through reconfiguring the mission and insisting on 
dialogue between the involved actors. It was only when the restric-
tions began to mount up and attempts at dialogue failed that UNMEE 
started to recognise the restrictions as deliberate attempts to under-
mine the mission. Eventually, they were read as expressions of dete-
riorating political consent. However, once the restrictions were inter-
preted as withdrawal of consent, UNMEE lacked the structure and 
means for responding and dealing adequately with the situation. The 
problem for UNMEE in terms of detecting, responding to and mitigat-
ing the impact of deteriorating political consent relates to the mis-
sion’s political role and relevance, which in turn derive from the 
original institutional setup of the operation.  
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Coda 
The Algiers agreements, their witnesses (OAU, EU, UN, Algeria, and 
the USA) and the institutions they produced (UNMEE, EEBC, EECC) 
can be said to demonstrate good and rapid international engagement. 
The compartmentalisation of the two agreements, however, came to 
create complications, allowing the situation to deteriorate. When, in 
2002, the EEBC ruling was made, UNMEE had no role in implement-
ing or enforcing the decision. This opened the way for the long drawn-
out stalemate since then. While Eritrea gradually imposed restrictions 
on UNMEE and advocated implementing the EEBC decision, Ethio-
pia refused to talk about the EEBC and the contested border issue, and 
focused on UNMEE instead. This raised problems for UNMEE – as 
the only permanent international presence – because it required the 
consent of both host governments to operate across the border. Al-
though neither country ever formally withdrew their consent, the dete-
riorating circumstances UNMEE was faced with gradually impeded 
on the mission and its ability to deliver according to its mandate.  
 
Armed conflict never erupted. Since both parties respected the cessa-
tion of hostilities agreement, interest in the underlying conflict faded. 
The international community paid too little attention to the challenges 
of implementing the Algiers agreements and its provisions to lay the 
foundation for a comprehensive peace process. The Algiers agree-
ments never become converted into a political process to establish 
comprehensive peace: they maintained the political stalemate and pro-
tracted the tensions. As the situation unfolded, UNMEE – the only 
actor continuously engaged in the conflict – proved insufficiently 
equipped to cope, as it had not been mandated to implement the rul-
ings of EECC or EEBC. UNMEE gradually lost momentum for en-
gaging the parties. A critical factor was that it had never been 
equipped with a political mandate allowing it to mediate with the par-
ties. The mission acted in accordance with its designated mandate as 
authorised by the Security Council. As mandates serve as straitjackets 
at the mission level, it was only the Security Council in New York that 
would have been in a position to change the ground rules and allow 
UNMEE to re-engage in the conflict.  
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Introduction 
This paper examines IGAD (the Inter-Governmental Authority on De-
velopment) in terms of its role and potential in dealing with conflicts. 
The focus is on conflicts with a regional or cross-border dimension, 
and the question asked is the extent to which IGAD is capable of ad-
dressing such conflicts. Attention is also paid to the role of donors and 
other international actors in enabling IGAD’s capacity in this respect. 
The final discussion analyses the factors that promote or impede 
IGAD’s potential for playing a constructive role in promoting regional 
peace. 
IGAD 
The forerunner to IGAD, the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Drought and Desertification (IGADD), was established in 1986. Its 
mandate was to deal with issues of drought, famine and desertification 
in the region comprising the countries of the wider Horn of Africa: 
Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. In 
line with the resurgence of regionalism in the 1990s, IGADD decided 
in 1995 to expand its scope of regional integration into the fields of 
economic integration and cooperation and of peace and security is-
sues. The agreement establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) was adopted by the IGADD countries in 1996, 
thereby replacing the older organisation. Its highest political authority 
is the Council of Ministers, composed of the foreign ministers of the 
member-countries; the secretariat of IGAD is located in Djibouti. The 
four primary areas of the organisation are food security and environ-
mental protection; infrastructural development; regional conflict pre-
vention, management and resolution; and humanitarian affairs. Within 
the field of peace and security, the IGAD mandate, spanning preven-
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tive diplomacy as well as conflict management and resolution, is quite 
a wide one. 
 
In fact, IGAD participation in peace diplomacy predates this 1996 ‘re-
vitalisation’ of the organisation. In 1994, IGADD served as mediator 
in the negotiations between the Government of Sudan and SPLA. 
Even though a Declaration of Principles was signed in 1995, dis-
agreements broke out over its interpretation, and the talks collapsed. 
Mediation under IGAD was taken up again in 1997, with Kenya play-
ing the key role. While a slow and tortuous process, it eventually led 
to the signing of the Machakos Protocol in 2002, of the Naivasha Dec-
laration in 2003, and of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in early 
2005. Since 1997, IGAD has also been involved in the series of So-
mali peace processes. The talks leading to the creation of the Transi-
tional National Government in 2000, the 2002 establishment of the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the 2009 merger of a fac-
tion of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia into the TFG 
were all backed or hosted by IGAD. In all these peace processes, it 
should be noted, the role of IGAD has been complemented by the 
strong involvement of extra-regional actors.  
 
In 2000, IGAD decided to establish an early warning and response 
mechanism. The Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early 
Warning and Response Mechanism was approved in 2002, and 
CEWARN was established in Addis Ababa in 2003. It focuses on pas-
toral conflicts in selected areas and has built up an advanced system 
for collecting information on local conflicts. In terms of early re-
sponse, mechanisms are still in the process of being developed. In 
2006, another satellite institution, the ICPAT programme for combat-
ing terrorism, was also established in Addis Ababa. The institution 
aims to build capacity among its member-states, including common 
efforts at improving border controls and fighting cross-border terror-
ism and criminality.  
 
While IGAD has always had a reputation as a weak regional organisa-
tion, and there are considerable structural factors that hamper its de-
velopment into an effective organisation, IGAD has nevertheless been 
significantly strengthened since its revitalisation in 1996. Alongside 
the developments within the field of peace and security, there have, 
for instance, been advances in the field of environmental management 
(like the creation of the Climate Centre in Nairobi); in developing 
joint or connecting infrastructure; in common livestock management 
undertakings; and in cooperation on migration. In 2008, IGAD also 
decided to intensify efforts for increased economic integration, with 
the objective of developing an IGAD Free Trade Area.  
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This consolidation process has not been unproblematic. The war be-
tween Ethiopia and Eritrea hampered much of the revitalisation effort; 
arrears in payments of membership fees have halted programmes and 
deepened donor dependency; and Eritrea’s 2007 decision to suspend 
its participation in IGAD has been both a blow to the organisation and 
an indication of the tensions and contradictions existing within it. 
Prospects of the imminent reintegration of Eritrea into IGAD do not 
seem very high, given the stalemate situations in the Eritrea–Ethiopia 
and the Eritrea–Djibouti conflicts, as well as the fact that the remain-
ing IGAD countries have requested the UN to introduce sanctions 
against Eritrea because of its involvement in Somalia. 
 
Observers and representatives of diplomatic missions remain sceptical 
to the seriousness and feasibility of many of IGAD’s expressed ambi-
tions for stronger integration. Yet, they also acknowledge the ad-
vances that have been made, the current efforts at further strengthen-
ing the organisation, and look positively upon the dynamism of the 
new IGAD Executive Secretary, Mahboub M. Maalim. 
 
The AU and the progress of its overall integration process have 
formed an important framework for the development of IGAD. In this 
process, the sub-regional organisations – or Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs), as AU terms them – are important building 
blocks. The AU has grouped its member-states into five regions – 
North, East, West, Central and South – and has recognised eight 
RECs, including IGAD, the East African Community (EAC) and the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). It has, 
however, also expressed the intention of reducing the number of 
RECs. 
 
The partially overlapping memberships of IGAD, EAC and COMESA 
do pose challenges for IGAD. For Kenya and Uganda, the EAC is un-
doubtedly the REC that is perceived as most important. Should there 
arise issues where Kenya and Uganda were forced to choose between 
EAC and IGAD, there is little doubt that the former would be chosen. 
It also means that Kenya is not the strong driving force within IGAD 
that it might otherwise have been. Still, Kenya and Uganda are mem-
bers of IGAD because they perceive benefits from this membership, 
and the potential conflicts from the double membership should not be 
exaggerated. 
 
Regarding peace and security issues, the RECs assumed greater im-
portance after the 2004 launching of the AU Common African De-
fence and Security Policy (CADSP). In order to carry out its wide 
mandate, three bodies were created to assist the AU Peace and Secu-
rity Council: the Council of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning 
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System (CEWS), and an African Standby Force. The two latter institu-
tions were to build directly on the regional mechanisms, or RECs. For 
the case of IGAD, CEWARN should be well suited to feed into a 
CEWS (although there may be compatibility issues related to the pas-
toralist focus and the specific indicator set of CEWARN that might 
not necessarily correspond to a system developed for the whole conti-
nent). As to the standby force, the policy foresees the creation of an 
East African Standby Brigade. That proposal (EASBRIG) will not be 
discussed in this report. 
IGAD’s Peace and Security Activities 
Peace processes 
CPA 
The hosting of the peace process that led to the signing of the agree-
ment between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA is among 
IGAD’s significant achievements. Clearly, there were also external 
factors – like the pressure on Sudan due to the US-led war on terror – 
that were crucial in getting the parties to reach an agreement. Fur-
thermore, there were other important players in the negotiation proc-
ess – like the Friends of IGAD, chaired by Norway. Nevertheless, 
IGAD did play an important role, not only because its hosting the ne-
gotiations was a condition set by the Government of Sudan, but also 
because of the active role of the Kenyan leadership in keeping the ne-
gotiations going. To facilitate the agreements, a secretariat was estab-
lished in Kenya. On the other hand, tensions have been reported be-
tween the IGAD secretariat in Djibouti and its satellite in Kenya, indi-
cating that perhaps not all of IGAD felt equally involved in the nego-
tiation process. 
 
The resultant agreement was comprehensive in scope, and its provi-
sions on power- and wealth-sharing are generally acknowledged as 
being both far-reaching and sound. Even if implementation of the 
agreement has been plagued by delays and difficulties, the CPA has 
led to a stop in the war and still serves as the map for the process to-
wards elections and the referendum on independence for the South in 
2011. These are no small achievements. While the limitation of the 
agreement to only two parties – the Government of Sudan and the 
SPLA – has been criticised, it remains an open question whether any 
agreement among a broader set of parties could ever have been 
reached, or if so, if it could have held up to now, nearly five years af-
ter the signing of the CPA. 
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After the CPA had been signed, implementation was up to the two 
parties. In view of the subsequent delays in implementation, it has 
been indicated that a stronger role for IGAD in overseeing the process 
ought to have been written into the agreement. As it is, IGAD has re-
mained largely on the sidelines, even though there is now an IGAD 
envoy to the peace process in Khartoum. 
 
Somalia 
In IGAD’s engagement in the Somali peace efforts, key roles have 
been played by the neighbouring states of Ethiopia, Djibouti and 
Kenya. In 1997, IGAD in cooperation with the OAU, mandated 
Ethiopia to be the facilitator of the process, and several peace confer-
ences were organised – without notable results. A Djibouti peace pro-
posal, backed by IGAD, led to the creation of the power-sharing Tran-
sitional National Government (TNG) in 2000. The Kenya-led Eldoret 
Conference organised in 2002, meant to deepen the base of the TNG, 
eventually resulted in the creation of a new Transitional Federal Gov-
ernment (TFG) in 2004, which has remained the internationally rec-
ognised authority since. Djibouti hosted the process that led to the in-
tegration of one faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Soma-
lia into the TFG in early 2009. 
 
Other actors have been involved in these processes, and the degree to 
which IGAD and its delegated member-states have served as the true 
driving forces behind these negotiations has varied. In the processes 
leading to the TNG and the TFG, IGAD seems to have played a sig-
nificant role. On the other hand, the negotiations with the ARS appear 
to have been driven largely by external actors, even if they took place 
in Djibouti.  
 
Hampering IGAD in its mediating efforts have been perceptions 
among some Somali actors that the organisation has not been an im-
partial and honest broker. According Ethiopia, with its active interfer-
ence in Somali affairs, the initial role as facilitator obviously gave rise 
to such concerns. Also at later stages, as when Abdullahi Yusuf was 
elected the first president of the TFG, there were rumours and com-
plaints that Ethiopia had managed to influence (even bribe) the proc-
ess to ensure the election of ‘their’ man. While there may be no truth 
in this claim,1 its very existence as a rumour is damaging to the peace 
process, and is directly linked to the potential of IGAD as a regional 
broker in the peace process. The AU decision that no frontline states 
should contribute troops to the AMISOM force reflects similar con-
cerns, and this may also be one reason for why IGAD has no coordi-
nating role in the deployment of the peacekeeping force. 
 
                                                 
1  Sally Healy: ‘Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa’. London: Chatham House, 2008. 
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General points 
From the perspective of IGAD as a permanent organisation with its 
secretariat in Djibouti, the engagement in peace processes shows a 
certain ad hoc character. There has been no systematisation of IGAD 
involvement. Further, there are many conflicts and peace processes of 
the region where IGAD has not sought any major role (Ethiopia–
Eritrea, Northern Uganda, Darfur); where there is involvement, new 
structures and venues are built up with only limited participation of 
the permanent IGAD secretariat; and the roles assumed in the proc-
esses vary between peace processes and phases. While this indicates 
flexibility to adapt procedures to the task at hand, it also gives the im-
pression that these engagements are sidelines to the normal IGAD op-
erations, more often dominated by individual countries than by IGAD 
as such. 
 
It should further be noted that the processes have been heavily de-
pended on external resources, and that extra-regional countries and 
partner groups have been closely involved, playing key roles in the 
actual negotiations. Both these points indicate that IGAD cannot really 
be counted as having a consolidated and proven capacity for peace 
mediation. 
CEWARN 
The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of 
IGAD were established in 2003, with its secretariat in Addis Ababa. 
Its mandate is to ‘receive and share information concerning potentially 
violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD 
region’, based on the recognition that timely interventions are more 
effective and less costly than waiting for potential conflicts to develop 
into full-scale crises. Developing regional early warning systems to 
feed into a continental system (CEWS) is also part of the AU security 
architecture. The model is a decentralised and bottom-up one, where 
the CEWARN secretariat is matched by parallel institutions in the 
member-countries – Conflict Early Warning Early Response Units 
(CEWERUs), which again work with lower level institutions down to 
the district level. In each country, a national research institute is also 
involved, overseeing the information collection and as employers of 
the local level field monitors. CEWERU steering committees at vari-
ous levels include civil society as well as government representation. 
 
While the mandate of CEWARN is wider, a strategic decision was 
made to focus initially on pastoralist conflicts. According to one in-
formant, other forms of conflict, including territorial conflict, were 
seen as too sensitive to address initially, whereas a focus on pastoral 
conflicts was considered to be of interest to all the IGAD states. Still, 
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this is seen as a first stepping-stone, and there is the explicit intention 
of eventually expanding the scope2. Since the Horn of Africa is the 
region in the world with the largest pastoralist population, and these 
groups dominate in the peripheral borderlands of the region, there may 
be good grounds for CEWARN’s focus on cross-border pastoralist 
conflicts. The bottom-up type character of CEWARN’s information 
collection system is also well suited to this type of conflict. 
 
CEWARN covers selected areas, or clusters. The first one, the 
Karamoja cluster – covering Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan – 
started up in 2003 (although within Sudan it did not become opera-
tional until 2009). Subsequently, in 2005, CEWARN opened a Somali 
cluster, spanning the borderlands of Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia (al-
though as yet it has not been possible to start working within Soma-
lia). In 2009, a third cluster was opened, spanning Djibouti and Ethio-
pia: this is the Afar-Issa cluster (thus far apparently operational solely 
in Djibouti’s Dikhil region). Thus, while the clusters still cover only a 
limited part of the immense border areas of the Horn of Africa, there 
has been a steady growth in the scope of the programme, and in the 
inclusion of further member-states. However, the two members that 
still do not take part in the mechanism – Eritrea and Somalia – seem 
unlikely to do so in the short term. In the case of Somalia, this is due 
to a lack of a functioning state apparatus, especially in its Southern 
regions, which the Somali cluster is intended to cover. In the Eritrean 
case, prospects of the country returning to IGAD in the near future do 
not seem good, thus blocking any possibility of participation in the 
CEWARN programme. 
 
CEWARN has an indicator-based early warning system, at the core of 
which is a set of 52 indicators especially developed for IGAD by local 
and regional experts on early warning and on pastoral conflicts. The 
indicator set includes a wide range of factors: such as communal rela-
tions, civil society activity, economic activities, governance and media 
dimensions, environmental, climatic and resource-related factors, 
safety and security issues and social services. Reports on these indica-
tors and variables are submitted by field monitors, entered into a so-
phisticated database, and used for analysis and for generating regular 
reports on developments within the various clusters. As the informa-
tion is generally not made available to the public, we cannot testify 
directly to the quality of the system. It is, however, reported to be a 
world-class early warning system.  
 
One impact of the programme is that it has served to document and 
raise awareness of the importance of the issue of pastoral conflicts. 
                                                 
2  The CEWARN 2007–2011 strategy contemplates an evaluation within the period to as-
sess the feasibility of expanding the scope. 
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During the first three years of operation, the early warning system re-
ported more than 1,500 violent incidents, resulting in the loss of al-
most 2,200 lives, as well as the loss of around 138,000 animals. 
Throughout most of this period, it should be noted, CEWARN cov-
ered only the Kenyan, Ugandan and Ethiopian sides of the Karamoja 
cluster. Thus, total figures on pastoralist conflicts in the regions must 
be considerably higher. Many of the incidents reported had cross-
border dimensions – among them, the Turbi massacre in July 2005, in 
which 70 people, 25 of them children, were killed by Kenyan and 
Ethiopian armed parties. 
 
CEWARN representatives readily admit that while the organisation 
has established an advanced early warning system, it has been weaker 
in terms of developing early response capacities. CEWARN’s 2007–
2011 strategy identifies this as a key challenge, and since its adoption, 
some advances have been made. In line with the bottom-up character 
of the early warning system, CEWARN also seeks to facilitate rapid 
response through empowering local-level actions without necessarily 
waiting for higher authorisation. Of particular interest for the present 
study is the proposal for cross-border CEWERUs, or regular meetings 
between the local peace committees from both sides of the border. Al-
though this may so far not have been instituted as a regular and per-
manent institution, several dialogue meetings of this kind have been 
arranged in response to specific incidents, or threats of incidents. 
CEWARN has reported various recent cases where these measures 
have succeeded in redressing grievances or averting the outbreak of 
violence. To facilitate early response, CEWARN has recently estab-
lished a Rapid Response Fund. The main objectives of the fund are to 
finance direct measures to prevent, limit or resolve conflicts, and to 
build the capacity of the peace committees at various levels. To ensure 
flexibility and avoid bureaucratic delays, funds are directly handled by 
the national CEWERUs, and decisions on the funding of smaller ac-
tivities or projects may be taken at the local level. CEWARN has also 
been involved in IGAD’s livestock activities, in particular the pro-
posal for establishing a regional livestock system for branding, identi-
fication and tracking. 
 
USAID and GTZ have been the main funders of CEWARN. For the 
Rapid Response Fund, a multi-donor basket fund has been set up, with 
contributions from Austria, Denmark, the German GTZ, Italy, Sweden 
and the UK. For the establishment of the Somali cluster, the activities 
and networks established by PACT’s PEACE II programme in the 
area appear to have been an important support base. 
 
In conclusion, CEWARN has developed an impressive early warning 
system for monitoring pastoral conflicts. An early independent review 
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(Adelman, Howard 2004, quoted in CEWARN’s 2007–2011 Strategy) 
characterised it as ‘cutting edge’ and as showing ‘greater strength than 
virtually any other early warning system existent with respect to data 
collection’. Since that time, CEWARN has managed both to extend its 
geographical coverage and to expand into the field of early response. 
Thus, the mechanism appears to be on an upward trend of continuing 
to consolidate and strengthen itself. Still, there may be structural limits 
to how far it may develop:  
 
– Firstly, while pastoral conflicts are important in the region, 
they are only one among the many types and dimensions 
present in the Horn. Given the sensitivity of other conflict 
forms to the governments that form IGAD and own 
CEWARN, it is not certain that the mechanism will be able 
to expand its scope of activity beyond localised conflicts of 
the kind exemplified by pastoralist conflicts.  
– Secondly, while the existing clusters cover important con-
flict areas, there are other areas – for instance covering the 
borders between Eritrea/Djibouti, Eritrea/Ethiopia and 
Ethiopia/Somalia – that may be too sensitive for the states 
involved to allow even the monitoring of pastoral conflicts. 
– Thirdly, while it has been possible to develop a decentral-
ised monitoring mechanism, it may prove far more difficult 
to apply the same principles to an early response mecha-
nism, as not all of the regimes in question are known for 
practices of empowering the populations of their peripher-
ies. 
 
In sum, CEWARN may face major difficulties in expanding its role to 
a) other conflict types, b) cover all border areas, or c) maintain its bot-
tom-up principles when moving into early response. 
ICPAT 
The IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) 
was launched in 2006, as a follow-up to a decision of the Heads of 
State of IGAD Member States meeting in 2002. The aims are to build 
national capacities for combating terrorism and to promote regional 
security cooperation. ICPAT is located in Addis Ababa, and the pro-
gramme is supported by the Ethiopia office of the Institute of Security 
Studies (ISS). There are five main areas of activities: 
 
a) Enhancing legal capacity: to support the member-states in devel-
oping their legal frameworks for combating terrorism, and in rati-
fying relevant international conventions. 
b) Optimising interdepartmental cooperation: to promote coopera-
tion and information-sharing among the various departments and 
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institutions involved in counter-terrorism measures within each 
country. 
c) Enhancing border control: to assess and promote ways of im-
proving border controls and cooperation and harmonisation 
among IGAD member-countries. 
d) Training, information sharing and best practices: to provide 
training for the key security and anti-terrorism institutions of the 
member-countries. 
e) Promoting strategic cooperation: to facilitate coordination with 
international bodies and avoid duplication of efforts within the 
overall field of counter-terrorism. 
 
ICPAT’s role is to serve as an institution for training and building the 
capacity of the IGAD member-states. It does not seek to build itself up 
as an additional and supranational intelligence-gathering body.  
 
In various interviews, respondents characterised ICPAT as largely do-
nor-driven, with an objective that might correspond more to donor in-
terests than to those of the IGAD countries. Dissatisfaction with the 
name was also expressed. On the other hand, it also seems clear that 
IGAD has embraced the opportunity that ICPAT represents for 
strengthening the security apparatus of the member-countries. More-
over, ICPAT is based on a wide definition of counter-terrorism, which 
in practice allows it to deal with most types of cross-border criminal-
ity. Within the new IGAD Peace and Security Strategy that is being 
developed, it has been proposed to follow this up by revamping 
ICPAT into a wider security sector programme which, in addition to 
working against all forms of terrorism (still understood in a wide 
sense), will also be dedicated to capacity-building to fight piracy, 
combat organised crime, and promote security-sector reform within 
the member-countries. 
 
ICPAT has received financial support from Canada, Denmark, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden, as well as technical sup-
port to activities from the UK. Among its activities, IGAD has also 
sought to map the overall support received by its individual member-
states for the security sector. While this has not been a simple task, the 
results so far seem to indicate that actual support received has been far 
less than what is commonly perceived to be the case. With the excep-
tion of US support, what takes place is focused more on intelligence-
sharing than actual capacity-building. The mapping also reveals a dis-
crepancy between Northern perceptions of needs and the countries’ 
own views: While donors give priority to ‘soft’ support in terms of 
training and seminars, the IGAD countries place hardware highest on 
the list. It was also mentioned that the country with the greatest need 
for building counter-terrorism capacity – Somalia – receives the least. 
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Again, we have had no direct means of assessing the quality of 
ICPAT’s work, apart from the fact that several donor representatives 
spoke of the programme in positive terms.  
 
To some extent, ICPAT can be seen in contrast to CEWARN, as a 
more top-down mechanism, working on strengthening the main secu-
rity institutions of the states. Its focus on borders is also much more on 
establishing effective control over the borderlines themselves. How-
ever, these are not absolute contrasts. To address the issues of the long 
and unsupervised border stretches of the region, ICPAT is also inves-
tigating possibilities for community border policing. The approach can 
therefore not be characterised as uniformly top-down. It is not easy to 
assess the extent to which the different strategies of CEWARN and 
ICPAT complement each other, or whether there are also contradic-
tions. However, it does seem evident is that there is an unfulfilled po-
tential for coordination between these two IGAD efforts.  
 
Moreover, the general work of the IGAD secretariat on issues of mi-
gration (see below) ought also to be linked to ICPAT’s efforts at 
strengthening border control. The fact that the International Organisa-
tion for Migration (IOM) is involved as a partner in both processes 
would seem to be of potential assistance for this. In practice, however, 
there has been little cooperation. In the IGAD secretariat, it was ex-
pressed that ICPAT dealt more with border issues from a security per-
spective, as if this were something totally de-linked from the secre-
tariat’s work in formalising cross-border migration within the region. 
IGAD’s new Peace and Security Strategy  
IGAD is currently in the process of developing a new Peace and Secu-
rity Strategy. This is a comprehensive process that started with inputs 
from commissioned experts, and was integrated into a proposed strat-
egy that has been undergoing successive rounds of discussion and re-
vision. While it was hoped that the strategy would be approved in 
2009, that now appears highly uncertain. Since the strategy is still be-
ing debated, it is of course premature to state with any certainty what 
will be its contents. Nevertheless, the information we have received 
gives some indications as to the overall orientation of the strategy. As 
far as we have understood, the following two points are likely to be 
included in the strategy: 
 
1. Pre-studies for the strategy have documented the very limited 
and rudimentary interconnections existing among the IGAD 
countries, and the significant potential for expanding coopera-
tion and integration in areas like trade, joint infrastructure and 
collaborative management of transborder resources (e.g. water, 
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energy, ports, telecommunications). The limited interconnec-
tions are pointed out as one reason why the region has not 
managed to reduce the level of conflicts. Using IGAD as a 
platform for strategically developing cooperation in the areas 
signalled forms the basis of and fundamental orientation of the 
strategy. It thus lifts the peace and security focus into a broader 
programme for regional integration. 
2. Within the more specific and traditional security focus, the 
strategy likewise aims at revamping ICPAT into a broader se-
curity sector programme. In addition to its focus on anti-terror 
measures, the new programme would also work on anti-piracy 
activities, fighting organised crime, and aiding its member-
countries in general security sector reform. As before, the fo-
cus will be on capacity-building among member-countries, 
rather than seeking to build up a regional operational institu-
tion.  
 
If the new strategy does indeed follow these lines, that will mean that 
IGAD broadens its peace and security work, from specific interven-
tions to a more comprehensive attempt at addressing some of the un-
derlying causes of the pervasive conflicts in the region. 
Other IGAD programmes of relevance 
Gender and conflict 
IGAD has its own gender desk, which focuses primarily on issues of 
gender and conflict. The most important programmes carried out have 
been the training of women in peace processes in Sudan 2004–2006 
and in Somalia. The desk has also given gender mainstreaming train-
ings with CEWARN with country-level CEWERU structures. How-
ever, since the position remained unfilled for 18 months, up to March 
2009, programmes and funding have been interrupted and momentum 
not yet regained. An IGAD Women Parliamentarians Conference will 
be held in late 2009 with funding from Denmark.  
 
While the current level of activity is not overwhelming, the existence 
of the desk and the willingness of the Gender Affairs coordinator to 
engage in the field do imply opportunities for donors interested in 
promoting activities within the field of gender and conflict. 
 
Migration 
Within its social affairs section, IGAD works to implement the overall 
AU policies with respect to migration. In cooperation with IOM and 
the individual IGAD countries, the secretariat has worked develop a 
common framework and a protocol for free movement for promoting 
economic integration. Human trafficking, forced migration (including 
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refugees as well as IDPs) and border issues are among the issues that 
have been in focus. However, the process is currently stalled, due to a 
funding gap. 
 
As mentioned above, this activity has been carried out without any 
coordination with ICPAT, apparently without any awareness that such 
coordination might be useful. 
 
Health 
IGAD’s health programme focuses on health in border areas and on 
cross-border and mobile populations. Aims include the development 
of joint research, common strategies for these areas, a regional health 
information system, optimising health services in these areas, coordi-
nating international services such as vaccination campaigns, and pro-
moting peace-building health activities (‘health as a bridge to peace’). 
Under these headings, IGAD is implementing a major programme 
funded by the World Bank’s Africa Catalytic Growth Fund, targeting 
HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria and reproductive health. The programme is 
being carried out in cooperation with the ministries of health in the 
respective countries. 
 
Economic and infrastructural integration 
There have been various activities under these headings. Recently, in 
connection with the 2008 IGAD decision to intensify efforts for eco-
nomic integration and develop a ‘minimum integration plan’ aimed at 
establishing an IGAD Free Trade Area, such efforts have gained new 
momentum. (The position with responsibility for economic integration 
within the IGAD secretariat had remained vacant for two and a half 
years – indicating that, until the 2008 decision to revitalise economic 
integration, this had not been a priority area.) Beyond the many forms 
of cooperation, harmonisation and integration implied in the FTA am-
bition, there have also been several other efforts aimed at developing 
closer contacts among the IGAD countries: joint infrastructural pro-
grammes (in transport and energy) where IGAD has assumed a key 
role as broker vis-à-vis donors; efforts at promoting private-sector 
contacts and cooperation among member-states; attempts at stimulat-
ing joint promotion of regional tourism; and work to harmonise and 
liberalise ICT regulations. 
 
The point here is not to indicate that IGAD has come very far along 
these dimensions, but that, to the extent that such efforts are success-
ful, they may generate interdependencies among the countries in-
volved. Creating and deepening such interdependencies are proposed 
to be the key elements of the new Peace and Security strategy. Thus, 
these efforts are relevant for the field of Peace and Security, even if 
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economic integration in IGAD can at best be characterised as emer-
gent. 
 
Other initiatives 
Also other IGAD initiatives may serve to further promote integration 
and defuse potential conflicts. These include programmes and propos-
als for environmental cooperation (for instance, on managing trans-
border water resources) and the IGAD Livestock Initiative, which 
aims at developing improved knowledge-based policies for pro-poor 
livestock policies for the region. Because of time constraints, how-
ever, we have not been able to gauge what advances have been made 
in these fields. 
The role of donors 
This section does not seek to give any overview of all donors and their 
roles. The aim is much more modest: To highlight a few central points 
about the relations between IGAD and its donors. 
 
IGAD is extremely dependent on donor funding. While the IGAD 
countries (or some of them) have recently been showing greater com-
mitment to paying their IGAD contributions, these payments still ac-
count for only a small portion of the overall budgets. 
 
The largest donor by far is the European Commission, and continued 
increases are foreseen in the scope of its cooperation with IGAD. Its 
support for IGAD is framed within its Horn of Africa Initiative, 
launched by Commissioner Louis Michel in 2006. Observers have 
pointed out that the EC as a donor has been generally known for tak-
ing a regional perspective, and this is very much the foundation of the 
Horn of Africa Initiative. It seeks to address instability in the region 
by working together with IGAD in three main areas: peace, security 
and governance; pastoralism and food security; and institutional de-
velopment. The strategy also contemplates support for AU capacity in 
conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping; regional economic 
integration in coordination with EAC and COMESA; and supporting 
African efforts to monitor and improve governance. The initiative is 
important for funding IGAD’s Peace and Security initiatives as well as 
for regional economic integration and the development of joint infra-
structural projects.  
 
An important venue for interaction between donors and IGAD has 
been the International Partners Forum (IPF). However, it has now lost 
some of its value, as meetings at the political level are no longer ar-
ranged, although there are still meetings at technical and ambassado-
rial levels. Several observers attributed this state of affairs to Italy’s 
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refusal to cede its chairmanship of the Forum, a post originally in-
tended to be rotated among countries. 
 
Several IGAD representatives noted that donors had clear preferences 
as to the kind of IGAD activities they wished to support. They 
claimed that it was much easier to get funding for security-oriented 
programmes such as CEWARN and ICPAT. (Environmental and food 
security issues were also mentioned as corresponding to donor percep-
tions of suitable IGAD activities, and were consequently more likely 
to be funded.) Conversely, it was seen as more difficult to get funding 
for programmes for social protection, health, and economic integra-
tion. Indirectly, this contributed to a donor-steered shaping of IGAD’s 
profile, respondents claimed. 
Conclusion: IGAD potentials and limitations 
Several characteristics of the IGAD region have contributed to the dif-
ficulties of establishing a well-functioning regional security system.  
 
Despite the significant variations among them, all IGAD members 
must be counted as weak states. Weakness may be measured among 
various dimensions, but in the present connection a key issue is the 
fact that armed insurgencies and/or violent political oppositional ac-
tivities are found in all countries (with the partial exception of Dji-
bouti today, although it is not so long since also this country experi-
enced armed insurgency). These states are all unable to maintain a 
central monopoly of violence, and are thus ‘failing states’ to a certain 
extent (at least according to some definitions of the term).  
 
Another – and related – dimension is the failure of IGAD’s members 
to fully integrate all groups into the nation and the state. Large groups 
of the population remain marginalised and alienated. Depending on 
the country, such exclusion may be perceived as due to matters of eth-
nicity, religion, clan, race, geography or pastoralist/sedentary opposi-
tions – but the underlying issue in all cases is the fact that the state and 
the benefits it is able to bring have been captured or dominated by cer-
tain groups or elites. In particular, it is the groups living in the periph-
eral borderlands that have been excluded in this way.  
 
The borders of the region form an issue in their own right. They are 
long, generally not demarcated, sometimes contested, and the states’ 
capacity to monitor and control flows across them are extremely lim-
ited. (For example, the 860 km border between Ethiopia and Kenya 
reportedly has only one border post.) Furthermore, these areas are 
largely inhabited by ethnic groups which are divided by the borders, 
are nomadic and have traditionally moved back and forth across the 
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borders (and continue to do so), and are not strongly integrated into 
the states or concerned with issues of citizenship. 
 
A corollary to the types of state weaknesses described above is the 
proliferation of armed non-state actors that are a key feature of the 
complex regional conflict pattern. These may be insurgencies fighting 
their state, but they may just as likely be in conflict with other local 
groups (or both). Local resource-based violent conflicts are a perva-
sive feature throughout much of Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, 
and are far from unknown in the other IGAD countries. And while 
these may often appear to be simply local conflicts between small 
groups, closer examination of the conflict dynamics will usually re-
veal that the state and its policies have played an important part in the 
trajectory leading to the outbreak of conflict. Furthermore, the non-
state actors engage in complex patterns of alliances and oppositions 
with states of the region – the ‘home’ state as well as the neighbouring 
one(s). Proxy wars and support to insurgents fighting against the 
neighbouring regime has been a staple of the region, practised by the 
most of these states. The result is that conflicts become entangled into 
complex regional conflict patterns with a large set of actors and often 
surprising and shifting alliances, with the IGAD states often as parties 
and on opposing sides. 
 
This means that in many cases of conflict, the IGAD countries may 
have opposing interests. Such conflicting interests may arise out of the 
actual alliances that states have established with non-state actors of the 
region, but they may also stem from the states’ different ideological 
foundations and principles for integrating groups and creating a na-
tion. Somalia’s ethnic-based nationalism; the Eritrean emphasis on 
national unity based on colonial history and anti-colonial struggle, to 
the exclusion of all forms of ethnic or religious mobilisation; Suda-
nese attempts at making Islam the foundation of the state; and Ethio-
pia’s ethnic federalism – are all highly contrasting ways of building 
the nation and integrating the different population groups that make up 
the state. Such fundamental differences easily lead to different views 
of particular conflicts, with correspondingly different views on how 
they should be settled.  
 
The contradictory principles upon which these states are founded may 
also entail obstacles to IGAD’s attempts to promote economic integra-
tion, facilitate migration and population movement, or harmonise leg-
islation within the regional organisation. Obviously, the war between 
Eritrea and Ethiopia, with the current suspended status of Eritrea’s 
IGAD membership, can stand as the extreme example of opposing in-
terests among IGAD member-states, with a potential for disrupting the 
integrative functions of this regional organisation. 
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As documented in the preparatory work to the IGAD Peace and Secu-
rity strategy, interdependencies among the IGAD countries are weak, 
although there may exist considerable potentials for developing them. 
Given these difficulties of weak states with sometimes opposing inter-
ests in the complex regional web of regional conflicts, it might per-
haps be concluded that the Eritrean exit strategy could seem an attrac-
tive strategy also for other countries. In fact, however, with the em-
phasis on regionalism and integration within AU and beyond, this 
does not seem likely. Rather, the complexities may mean that integra-
tion is challenging, that the pace must necessarily be slow, and that 
there are limits to how far we should expect it to be developed.  
 
In the specific field of greater regional security, there are likewise lim-
its to what should be expected of IGAD. While the organisation can 
count the CPA as a significant achievement in the difficult field of 
peace mediation, it does not seem likely that IGAD will be able to re-
peat this success in many other conflicts. Given the entanglement of 
its member-states in the conflicts of neighbouring countries, IGAD 
will generally be unsuited to act as broker. As seen in the case of So-
malia, peace deals become tainted due to suspicions of undue influ-
ence – in this instance, by Ethiopia, which was perceived as seeking 
primarily to protect its own security interests. As a reflection of this 
difficulty in sustaining a neutral position acceptable to all parties, the 
failure of IGAD to assume any leading role with respect to the con-
flicts in Northern Uganda, Darfur or the Ethio–Eritrean war is notable 
indeed.  
 
CEWARN is a success story as far as it goes – dealing with pastoralist 
conflicts in defined areas. It has been able to achieve this success be-
cause it has concentrated on issues and areas that do not threaten the 
states as such. Indeed, the opposite is more the case: the mapping and 
monitoring of conflicts between local groups is very much in the in-
terest of the states, which have been struggling to establish instru-
ments of governance and control in these areas. Efforts to expand the 
scope of CEWARN to cover conflict types where the IGAD states are 
parties – whether directly or as sponsors of non-state actors – will 
probably be resisted, and have limited chances of succeeding. Given 
the pervasiveness of state entanglements in the region’s web of con-
flicts, CEWARN will then be useful in connection with only a limited 
part of the regional conflict formation.  
 
ICPAT can be similarly understood as functioning since it serves the 
interests of the member-states or regimes. They are all interested in 
strengthening their security sectors. ICPAT may even succeed in 
strengthening border control – even though the character of the re-
gion’s borders will ensure that any control established will have lim-
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ited scope. However, it does not seem likely that the security-oriented 
ICPAT programme will be able to lead to increased integration and 
inclusion of marginalised groups into the state. In other words, ICPAT 
would not appear to have great potential for addressing the underlying 
drivers of conflict.  
 
Thus, the conclusion seems to be that while the directly peace- and 
security-oriented activities of IGAD are positive in themselves, they 
lack the potential to significantly alter the underlying causes of con-
flict or lead to general stabilisation of the region. This seems to cor-
roborate the conclusions of the Peace and Security Strategy: any du-
rable peace will have to be built on the creation of strong interdepend-
encies among the states, and on development efforts that reach out to 
the marginalised populations of the Horn of Africa. 
 
On this background, and if the observation is correct that donors have 
primarily preferred to support IGAD’s security-oriented programmes, 
then this appears to be a mistaken and short-sighted strategy. Support 
for cross-border infrastructure and the common utilisation of resources 
among countries would seem at least equally important, as would sup-
port for the overall economic integration process. However, the doubts 
raised by some respondents as to how serious the countries really are 
about economic integration (and the necessary liberalisation that this 
will entail), and to the overall feasibility of the integration plan, indi-
cate that there may be serious limitations to this strategy as well. 
 
A final observation is that a weakness of IGAD is the lack of integra-
tion among its institutions. CEWARN and ICPAT work in comple-
mentary ways, but with expending much energy on coordination. 
ICPAT and the IGAD secretariat both work on developing regional 
policies on migration and border control, but from different perspec-
tives and without cooperation. Satellite and liaison offices and envoys 
are established, but how their work is integrated with that of the or-
ganisation as a whole is unclear. Peace process secretariats are estab-
lished and develop identities separate from and in contrast to IGAD 
headquarters.  
 
There may be many reasons why IGAD has developed in such a de-
centralised and seemingly uncoordinated way. One important explana-
tion is undoubtedly the central role of donor funding in all IGAD ac-
tivities. Such a situation, with such a wide range of donors to boot, 
readily leads to a situation where activities are initiated not on the ba-
sis of an overall strategic plan, but reflect more the interests and pri-
orities of the various donors. This may create a lack of coherence in 
itself. Furthermore, donor wishes as to funding specific programmes 
or targeted activities may lead to a lack of funding for precisely the 
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overarching processes that could have ensured better coordination 
among the many different programmes under the IGAD umbrella. 
 
 
